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DRAFT OF APRIL 2, 2018 
 
WHAT CAUSED THE 2016 CHICAGO HOMICIDE SPIKE?   
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE “ACLU EFFECT” AND 
THE ROLE OF STOP AND FRISKS IN PREVENTING GUN 
VIOLENCE 
 




 Homicides increased dramatically in Chicago in 2016.  In 2015, 480 
Chicago residents were killed. The next year, 754 were killed–274 more homicide 
victims, tragically producing an extraordinary 58% increase in a single year.  This 
article attempts to unravel what happened. 
 
 This article provides empirical evidence that the reduction in stop and frisks 
by the Chicago Police Department beginning around December 2015 was 
responsible for the homicide spike that started immediately thereafter.  The sharp 
decline in the number of stop and frisks is a strong candidate for the causal factor, 
particularly since the timing of the homicide spike so perfectly coincides with the 
decline.  Regression analysis of the homicide spike and related shooting crimes 
identifies the stop and frisk variable as the likely cause.  The results are highly 
statistically significant and robust over a large number of alternative 
specifications.  And a qualitative review for possible “omitted variables” in the 
regression equations fails to identify any other plausible candidates that fits the 
data as well as the decline in stop and frisks. 
 
 Our regression equations permit quantification of the costs of the decline in 
stop and frisks.  Because of fewer stop and frisks in 2016, it appears that 
(conservatively calculating) approximately 236 additional victims were killed and 
1115 additional shootings occurred in that year alone.  And these tremendous 
costs are not evenly distributed, but rather are concentrated among Chicago’s 
African-American and Hispanic communities.   
 
 The most likely explanation for the fall in stop and frisks that appears to 
have triggered the homicide spike is a consent decree entered into by the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) with the Chicago Police Department (CPD).  
Accordingly, modifications to that consent decree may be appropriate. 
 
 More broadly, these findings shed important light on the on-going national 
debate about stop and frisk policies.  The fact that America’s “Second City” 




contrary experience in New York City may be an anomaly.   The costs of crime—
and particularly gun crimes—are too significant to avoid considering every 
possible measure for reducing the toll.  The evidence gathered here suggests that 
stop and frisk policies may be truly lifesaving measures that have to be considered 
as part of any effective law enforcement response to gun violence.   
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 1 
WHAT CAUSED THE 2016 CHICAGO HOMICIDE SPIKE?   
AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE “ACLU EFFECT” AND THE ROLE 
OF STOP AND FRISKS IN PREVENTING GUN VIOLENCE 
  
Paul G. Cassell∗ & Richard Fowles∗∗ 
 
 “So by January 2016, the city was on fire.  . . . Cops had to worry about the 
ACLU deal.  And many of them became scared and demoralized. . . . So cops 
stopped making stops.  And kids started shooting more – because they could, and 
because the rule of law, law enforcement, had been delegitimized.  And that 
created an atmosphere of chaos.” 
     —Letter from Chicago U.S. Attorney Zachary Fardon, upon his resignation in 
March 2017.1   
 
     “We reject any suggestion of a so-called ‘ACLU effect’ to explain the recent 
spike in gun violence on Chicago's streets. There is no discernible link between the 
rate of invasive street stops and searches by police and the level of violence. . . . 
There simply is not any evidence of this so-called ‘effect.’” 
     —Public letter from the Illinois ACLU on February 1, 2016 regarding the 
Chicago homicide spike.2 
 
    “As they were babies, coming up, I had to tell them ‘when you hear shots, you 
gotta get down.’” 
 
∗ Ronald N. Boyce Presidential Professor of Criminal Law and University Distinguished 
Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah. 
∗∗ Professor, Economics Department, University of Utah.  
 The authors thank Chuck Abernathy, Shima Baradaran Baughman, Patricia Cassell, 
Griffin Edwards, Jonah Gelbach, Erika George, Michael Maltz, Josh Marquis, Ed Mogul, 
Lawrence Rosenthal, Stephen Rushin, Wesley Skogan, Matt Tokson, and the participants 
in a colloquium at the S.J. Quinney College of Law for helpful comments, and also 
Maryann Dennis, Chaunceton Bird, Valeri Craigle, Felicity Murphy, and Susan Snyder for 
excellent research assistance.  The authors remain solely responsible for any errors. 
 Although this Article was a collaborative effort, Cassell had initial responsibility for 
data collection and legal analysis, and Fowles had initial responsibility for statistical 
analysis.  We appreciate financial support provided by the Albert and Elaine Borchard 
Fund for Faculty Excellence. We thank the Chicago Police Department, which helped us 
gather data for this article.  We also thank the University of Chicago Crime Lab, which 
released an informative report on gun violence in Chicago, which we used as one source of 
data for our analysis.   
1 Open Letter from Former U.S. Attorney Zachary Fardon, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 16, 2017, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-open-letter-zachary-fardon-
20170313-htmlstory.html [hereinafter Fardon Resignation Letter].   






     —Chicago resident Stepanie Armas, explaining what she taught her kids from a 




Homicides increased dramatically in Chicago in 2016.  In 2015, 480 Chicago 
residents were killed. The next year, 754 were killed—274 more homicide victims, 
tragically producing an extraordinary 58% increase in a single year.  This article 
attempts to unravel what happened. 
 
We are not the first to analyze this important question, as others have 
observed this startling year-to-year change in homicides.  However, a surprising 
lack of empirical effort has been devoted to exploring the causal factor or factors.  
This issue is, to put it bluntly, of life or death importance.  Against a frightening 
backdrop of an annual baseline of about 500 homicides in Chicago each year, 
something in 2016 led to the death of more than 250 additional victims.  What was 
it? 
 
Several different factors have been proposed as the cause of the homicide 
spike.  Some have argued that a so-called “ACLU effect”—a decline in law 
enforcement effectiveness due to a consent decree that the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) signed with the Chicago Police Department (CPD) 
shortly before the start of 2016 —was responsible.  Others have pointed to the 
release of a video showing the police fatally shooting 17-year-old Laquan 
McDonald in the back as the pivot point.  Still others have suggested a change in 
gang dynamics in the city.  And a variety of other factors might well have been in 
play. 
 
While the two of us have differing points of view on various subjects, we 
both share a commitment to empirically-based assessment of such questions—an 
empirical bent that has led us to team up in the past.4  In this paper, we bring 
empirical research tools to bear in an attempt to identify what changed in Chicago 
between 2015 and 2016.  While such analysis may be unable to provide definitive 
answers, it can suggest which factors are more likely than others.  Given that, quite 
literally, more than two hundred additional victims died in 2016 in some of 
Chicago’s most impoverished neighborhoods—and more might similarly be killed 
in the future in Chicago and elsewhere—finding answers must be regarded as a 
high priority. 
 
3 Amanda Wills, Sergio Hernandez, & Marlena Baldacci, 762 Murders. 12 Months. 1 
American City, CNN, Jan. 2, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/02/us/chicago-murder-
rate-2016-visual-guide/index.html 
4 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year 
Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 





Our analysis proceeds in several steps.  Part II describes in general terms what 
is quite accurately called a “spike” in homicides in Chicago in 2016.  A 58% year-
to-year change in America’s “Second City” is staggering, suggesting something 
changed dramatically to initiate the increase. 
 
Part III attempts to pinpoint the time when things changed in Chicago—what 
might be called the “inflection” or “break” point in the data series.  We begin by 
seasonally adjusting Chicago homicide and shooting data, which show significant 
seasonal fluctuation from cold weather months to warm weather months.  Once the 
data are seasonally adjusted, a change or “break” in the data series can be 
statistically detected around November 2015.    
 
Part IV explores the possibility that, as some have alleged, a reduction in stop 
and frisks by the Chicago Police Department that commenced at the very end of 
2015 was responsible for the homicide spike starting immediately thereafter.  
Goods reasons exist for believing that the decline in stop and frisks caused the 
spike.  Regression analysis of the homicide spike strongly supports this conclusion, 
as the steep decline in stop and frisks is strongly linked, at extremely high levels of 
statistical significance, to the sharp increase in homicides (and other shooting 
crimes) in 2016.  We also explain why the possibly contrary experience with 
reductions in stop and frisks in New York City may be exceptional and 
inapplicable to Chicago and other cities.   
 
Part V qualitatively searches for other possible factors that might be 
responsible for the Chicago homicide spike.  For various reasons, none of these 
other candidates fit the data as well as the decline in stop and frisks. 
 
Part VI looks at issues surrounding specification of our regression equations.  
Bayesian Model Averaging (“BMA”) provide strong statistical evidence that our 
findings are robust in the sense that they are not due to inclusion or exclusion of 
any particular variables. 
 
Part VII provides quantification of the costs of the decline in stop and frisks, 
both in human and financial terms.  We conclude that, because of fewer stop and 
frisks in 2016, a conservative estimate is that approximately 236 additional 
homicides and 1115 additional shootings occurred that year.  A reasonable 
estimate of the social costs associated with these additional homicides and 
shootings is about $1,500,000,000.  And these costs are concentrated in Chicago’s 
African-American and Hispanic communities.   
 
Part VIII explains why the ACLU settlement agreement with the Chicago 





Part IX offers some tentative suggestions for how policy-makers might 
reassess the importance and benefits of stop and frisk practices on the streets of 
Chicago and other cities across the country.   
 
In a concluding section, we situate our findings within a larger body of 
developing empirical literature supporting the conclusion that restrictions on law 
enforcement investigations has real-world consequences by reducing police 
effectiveness.  Sadly, Chicago’s 2016 homicide spike may be a reflection of the 
tragic consequences that follow when that linkage is ignored.   
 
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE 2016 CHICAGO HOMICIDE SPIKE 
 
 2016 was a news-making year for Chicago. The city, however, was not 
receiving accolades but rather garnering unwanted attention for a nearly 
unprecedented spike in homicides—a “crushing wave of violence.”5 More than 
750 people were killed in Chicago in 2016, the highest number of homicides the 
city experienced in nearly 20 years.6 In fact, in the previous nine years, Chicago’s 
yearly homicides were between 400 and 500.7  A look at the previous decade will 
help reveal the staggering increase in Chicago’s 2016 homicide number.  
Beginning in 2001, when 667 people were murdered in Chicago, the annual totals 
generally declined overall through 2015.  Then, suddenly in 2016, the number of 
homicides increased  by more than 50%, “the largest single-year homicide increase 
of the last 25 years among the five most populous United States cities.”8  Figure 1 
depicts Chicago’s annual homicides for the last ten years.  
  
 
5 The Chicago Lessons That Chicago Has to Relearn, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 25, 2016, at 22 
2016 WLNR 29152627.  
6 Azadeh Ansari & Rosa Flores, Chicago’s 762 Homicides in 2016 is Highest in 19 Years, 
CNN (Jan. 2, 2017 22:20 GMT), http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/01/us/chicago-murders-
2016/index.html. 
7 Ray Sanchez & Jason Hanna, Chicago Police Tout 14% Homicide Drop, and Concede 
There’s More To Do, CNN, Dec. 1, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/01/us/chicago-
homicide-shooting-statistics/index.html. 





Annual Chicago Homicides (2007-2016)
 
 
  Such a stark surge did not go unnoticed.  Before the year was half over, 
Chicago’s increasing homicide rate was making national headlines.9 It was even a 
point of discussion for Donald Trump during the first presidential debate in 
September 2016, when then-candidate Trump described Chicago as a “war-torn 
country.”10 In January 2017, the television program 60 Minutes aired “Crisis in 
Chicago,” in which the correspondent recounted, “In the six days we were in 
Chicago, 55 people were shot, 16 were killed. We were struck by just how routine 
it all felt. The dead and wounded were removed with grim efficiency—right down 
to the hazmat crews that cleaned away the blood. Murder seemed almost 
normal.”11 
 
 The violence that tore through the city (particularly in neighborhoods on the 
south and west sides of town) took many victims and left behind broken families 
 
9 See, e.g., Ford Fessenden & Haeyoun Park, Chicago’s Murder Problem, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 27, 2016 (noting that by mid-May 2016, homicides increased by 62% and shootings 
were up by 60%), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/05/18/us/chicago-murder-
problem.html?_r=1. 
10 Aaron Blake, The First Trump-Clinton Presidential Debate Transcript, Annotated, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2016/09/26/the-first-trump-clinton-presidential-debate-transcript-
annotated/?utm_term=.f44340584aa1. 





and communities. As one Chicagoan noted, “Once we leave the house, what do we 
do? It could be me or one of my daughters.”12 Another resident, when asked what 
it was like to live in his neighborhood said, “I’ve seen five young men lose their 
lives on this block. . . . You don’t know what it’s like to be numb.”13 An 8-year-old 
girl was shot in the arm during a vigil for a 14-year-old. She was “the 30th child 
aged 13 or younger shot in Chicago” as of August 2016.14  On the last day of that 
bloody year, hundreds of Chicagoans marched down Michigan Avenue (Chicago’s 
so-called “Magnificent Mile”), carrying more than 750 crosses—each numbered to 





Marchers in Chicago carry crosses bearing the names of the victims of Chicago’s gun violence, 
December 31, 2016.  Source: Chicago Tribune (copyright permission pending). 
 
 
12 Jeremy Gorner, 700 Homicides—With a Month To Go Chicago Killings Increase 56% 
Over 2015, Reaching Levels Not Seen in Two Decades, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 3, 2016 at 1, 2016 
WLNR 36891574. 
13 Annie Sweeney, ONE GUN’S JOURNEY 42 Bullets Fired, 2 People Killed, 5 Wounded: 
A Stolen Glock Turned Into a ‘Gang Gun’ Over a Violent Year, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 9, 2016, at 
1, 2016 WLNR 30931543. 
14 Elvia Malagon, Alexandra Chachkevitch, & Peter Nickeas, Amid Vigil’s Grief, Girl is 
Shot “I was Hollering for my Mommy,” 8-year-old Hit in Arm Says, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 23, 
2016, at 1, 2016 WLNR 25684469. 
15 Marwa Eltagouri, Crosses Witness to Those Killed in 2016, CHI TRIB., Jan. 1, 2017, at 




 The victims of the shootings did not mirror Chicago’s population.  To the 
contrary, the vast majority of the victims were racial minorities.16  Of the 2016 
victims, 78% were African-American, 16% were Hispanic, and 5% were white.17   
 
III.  THE DIMENSIONS AND TIMING OF THE HOMICIDE SPIKE 
                      
 Having set out some of the background about Chicago’s 2016 homicide 
spike, in this section we undertake a quantitative exploration of the data to see if 
we can learn anything more about the spike.  We begin by explaining our data 
sources and why it is necessary to adjust them for seasonal fluctuations when 
making this inquiry.  We then try to identify whether a structural change exists in 
each of the series and, if so, when that change occurred.   
 
A.  Data Sets of Interest 
 
Our interest is in Chicago’s homicide spike, so naturally our first data set is 
the number of homicides in Chicago.   Data on the subject were graciously 
provided to us by the Chicago Police Department.  That data came in monthly 
form, as shown from 2012 to 2016 in Figure 2. 
  
 
16 See Dahleen Glanton, With 500 Homicides in Chicago, Time for African-Americans to 
Get Tough on Crime, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 7, 2016, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/ct-violence-african-americans-glanton-
20160907-column.html (discussing disproportionate number of African-American victims, 
as well as perpetrators, in Chicago in 2016).   
17 See UNIV. OF CHI. CRIME LAB, GUN VIOLENCE IN CHICAGO, 2016 at 13 (2017) 
[hereinafter CHICAGO CRIME LAB].  Cf. Lawrence Rosenthal, Good and Bad Ways to 
Address Police Violence, 48 URBAN LAWYER 675, 701 (2016) (reporting homicide 
victimization rate for blacks in the U.S. is about six times higher than for whites).  To avoid 
overlooking the human element in our research, we have tried to focus on the victims in 
our research.  A listing of the names of all homicide victims in Chicago in 2016 is found in 









Source: Chicago Police Department 
 
 In addition to collecting homicide data, the Chicago Police Department also 
collects several other closely-related data sets.  Most of Chicago’s homicides are 
committed by firearms,18 so it is interesting and helpful to look at shooting data.  
The Chicago Police Department made available to us data for fatal shootings and 
non-fatal shootings.  Naturally, these two categories can be summed to produce a 
third category of total shootings.   
 
 
18 See id. at 9 (concluding that 90% of Chicago homicides in 2016 involved a firearm).  
Nationally for 2016, about 73% of murders involved firearms.  FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2016, tbl.4 
(2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/topic-pages/murder 




 Each of these three data sets shows a generally similar pattern to that 
exhibited by the homicide data set.  For example, the figures for non-fatal 
shootings in Chicago during the same time period (2012 through 2016) reveal a 
sharp increase in 2016, as shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 





While our main interest is the homicide data, also exploring the shooting data 
makes considerable sense. A close connection exists between shootings and 
homicides, because (at least in some cases) a homicide can be described as a 
shooting for which medical care did not arrive sufficiently quickly.19  In this 
article, we analyze monthly data from 2012 through 2016 for these four Chicago 
 
19 See Anthony R Harris et al., Murder and Medicine: The Lethality of Criminal Assault 
1960–1999, 6 HOMICIDE STUD. 128 (2002) (discussing connection between serious assaults 




data series: (1) homicides; (2) fatal shootings; (3) non-fatal shootings; and (4) total 
shootings, which are simply the sum of the previous two categories.     
 
Before diving into an analysis of these data, a brief word about their accuracy 
may be useful.  Generally speaking, homicide data are well known for being 
among the most reliable of crime data, because homicides attract attention and 
police data on homicides are generally consistent with other sources of information 
(such as public health reports).20  However, there have been some recent 
suggestions that the Chicago Police Department has manipulated its crime data to 
make things appear rosier than they really were—including manipulation 
classifications of a handful of homicides.21  Our interest here is not in sorting out 
classifications for a few disputed homicides, but rather trends lines that move from 
month to month.  Against that backdrop, reclassification of a few homicides here 
or there would not be likely to affect any of the issues we discuss in this article.   
Moreover, we have available to us a second data set—fatal shootings—which 
would be much more difficult to manipulate than the “homicide” data, which 
requires some degree of assessment as to the cause of death.  We compared the 
trends in fatal shootings and homicides and could find no significant differences 
between them.  Our data are clearly accurate enough for our purposes. 
 
It may also be relevant to note that in 2014 the Office of Inspector General for 
the City of Chicago conducted an audit of some of CPD’s crime statistics for 
assault.22  CPD acknowledged some mistakes and submitted revised totals to the 
FBI for 2012.23  Our analysis does not involve assault data, but if it did, the audit 
and subsequent corrections might provide an additional suggestion of accuracy.     
 
We analyzed monthly data on these times series from 2012 to 2016.  A 
starting point of 2012 was selected because that would provide several years of 
baseline data before the increase began.  We selected 2016 as an ending point 
because, when we began our research collaboration (in spring 2017), that was the 
 
20 See JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERNNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 34 
(1985). 
21 David Bernstein & Noah Isackson, The Truth About Chicago’s Crime Rates, CHI. MAG., 
Apr. 7, 2014, http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/May-2014/Chicago-crime-
rates/; see also David Bernstein & Noah Isackson, The Truth About Chicago’s Crime 
Rates: Part 2, CHI. MAG., May 19, 2014, http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-
Magazine/June-2014/Chicago-crime-statistics; David Bernstein & Noah Isackson, New 
Tricks, CHI. MAG., May 11, 2015, http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/June-
2015/Chicago-crime-stats/.   
22 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE CITY OF CHICAGO, REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF 
INSPECTOR GENERAL: CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT ASSAULT-RELATED CRIME 
STATISTICS CLASSIFICATION AND REPORTING AUDIT (2014), 
http://chicagoinspectorgeneral.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/OIG-Crime-Stats-
Audit.pdf.   




last complete year for which data was available.  While a full year of 2017 data has 
since become available, additional changes have occurred in Chicago policing that 
would complicate discussions, as discussed at greater length below,24 and we do 
not have access to a full year of 2017 data for other data sets of interest.   
 
B.  Seasonal Adjustment of Homicide and Shooting Data  
 
As is readily apparent from Figures 2 and 3 above, homicides and shootings 
in Chicago fluctuate significantly throughout each year.  A standard explanation 
for these variations is that crime data exhibit “seasonality,” with more crimes 
committed in the warmer months than in the colder months.  Good empirical 
support exists for the standard explanation,25 particularly given that some studies 
find that crime seasonality is stronger in cities with colder climate26 (a group which 
would include Chicago).  The connection between crime and weather, however, is 
not always validated in empirical studies.27  For instance, a  recent analysis of 
Chicago crime data by the Chicago Tribune concluded that while frequency for 
some crimes increased with temperature, homicides did not.28   
 
 
24 See infra notes 239-52 and accompanying text.   
25 See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson, Heat and Violence, CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 33 (2001) (concluding hot temperatures increase violence directly by increasing 
feelings of hostility); Gerhard J. Falk, The Influence of the Seasons on the Crime Rate, 43 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 199, 212 (1952) (violent crimes consistently reach the maximum 
frequency in the summer, but criminal homicides can be higher in December than in June 
and August); Brian Jacobs et al., The Dynamics of Criminal Behavior: Evidence from 
Weather Shocks, 42 J. HUM. RESOURCES 489 (2007) (finding that weather, and particularly 
temperature, is strongly correlated with violent crime); Shannon J. Linning et al., Crime 
Seasonality: Examining the Temporal Fluctuations of Property Crime in Cities with 
Varying Climates, 61 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 1866 (2017);  
see also Andrew W. Lehren & Al Baker, In New York, Number of Killings Rises with Heat, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2009 (qualitatively concluding that more homicides occur in New 
York during the summer), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/19/nyregion/19murder.html.  
26 See, e.g., J.R. Hipp et al., Crimes of Opportunity or Crimes of Emotion? Testing Two 
Explanations of Seasonal Change in Crime, 82 SOC. FORCES 13333 (2004); Linning et al., 
supra note 25, at 1884–88; D. McDowall et al., Seasonal Cycles in Crime, and their 
Variability, 28 J. QUAN. CRIMINOLOGY 389 (2012).   
27 See, e.g., Ellen G. Cohn, Weather and Crime, 30 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY. 51 (1990) 
(finding that while assaults tend to increase with temperature, at least up to 85º, the 
relationship for homicides is uncertain).   
28 Mowafak Allaham & Ryan Marx, Does a Hot Summer Mean More Crime? Here’s What 
the Data Show, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 23, 2017, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/data/ct-
crime-heat-analysis-htmlstory.html; see also Dean DeChiaro, Does Chicago’s Homicide 
Rate Rise and Fall with Cold Winter Weather?, MEDILL REP. CHI., Feb. 5, 2015, 
http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/does-chicagos-homicide-rate-rise-and-fall-




With our data, simple visual observation of the twelve-month patterns for 
homicides and shootings strongly suggested the presence of seasonality.  This 
hypothesis was confirmed more rigorously by detecting seasonality through 
traditional time series decomposition, using ARIMA (automatic autoregressive 
moving average time series analysis, as calculated by R).   In light of the 
seasonality in our data, we performed a standard, classical time series 
decomposition to remove seasonal variations in both the homicide and shootings 
data.   
 
C.  Identifying the Existence and Timing of a Break Point 
 
 With seasonality thus removed from our data sets, we were in a position to 
begin examining them to try to identify if and when the data began to change.  As 
discussed above, we have strong reasons for believing that something changed in 
Chicago around the start of 2016—the existence of a Chicago homicide “spike” 
was widely observed at the time and discussed throughout Chicago and, indeed, 
nationally.29  Because we have monthly data series spanning 2012 to 2016, it is 
possible to run statistical tests to see if the series exhibit what are known as 
“structural breaks”—i.e., a change in the trend line of the data at some particular 
point in time.30 Reviewing data for a structural break is a pure time series question 
about a single data series.  Moreover, standard statistical software is available to 
perform such examinations.  Using the structural change function (strucchange31) 
in the standard software package known as R, we reviewed the four data series at 
hand.  Table 1 shows the date on which a structural change is detected in each 
series, as well as confidence bands for the earliest data for the change and the latest 
date for the change (at the standard 95% confidence level). 
  
 
29  See, e.g., Mark Berman, Led by Chicago, Homicides Spiking Again in Some Big U.S. 
Cities, CHI. TRIB. Sept. 19, 2016, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-
homicides-spiking-big-city-chicago-20160919-story.html.   
30 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review of 
Fifty Years of Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 
BOST. U.L. REV. 685, 757 (2017) (performing structure break analysis on crime clearance 
rates). 
31 See Achim Zeileis et al., Strucchange: An R Package for Testing for Structural Change 




Table 1  
Structural Changes in Data Series 
 
Data Series Structural Change Earliest Date Latest Date 
Homicides January 2016 November 2015 February 2016 
Fatal Shootings December 2015 November 2015 January 2016 
Non-Fatal Shootings October 2015 September 2015 November 2015 
Total shootings October 2015 September 2015 November 2015 
 
 Because of our interest in identifying a cause (or causes) for the homicide 
spike, we highlight the fact that the strucchange program quantitatively identifies 
January 2016 as the break point for the homicide data.  Interestingly, the 
University of Chicago Crime Lab qualitatively identified this same month as the 
break point in its important earlier research.32 
 
 Equally of interest is the fact that a break point is identified in all four of the 
data series we assembled.  It seems likely that the same factor (or factors) 
operating to increase homicide rates would also operate to increase fatal shootings 
or non-fatal shootings.  If this assumption is correct, then we would expect to see 
the same precise breakpoint for all of our data sets.  In fact, the breakpoints are 
very similar, but slightly different, ranging from October 2015 for non-fatal 
shootings and total shootings to January 2016 for homicides.  But perhaps of even 
more interest is a possible convergence between all four data sets.  Looking at the 
confidence band for the break points in the data sets, all four of the data sets permit 
the possibility of that break took place in November 2015.   
 
 Finally, the analysis of the data set—both visually and quantitatively 
through the strucchange program—does not reveal a second break point anywhere 
in 2016. Whatever changed to cause the spike appears to have remained in place 
throughout the year.   
 
 The critical point, then, is somewhere around November 2015 to January 
2016, Chicago homicides and shootings spiked sharply upwards and remained at 
these higher levels.  Why? 
  
 
32 CHICAGO CRIME LAB, supra note 17, at 8.  The Crime Lab’s report is important reading, 
but ultimately was unable to identify a cause for the spike.  See id. at 18 (calling the spike 
an “unsolved puzzle”).  The Crime Lab also called for an “ongoing conversation” about the 
issue, id. at 26, and we view our contribution to the conversation as following up to the 




IV.  CHANGES IN STOP AND FRISK AS A CAUSE OF THE HOMICIDE SPIKE 
 
Having identified a break in the Chicago homicide data and related shooting 
data in about late 2015, we turn to the question of what caused the break.  We 
begin by trying to identify what the causal factor would probably look like—i.e., 
what sorts of changes would the causal factor have to explain (and not explain).  In 
light of changes that the causal factor would have to explain, we believe that a 
reduction in stop and frisks that occurred at approximately the end of 2015 is the 
single most likely causal factor.  Regression equations, which show a statistically 
significant connection between declining stop and frisks and increasing homicides, 
support this interpretation. 
 
A.  What the Causal Factor Needs to Explain 
 
 1.  The Homicide Spike was Limited to Chicago  
 
 One question that comes immediately to mind about the 2016 spike in 
Chicago homicides is what was happening during that year in other areas.  Was the 
Chicago surge part of some larger phenomenon outside the city?  The quick 
answer appears to be no. 
 
Let’s look first at the national homicide rate trends in 2016.  In 2016, the 
homicide rate around the country increased 8.6% from 2015.33  Of course, that is 
only a small fraction of the Chicago increase.  Indeed, the disparity between 
Chicago and national trends grows even larger, when we realize that the Chicago 
spike was so large that it influenced the national homicide rate change.  Backing 
out Chicago homicides (in both 2015 and 2016), the nation’s homicide rate 
increased only 7.0% from 2015 to 2016.34  Chicago’s spike cannot be attributed to a 
broader national pattern.   
 
A similar conclusion emerges if we compare Chicago to other major cities 
around the country.  Not only was the 2016 spike a sharp increase for Chicago, 
“[n]one of the other five largest cities in the U.S.—Houston, Los Angeles, New 
York City, and Philadelphia, in addition to Chicago—have witnessed a single-year 
homicide increase over the past 25 years that rivals Chicago’s increase in 2016.”35  
One way of contextualizing these numbers is that, in August 2016, more people 
 
33  See 2016 UCR, supra note 18. 
34  (17,250-765) ÷ (15,883-478) = 7.0% increase.  Note: These numbers come from the 
FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports in 2015 and 2016.  The number of Chicago homicides listed 
by the FBI is just slightly different than those listed by the CPD.  Because the differences 
are extremely small, we have not bothered to sort them out.    




had been shot in Chicago than in New York and Los Angeles combined, although 
the population of each of the two cities far exceeds Chicago’s.36 
 
For direct comparison of Chicago to other large cities, we collected the 2016 
change in homicide rates for the nation’s twenty largest cities (arranged by 
population size) in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2 
Rate of 2016 Homicide Increase Nation’s Largest 20 Cities 
2015 Compared to 2016 
 
City Rate of 2016 Homicide Increase 
New York City -4.8% 





San Antonio 58.5% 
San Diego 35.1% 
Dallas 25.7% 
San Jose 56.7% 
Austin 69.6% 
Jacksonville 9.3% 
San Francisco 7.5% 
Indianapolis 0.0% 
Columbus 18.2% 




El Paso 0.0% 
Source: FBI Uniform Crimes Reports – 2015 & 2016 
 
As can be seen, with the exceptions of Austin and San Antonio (which have 
comparative smaller numbers of annual homicides, making them subject to greater 
 
36 Jerry Gorner, Peter Nickeas, & Elvia Malagon, City’s Deadliest Month Since October 
1997, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 30, 2016, at 1, 2016 WLNR 26378967; Gorner, 700 Homicides, 
supra note 12. 
37 UCR data actually appear to show a slightly larger percentage rate increase—60.0%.  To 




year-to-year percentage fluctuations for idiosyncratic reasons38), Chicago had the 
highest annual percentage increase in 2016, and the vast majority of other cities 
had no comparable increase. 
 
Nor can the Chicago figures be explained by something that might have been 
going on regionally.  We compared Chicago to other “Midwestern” cities (loosely 
defined) in Table 3, below. 
 
Table 3 
Rate of 2016 Homicide Increase Midwestern Cities 
2015 Compared to 2016 
 
City Rate of 2016 Homicide Increase 
Chicago  58.0% 
St. Louis 0.0% 
Indianapolis 0.0% 
Grand Rapids 0.0% 







Source: FBI Uniform Crimes Reports – 2015 & 2016 
 
As is immediately apparent, Chicago’s annual increase was greater than all 
the other cities in the region—substantially so in every case with the sole exception 
of Louisville, where Chicago’s increase was still more than ten percentage points 
higher.39  Also of particular interest is the data from Gary, Indiana, a city that is, in 
some sense, a Chicago suburb.  Gary is just 25 miles from downtown Chicago, and 
yet it experienced no increase in homicides in 2016.   
 
38  For example, Austin’s year-to-year increase from 2015 to 2016 was 28 to 39—an 
increase of less than a dozen homicides.  Apparently there were several cases involving 
multiple deaths that year.  See Calily Bien, Austin Sees Increase in Homicides in 2016, 
Fewer Traffic Deaths, KXAN Investigation, Jan. 3, 2017, 
http://kxan.com/2017/01/03/austin-sees-increase-in-homicides-in-2016-fewer-traffic-
deaths/.  In San Antonio, in 2016 there were “a lot of spontaneous murders” and it was 
“difficult to put a reason” for the increase, according to the San Antonio Chief of Police.  
Emilie Eaton, Homicides in S.A. Hit a 21-Year High.  Why?, MySA.com, Jan. 1, 2017, 
https://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local/article/Homicides-in-S-A-hit-a-21-year-high-
Why-10829542.php.    
39 Louisville appears to have suffered from a spike in local gang-related homicides in 2016.  







In a final effort to pinpoint the geographical area where the homicide spike 
occurred, we looked at data for Illinois.  Comparing  homicides in Illinois from 
2015 to 2016 produces a 20.4% increase.40  But because Chicago’s numbers are 
such a large part of the Illinois numbers (about two-thirds), we need to back out 
Chicago’s numbers from both years to see what was going on in other parts of 
Illinois.  Doing that reveals that, apart from Chicago, Illinois had only a 4.7% 
increase in homicides from 2015 to 2016—far below the increase Chicago 
experienced and roughly reflective of (and slightly below) the national increase 
that year of 8.6%.41  This strongly suggests that whatever afflicted Chicago in 2016, 
it was not something that afflicted other parts of the state.  
 
Figure 4 




The “takeaway” from these numbers seems obvious: Something happened 
uniquely to Chicago to cause a homicide spike in 2016. 
 
2.  The Chicago Spike was Largely Limited to Gun-Related Crimes 
 
 
40 2016 UCR, supra note 18 (tb.2).  
41  We have left the Chicago data in the national figure, even though this operates to 
increase size of the national 2016 homicide spike.  Also, as discussed below, there was no 
“break” in the Illinois data set—unlike the sharp Chicago increase.  See infra note 332 and 




In looking for causes of the homicide spike, another question that arises 
immediately is whether all forms of crime increased throughout the city in 2016 or 
just homicides.  Here again, it is easy to collect FBI data on the standard crime 
categories for Chicago, comparing 2015 to 2016.  Our results are depicted below, 
in Table 4.   
 
Table 4 








Burglary Larceny Vehicle Theft 
22.2% 58.0%42 11.0% 23.9% 20.7% 8.2% 8.4% 7.4% 12.2% 
Source: FBI – Uniform Crime Reports – 2015 & 2016. 
 
 As is readily apparent, whatever caused the homicide spike does not appear 
to have affected other crime categories nearly as substantially. 
 
It is interesting, however, to move outside the standard FBI crime categories 
and look at the year-over-year numbers for shootings in Chicago.  As shown in 
Table 5 below, shooting crimes increased substantially in 2016 compared to 2015. 
 
Table 5 
Chicago 2015 to 2016 Year-Over-Year Increase by Shooting Crime 
Category 
 
Crime Category Rate of 2016 Increase 
Homicides 58.0% 
Fatal Shootings 66.4% 
Non-Fatal Shootings 44.2% 
Total Shootings  48.0% 
Source: Chicago Police Department Data 
 
These numbers suggest that whatever caused the 2016 Chicago homicide 
spike also caused a spike in shooting (i.e., gun-related) crimes.43  
 
 
42  UCR data actually appear to show a slightly larger percentage rate increase—60.0%.  To 
be more conservative, we use the CPD homicide numbers.   
43  A similar conclusion was reached by the University of Chicago Crime Lab, which 
reviewed detailed CPD records.  The Crime Lab compared various categories of crimes to 
determine a 2015-to-2016 year-to-year increase, finding that gun homicides increased 61%, 
as compared to 31% for non-gun homicides; while shootings increased 43% and gun 
robberies increased 26%, compared to a 10% increase in non-gun violent crimes and a 6% 




Combining what we have learned so far, in searching for the cause of 
Chicago’s homicide spike, we should be looking for something that has four 
characteristics: (1) it caused an abrupt change that took place near the end of 2015, 
not predicted by previous trends; (2) it remained in place throughout 2016; (3) it 
was confined to Chicago and did not affect other major cities in the country, the 
region, or other parts of Illinois; and (4) it elevated Chicago’s gun-related crimes 
uniquely as compared to other crimes.44    
 
B.  Changes in Stop and Frisk Policies in 2016 
 
We are obviously not the first observers to wonder about what caused the 
2016 Chicago homicide spike.  Others have suggested a variety of different 
possible causes, including (based on media reports) the following list of 
possibilities: 
 
fractured gang hierarchies and rivalries; high rates of 
neighborhood poverty and segregation; an influx of guns from 
other places; insufficient penalties for illegal gun-carrying; social 
media disputes; demolition of public housing; a lack of resources 
devoted to solving serious crimes; police department management 
and manpower; reduced police activity; changes in city and state 
funding for social services and other core government functions; 
the absence of family involvement in the lives of youth; closing of 
mental health clinics; . . . weather, . . . the release of video footage 
showing the shooting by a CPD officer of teenager Laquan 
McDonald, announcement of a U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
investigation of CPD, a new state law regarding street stops, and 
implementation of an agreement between the City and the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) concerning street stops.45    
 
 At first blush, applying to this list of possibilities the four characteristics of a 
plausible cause, one potential causal factor jumps out: the ACLU agreement 
concerning street stops.  The agreement was an abrupt change at the end of 2015, 
remained in place throughout 2016, was confined to Chicago, and could uniquely 
cause gun crimes to increase.  Could that agreement be the explanation? 
 
 1.  The Decline in Stop and Frisks in 2016 
 
The ACLU and the Chicago Police Department entered into an agreement on 
stop and frisks in August 2015, which was implemented towards the end of 2015.  
In theory, it is possible that that agreement did or did not change the number of 
 
44  Id. at 4 (for an explanation to make sense it “would need to involve something that 
changed abruptly near the end of 2015 and disproportionately affected gun crimes”).    




stops and frisks conducted by CPD.  We defer discussion of that issue as well as 
the details of that agreement to a later part of this article.46  For present purposes, 
our only interest is trends in the number of stop and frisks around the time of the 
homicide spike. 
 
On this subject, at least, the data appear to be unequivocal.  As shown in 
Figure 5, reported CPD stops47 were running at about 40,000 each month from 
January 2012 through November 2015.  Then, as the settlement agreement phased 
in, stops declined in December and plummeted sharply in January 2016—plunging 
to less than one-fourth the previous number (less than 10,000 a month).  
Throughout all of 2016, stops remained at this markedly lower level—only 20 to 
25% of what they had been previously.   
 
Figure 5 
Chicago Stop and Frisks (2012-16) 
 
 
Source: Chicago Police Department Data. 
 
It is also quite likely that these numbers significantly understate the actual 
extent of reduction in police stops, because (as was one of the issues addressed in 
the settlement agreement) CPD documentation of stops before the consent decree 
had been less than complete.  A more accurate figure for the reduction in police 
stops might show stops declining from a pre-agreement baseline of about 60,000 a 
 
46 See infra notes 266-325 and accompanying text.   
47 For convenience, we will use the terms “stop and frisks” and “stops” interchangeably, 




month to below 10,000 a month in January 201648—a steep 80% drop in just two 
months in stop and frisk activities that was sustained throughout the rest of the 
year.   
 
2.  The Linkage Between Declines in Stop and Frisks and Gun Crimes 
 
What would be the expected effect of an abrupt, roughly 75% to 80% drop in 
stop and frisk activities by the CPD?  One rather obvious answer is that gun crimes 
would increase.  Stop and frisk is designed to discover and remove illegal firearms 
from the hands of criminals that police encounter—and thus deter the illegal 
carrying of firearms in the first place. And it is one of a relatively small number of 
police practices that has been shown, through suggestive empirical studies, to 
directly reduce gun crimes.49    
 
This cause-and-effect argument between the decline in stop and frisks and the 
subsequent increase in gun crimes is remarkably easily to articulate.  And, 
importantly, while we make a quantitative connection below, qualitative analysis 
can also be vital in assessing time series issues.50  Knowledgeable observers made 
the linkage in Chicago contemporaneously with the rising gun crimes.  For 
example, as one officer explained during the spike, “Gangbangers now realize that 
no one will stop them,” and “people who wouldn’t have carried a gun before are 
now armed.”51    
 
 
48 See CHICAGO CRIME LAB, supra note 17, at 24 (relying on reanalysis of CPD records to 
show stops falling from right around 60,000 in October 2015 to around 10,000 (or less) 
throughout 2016.  For our purposes, we use the official CPD data, because that provides a 
“conservative” (i.e., understated) estimate of the effects of changes in stop and frisks.  
    After our article was circulated for comments, we learned that the stop data we present 
here may be a more limited data set than all stops – perhaps stops of adults, but not 
including juveniles.  We have compared our data with higher figures from the Crime Lab, 
finding our series moves in parallel with theirs.  Preliminary indications are that swapping 
in their data series for ours makes no difference in the statistical significance of any our 
findings, although it might modestly reduce the coefficient of the stop and frisk variables 
discussed below.  We are exploring the differences in the data.   
49 See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., PROACTIVE POLICING: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND COMMUNITIES 
4-22 to 4-24 (David Weisburd & Malay K. Majmundar eds., 2017); see also Lawrence W. 
Sherman, Comment on Jacqueline Cohen & Jens Ludwig, Policing Gun Crimes, in 
EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 217, 240 (2003) (discussing 
studies showing that intensive police efforts to discourage illegal public gun carrying 
reduce gun injuries and deaths).   
50  See generally DAVID A. FREEDMAN, STATISTICAL MODELS AND CAUSAL INFERENCE: A 
DIALOG WITH THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2010) (discussing the importance of “shoe leather” in 
interpreting quantitative models). 





Another example of the recognition of the linkage came from the U.S. 
Attorney for Northern District of Illinois (i.e., Chicago).  U.S. Attorney Zachary 
Fardon was appointed by President Obama in 2013 and appears have no political 
axe to grind.52  In his public letter of resignation in March 2017, he summarized the 
events surrounding the homicide (and shootings) spike, explaining his conclusion 
that the decline in stops was a primary cause: 
 
So by January 2016, the city was on fire.  . . . Cops had to worry 
about the ACLU deal.  And many of them became scared and 
demoralized. . . . So cops stopped making stops.  And kids started 
shooting more—because they could, and because the rule of law, 
law enforcement, had been delegitimized.  And that created an 
atmosphere of chaos.53   
 
 Attributing the rise in shootings and homicides to a decline in stop and frisks 
has considerable empirical support.  Most notably, a November 2017 report from 
the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) reviewed the relevant literature on 
stop and frisk (which they called “stop, question, and frisk” or “SQF”).54  The NAS 
report concluded that “[e]valuations of these focused uses of enforcement tactics 
that have included pedestrian stops report meaningful and statistically significant 
crime reductions at targeted locations, though estimated jurisdictional impact 
(when measured) has been modest.”55  The report summarizes the results of stop, 
question, and frisk studies conducted from 2008 to 2016.56 The report criticizes 
early, non-experimental studies as not being useful to make causal inferences.57 
The NAS then reports on a growing body of experimental research showing that 
stop, question, and frisk policies reduce crime.58 The report concludes that SQF 
may help reduce crime, while being careful to note that “the[] studies do not 
specifically isolate the impact of SQF on crime.”59  The report also cautioned that 
“[n]on-experimental analyses of SQF programs implemented as a general, citywide 
crime control strategy have found mixed outcomes.”60 
 
52 Fardon Resignation Letter, supra note 1 (“I am not a political person.  I belong to no 
political party; never have.  I am not a Democrat.  I am not a Republican.  I am not a 
liberal.  I am not a conservative. . . . I have no interest in political office.”).   
53 Id. To be clear, Fardon also referenced the release of the McDonald shooting video, the 
lack of a police superintendent in January 2016, and the start of the federal investigation as 
possible contributing factors to a lack of police morale.  See id. These possible contributing 
factors are discussed below.  See infra notes 129-200 and accompanying text.    
54 NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 49, at 4-22 to 4-24.  
55 Id. at 4-24.     
56 Id. at 4-22–4-24. 
57 Id. at 4-22–4-23 (critiquing the methodology of the Smith/Purtell and 
Rosenfeld/Fornango studies). 
58 Id. at 4-23–4-24. 
59 Id. at 4-24. 





Some of the main studies the NAS relied upon are worth a brief review.  
Christopher S. Koper and Evan Mayo-Wilson analyzed seven experimental studies 
evaluating police crackdowns on gun carrying in cities in the United States and 
Colombia.61 The police intervention tactics analyzed in the studies included 
directed or saturation patrols, roadblock checkpoints, enhanced monitoring of 
probationers and other suspected gun offenders, use of new gun detection 
technologies, and weapon reporting hotlines.62 Six of the seven studies that Koper 
and Mayo-Wilson analyzed showed that directed police patrols (which includes 
stop, question and frisks) reduced gun crimes in high-crime places during high-risk 
times.63 With one exception, the American gun crime crackdowns, all of which 
involved increased use of SQF, found that gun crime declined by 29% to 71%, 
depending on the outcomes measured.64 
 
Lawrence W. Sherman and his colleagues reviewed data from 1992 to 1993, 
when the Kansas City Police Department focused extra police patrols on gun crime 
hot spots.65 Stop, question, and frisk accounted for 34% of the gun seizures during 
the experiment.66 There were 169 gun crimes in the targeted area during the 29 
weeks before the hotspot patrols, but only 86 gun crimes during the 29 weeks of 
the hotspot patrols.67 This amounted to a 49% decrease in gun crimes.68 
 
Jerry Ratcliffe and his colleagues reviewed a Philadelphia foot control 
experiment, in which, in 2009, 60 violent crime hotspots were identified and 
assigned extra foot patrol officers.69 Target areas of the experiment showed violent 
crime reduction of 23% compared to control sites.70 Though the Ratcliffe study 
was not designed to specifically address SQF, the researchers made some 
significant observations. Pedestrian stops (defined in the study as “whenever a 
police officer conducts a field interview, stop-and-frisk, or search of a suspect in 
the street”71) increased by 64% in target areas, compared to less than a 1% increase 
 
61 Christopher S. Koper & Evan Mayo-Wilson, Police Strategies to Reduce Illegal 
Possession and Carrying of Firearms: Effects of Gun Crime, CAMPBELL SYSTEMATIC 
REVS., at 14 (Sept. 2012). 
62 Id. at 10. 
63 Id. at 6. 
64 Id. 
65 Lawrence W. Sherman, James W. Shaw, & Dennis P. Rogan, The Kansas City Gun 
Experiment, NAT’L INST. OF JUST.: RESEARCH IN BRIEF, at 3–4 (Jan. 1995). 
66 Id. at 5. 
67 Id. at 6. 
68 Id. 
69 Jerry H. Ratcliffe et al., The Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment: A Randomized 
Controlled Trial of Police Patrol Effectiveness in Violent Crime Hotspots, 49 
CRIMINOLOGY 795, 796 (2011). 
70 Id. 




in control areas.72 Also, in the target areas that demonstrated the clearest evidence 
of crime reduction, there was a “substantial jump in proactive activity for foot 
patrol officers.”73 In short, though the researchers recognized the value of SQF, 
they were “reluctant to suggest that proactive policing alone resulted in the crime 
reduction found in th[e] experiment.”74 
 
David Weisburd, Alese Wooditch, Sarit Weisburd, and Sue-Ming Yang used 
data on the exact locations of SQF occurrences and non-traffic-related crimes in 
New York City for the years 2006 to 2011.75 They concluded that with a total of 
686,000 SQFs in a given year (the highest rate of SQFs during the study period), a 
reduction of 11,771 crimes was expected, or a 2% decrease.76 These crime-
prevention benefits were realized primarily within short distances of an SQF 
occurrence and within a limited time frame (less than five days) after an 
occurrence.77 
 
Wooditch and Weisburd used crime incident data to examine the effect of 
SQFs conducted by the New York City Police Department in the Bronx, New 
York over a 150-day period in 2006.78 The findings suggested that SQFs produce a 
modest reduction in crime, which extends over a three-day period from an 
occurrence.79 SQFs were most beneficial to crime deterrence within 100 feet of a 
stop location, with benefits decreasing out to 300 feet from an occurrence.80 For 
example, within 100 feet of an SQF event, the likelihood of a crime occurring one 
day after the SQF was 10% lower than if the stop had not occurred, with deterrence 
benefits decreasing with more time and space from the stop.81 
 
Interestingly for our purposes—i.e., for trying to explain why Chicago’s gun 
crime rates increased dramatically but not rates for other crimes—one of the 
conclusions suggested by such studies is that stop and frisk (at least in some forms) 
will reduce gun crimes, but not other violent crimes.  For example, a study in 
Indianapolis found that targeted offender gun patrols reduced gun-related crimes 
 
72 Id. at 813–14. 
73 Id. at 821. 
74 Id. 
75 David Weisburd et al., Do Stop, Question, and Frisk Practices Deter Crime?, 15 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 31, 34 (2015). 
76 Id. at 41. 
77 Id. at 46. 
78 Alese Wooditch & David L. Weisburd, Using Space-Time Analysis to Evaluate Criminal 
Justice Programs: An Application to Stop-Question-Frisk Practices, 32 J. QUANTITATIVE 
CRIMINOLOGY 191, 193 (2016). 






substantially but did not appear to affect violent crimes without firearms.82  Another 
study, in New York, found few effects of SQF on robbery and burglary rates.83   
 
Based on these studies reviewed—as well as other similar studies reaching 
similar conclusions84—we would expect that the significant and sustained decline in 
stop and frisks in Chicago at the end of 2015 should have led to an increase in 
homicides in 2016.  And that is exactly what happened, as shown in Figure 6. 
  
 
82 E.F. MCGARRELL ET AL., REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE: EVALUATION OF THE INDIANAPOLIS 
POLICE DEPARTMENT’S DIRECT PATROL PROJECT (NCJ-188740 Nat’l Inst. of Just. 2002).   
83 Richard Rosenfeld & Robert Fornango, The Impact of Police Stops on Precinct Robbery 
and Burglary Rates in New York City, 2003-2010, 31 JUST. Q. 96 (2014) (finding no 
statistically significant correlations between SQF and burglary or robbery using yearly 
rates of crime and SQF stops across all 75 precincts in the New York City Police 
Department).   
84 See, e.g., Cohen & Ludwig, supra note 49, at 230–38 (reporting results of Pittsburg 
firearm suppression patrols, which “substantially reduce[d] citizen reports of shots fired 
and gunshot injuries in the target neighborhoods”); ); Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse 
Relationship Between the Constitutionality of New York City “Stop and Frisk”, 94 B.U. L. 
REV. 1495, 1514-25 (2014) (collecting evidence on NYPD’s stop and frisks policies “have 
to be considered a plausible explanation for the City’s distinctive violent crime decline”).   
But see, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social Science of Stop and Frisk, 10 ANN. 
REV. L. SOC. SCI. 335 (2014) (arguing that conflicting research fails to establish a clear 





Chicago Stop and Frisks vs. Homicides (2012-16) 
 
3.  The Experience of Other Cities and Declining Stop and Frisks. 
 
The conclusion just reached about a likely connection between 
simultaneously declining stop and frisks and increasing homicides (and gun 
crimes) seems fairly straightforward.  And yet some observers have been reluctant 
to reach this conclusion.  One example of this reticence comes from an extensive 
report by the University of Chicago Crime Lab.  The informative report, entitled 
“Gun Violence in Chicago, 2016,” was released in January 2017.85  It noted the 
same decline in CPD street stops that we have discussed here, but concluded that it 
was not “clear what role, if any, the decline in street stops played in contributing to 
the increase in gun violence in Chicago in 2016 . . . .”86   The reason given for not 
 
85  CHICAGO CRIME LAB, supra note 17.     




reaching this conclusion was that “other cities have experienced large declines in 
street stops without similar increases in gun crime,”87 specifically New York City.   
 
So what about New York City?  As the Crime Lab report notes, stop and 
frisks fell substantially in New York, declining more than 95% from their 
highpoint in 2011 to a much lower level in 2015.88  And while stop and frisks were 
declining, New York’s homicide rates declined or remained roughly stable.89 
 
While the results in New York City are interesting, on further examination, 
their applicability to Chicago seems dubious.  The simple point is that New York is 
different than Chicago—different in its gun crime rate, its police levels, and its 
population trends.  Indeed, with regard to important criminal justice features, New 
York is clearly idiosyncratic. 
 
Let’s first compare New York’s homicide rates to Chicago’s.  In 2016, New 
York’s homicide rate was only 3.9 per 100,000 population, while Chicago’s was 
27.890—a rate more than 600% higher. But the relevant differences between the two 
cities may be even higher than this already staggering difference suggests.  
Looking at homicides committed by firearms, in 2016 New York’s rate was 2.3 
compared to Chicago’s rate of 25.191—a rate more than 1000% higher.   This is 
important because, as discussed earlier, gun crimes may be particularly sensitive to 
stop and frisk policies.92   
 
In addition, because New York has such a small number of guns and gun 
crimes (relative to Chicago and many other cities), it can concentrate resources on 
preventing gun crimes in a way that other cities cannot.  As Professor Franklin 
Zimring has noted in questioning whether NYPD’s success in lower crime rates 
could be directly transported to other cities, “New York’s success may have been 
assisted by its low rates of civil handgun ownership.  Even when there were a 
substantial number of handguns on New York’s streets, the number in homes was 
much smaller than in other big cities.”93  This means that removing guns from New 
 
87  Id.  
88 Id. at 25, fig. 38.  Cf. Al Baker, Street Stops by New York City Police Have Plummeted, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2017 (noting significant drop in reported stops, but also noting 
concern that not all of NYPD’s stops were being officially recorded). 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/30/nyregion/nypd-stop-and-frisk.html  
89 CHICAGO CRIME LAB, supra note 17, at 25; see also Michael D. White, Federal Civil 
Litigation as an Instrument of Police Reform: A Natural Experiment Exploring the Effects 
of the Floyd Ruling on Stop-and-Frisk Activities in New York City, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
9, 60 (2016) (advancing similar argument).   
90 Id. at 9, fig. 8.   
91 Id.  
92 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. 
93 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW YORK’S LESSON FOR URBAN 




York’s streets may have been an especially powerful tactic there, because 
handguns were harder to replace than in other cities.94   
 
Another problem in equating New York’s circumstances with Chicago’s is 
that the level of police power is different.  New York has high levels of law 
enforcement.95  For example, if we look to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports for 
2016, New York had 51,399 police employees compared to 13,135 for Chicago, 
which even when adjusted for population size, means that New York’s overall 
police force was, on a per capita basis, about 25% larger than Chicago’s.96  But this 
comparison fails to capture the true workload differences between the two cities.  
Using the same crime (homicide) as used by the Crime Lab study, New York had 
about 153 law enforcement employees for every homicide committed in the city, 
while Chicago had only about 17 employees for every homicide committed97—
about a 800% difference. 
 
The difference is even greater if one combines both the gun homicide and 
police force numbers.  Per gun homicide, New York has roughly 260 employees, 
while Chicago has only 1998—well over a 1000% difference.  To this point it might 
be objected that a homicide is a homicide, so it makes no sense to break out gun 
homicides separately.  But homicides are not all alike.  To the contrary, in general, 
homicides committed by firearm are more difficult to solve than other kinds of 
homicides,99 only adding to the relative difficulties for the Chicago Police 
Department.   Moreover, in 2016, about 23% of New York’s homicides were gang-
related,100 while roughly 67% (or more) of Chicago’s homicides and shootings 
 
94 Id.  
95 See, e.g., id. at 129, 144.   
96 See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2016, tbl. 26 (full-time law enforcement employees, by state, by city, 2016).  The 
per person law enforcement employees in New York were 0.0060 compared to 0.0048 in 
Chicago.  Id.  These figures may understate the differences, because the reported numbers 
may not include New York’s sizeable housing and transit police forces.  See ZIMRING, 
supra note 93, at 116–17 (discussing these police forces).   
97 See id., tbls. 6 & 26 (51,399 employees ÷ 335 homicides for New York vs. 13,135 
employees ÷ 765 homicides for Chicago).   
98 Estimated by using the ratios reported above.  See notes 17  & 96 supra and 
accompanying text.  
99 See, e.g., Marc Riedel, Homicide Arrest Clearances: A Review of the Literature, 2 
SOCIOLOGY COMPASS 1114, 1147 (2008) (reviewing studies and concluding “[t]he reason 
that [homicides with weapons] other than firearms are cleared more quickly is that forensic 
evidence is available not available with firearms, especially handguns that kill at a 
distance”). 
100 See Benjamin Mueller & Al Baker, Drop in Gang Violence Drove New York City 
Shootings Below 1,000 in 2016, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2017 (reporting that NYPD identified 
only 79 killings in 2016 as “gang related,” down from 129 in 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/03/nyregion/new-york-city-shootings-gang-
violence.html.  Dividing 79 by Uniform Crime Report figure of 335 reported homicides in 




appear to have been gang-related.101  Here again, gang-related homicides may be 
more difficult to solve than are other homicides,102 particularly in Chicago.103   
 
New York’s large police force reserves also permit operational strategies that 
are not possible in Chicago—including strategies to respond to increasing gun 
crimes from the absence of stop and frisks.  NYPD greatly restricted its use of  
stop and frisks from 2011 to 2015. Interestingly, at least during some of that time, 
gun crimes may have increased.  For example, in 2013 and 2014, gun crimes in 
New York City rose for two consecutive two years, the first two-year consecutive 
increase in nearly two decades.104 By June of 2015, murder rates in the city had 
increased 20 percent and shootings increased nine percent.105  The decline in stop 
and frisks was publicly suspected to be a factor.106  Thereafter, NYPD 
Commissioner William Bratton then utilized the large police force uniquely 
available to the NYPD and instituted a summer program of high-visibility policing 
 
101 We have been unable to locate precise figure for “gang-related” homicides in Chicago 
in 2016.  The figure quoted above is from the Crime Lab study, based on an analysis of 
CPD records, of arrests for both homicides and shootings.  See CHICAGO CRIME LAB, supra 
note 17, at 16, fig. 3.  This figure probably slightly understates the degree of gang 
involvement, because gang crimes are probably, on average, more difficult to solve than 
many other crimes (e.g., simple assaults, domestic disputes) and thus less likely to produce 
an arrest.   
102 But cf. Kenneth J. Litwin & Yili Xu, The Dynamic Nature of Homicide Clearances: A 
Multilevel Model Comparison of Three Time Periods, 11 HOMICIDE STUD. 94 (2007) 
(analyzing Chicago homicides from 1966 to 1995, and finding the gang-related homicides 
were more likely to be cleared than other homicides, but cautioning that the conclusions 
may have been affected by the number of cases in which circumstances were unknown may 
have affected the conclusions); Charles Wellford & James Cronin, Clearing Up Homicide 
Clearance Rates, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J., Apr. 2000, at 4 (reporting that homicides 
involving a victim as a member of a gang or drug organization was positively associated 
with clearance of the crime, although this was not a highly correlated factor),    
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/jr000243b.pdf. 
103 See David Heinzmann, As Chicago Killings Surge, the Unsolved Cases Pile Up, CHI. 
TRIB., Sept. 9, 2016 (noting that “[m]ost killings in Chicago take place amid a street gang 
culture that intimidates anyone from coming forward with information”), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-chicago-homicide-clearance-rate-
20160909-story.html. 
104  HEATHER MACDONALD, THE WAR ON COPS: HOW THE NEW ATTACK ON LAW AND 
ORDER MAKES EVERYONE LESS SAFE 108 (2016).   
105 Id.  It appears that homicides by guns had increased even more than the overall 
homicide rate.  See Tina Moore et al., Crime Down, But Murders by Gun on the Rise, N.Y. 
POST, Nov. 2, 2015, https://nypost.com/2015/11/02/crime-down-but-murders-by-gun-on-
the-rise/.   
106 See Tina Moore et al., Crime Down, But Murders by Gun on the Rise, N.Y. POST, Nov. 
2, 2015 (citing “high-ranking police source” as explaining rise in gun crimes in the first 




that “flooded shooting zones with cops.”107 As a result, the shooting surge flattened 
out and, by the end of 2015, murders were up by “only” 6 percent.108 
 
New York may also be different than Chicago due to long-term population 
trends.  Heather MacDonald has recently argued that New York’s “gentrification” 
is fueling New York’s ongoing crime drop.”109 She suggests that population trends 
are lowering crime rates.110  Her argument is bolstered by criminology research 
showing that changes in population groups can affect crime rates.111  MacDonald 
contends that high-crime areas in, for example, Chicago have not been gentrified,112 
which could account for the city’s continuing struggle with higher crime rates than 
New York.113  
 
The many differences between the cities means that it becomes difficult to 
draw lessons from New York’s experience with its reduction in stop and frisk and 
apply them directly to Chicago.  Professor Zimring expressed this point neatly 
when he wrote, in 2012, that “[o]ne cannot abstract stop-and-frisk from the 
complex of information, patrol, and policy in New York City to test it 
comprehensively in Newark or Miami.”114  For the reasons explained here, a direct 
New York to Chicago comparison is probably unhelpful as well.   
 
Instead of looking to a single exceptional city like New York, it may be 
useful to compare Chicago’s experience to a broader set of cities.  For such a 
comparison, it is instructive to look to a recent and important study completed by 
Professors Stephen Rushin and Griffin Edwards.115  They analyzed the effects of 
federal consent decrees imposed by the Justice Department on a series of cities 
across the United States.  While they did not focus directly on stop and frisk 
policies, it is reasonable to assume that the consents decrees may have reduced 
stop and frisks.116  Based on collection of seventeen cities (not including either New 
 
107 MACDONALD, supra note 104, at 109.  
108 Id.  
109 Heather MacDonald, Don’t Take the Wrong Lessons from NYC’s Murder Drop, NAT’L 
REV., Dec. 28, 2017, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/454997/new-york-city-
homicide-rate-drop-lessons-proactive-policing. 
110 Id. 
111 See, e.g., ZIMRING, supra note 93, at 132-33 (discussing demographic changes in 
Manhattan as an explanation for decline crime rates, but noting this is a long-term factor).   
112 By some measures, Chicago remains one of the most segregated cities in the nation, with 
a higher level of black-white segregation than New York City.  See William H. Frey, 
Census Shows Modest Declines in Black-White Segregation, BROOKINGS INST., Dec. 8, 
2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2015/12/08/census-shows-modest-
declines-in-black-white-segregation/ (in New York metro area, the percent of blacks in the 
neighborhood of the average black resident was 51%, compared to 64% in the Chicago 
metro area).   
113 MacDonald, Don’t Take the Wrong Lessons, supra note 109, at 132–33.   
114 ZIMRING, supra note 93, at 149. 
115 Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 721 (2017).   




York or Chicago), Rushin and Edwards concluded that, on average, violent crime 
rates were 2.6% higher and property crime rates 6.9% higher in cities subject to 
consent decrees when compared to the national average.117  In addition, they found 
that crime increases were particularly likely to be statistically significant for 
property crimes and street crimes like homicide, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and 
robbery—“i.e., criminal activity that is likely sensitive to situational deterrents like 
aggressive street policing.”118 The experience in this collection of cities may be 
more applicable to Chicago than the experience in New York.   
 
C.   Regression Analysis of Chicago’s Decline in Stop and Frisks and the 
Homicide Spike 
 
Turning back to Chicago, it is possible to quantitatively explore the specific 
linkage between declining stop and frisks and increases in homicides and 
shootings.   Multiple regression analysis is a commonly-used technique to explore 
possible causal linkages between variables, particularly in the criminal justice 
field.119  To explore possible linkages in Chicago, we ran standard ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions on Chicago monthly homicides and the three other 
shooting crime variables, as explained by a baseline intercept, a time trend, Illinois 
homicides (minus Chicago), various arrest series, a temperature series, and 
Chicago stop and frisks.   
 
The reason for including data on temperature has been discussed earlier.120  
The basic idea is that more homicides are committed during warm weather months.  
Because we included this variable, our dependent variables (homicides and other 
shooting crimes) were not seasonally adjusted but were simply raw numbers from 
each month.   
 
The reason for including the Illinois-homicides-apart-from-Chicago is worth 
brief discussion.  We wanted to have some sort of control for broader trend lines 
that might be causing crime to increase, other than factors unique to Chicago.   
Using data for homicides in Illinois (apart from Chicago) might be one way of 
controlling for things happening in Illinois, as homicides in other parts of the state 
might reflect changes happening there.  Moreover, as noted earlier, Illinois trends 
are not too far off from national trends.121 
 
 We also included a data set of monthly 9-1-1 calls to the police.  These are 
citizen-initiated calls and thus might be expected to be a measure of police-citizen 
relations, as discussed at greater length below.   
 
117 Id. at 762, fig. 5, 763, fig. 6.   
118 Id. at 765–66.   
119 See, e.g., Cassell & Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops?, supra note 30, at 710–14.   
120 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.   





One other set of variables is worth brief mention.  Other law enforcement 
efforts might play a role in crime and crime rates.  In particular, the ability of CPD 
to arrest criminals for a variety of crimes might influence subsequent crimes.  To 
control for this possibility, we included in our regression equations several 
monthly arrest series, specifically property crime arrests, violent crime arrests 
(excluding homicides and shooting arrests), gun arrests, shooting arrests, and 
illegal drug arrests.122  Because we had several series on arrests, thus having some 
measure of police success in solving crimes, we did not include any other separate 
variables for crime clearance rates.123 
 
We have tried to put together the simplest model possible for exploring our 
research question, believing that “simple and transparent analytical strategies” are 
the best approach.124  Our results, obtained in the standard software package R, are 
reported in Table 6 below.   
 
Table 6 
Regression Equations of Chicago Crimes Explained by Various Variables 
(2012 to 2016 Monthly Data) 

























































































122 The arrest data was graciously provided to us by the University of Chicago Crime Lab.  
123 We considered constructing separate clearance rate variables by dividing some of crime 
variables (e.g., the number of homicides) by the sum of the arrest variables (e.g. the 
number of homicide arrests).  But this would have effectively put exactly the same variable 
on both the left side and right side of the equations, which can be problematic.    
124  THAD DUNNING, NATURAL EXPERIMENTS IN SOCIAL SCIENCES: A DESIGNED-BASED 












































.745 .743 .869 .882 
 
*** significant at .001 level  ** significant at .01 level  * significant at .05 level  † significant 
at .10 level 
 
As can be readily seen, the linkage between stop and frisk and the four 
shooting crime data series is very strong, statistically significant at the .001 (99.9% 
confidence) level.125  The sign (negative) is as expected—i.e., an increase in stop 
and frisks decreases each of the four crime variables: homicides, fatal shootings, 
non-fatal shootings, and total shootings.  Interestingly, only two variables show 
statistical significance across all crime variables: stop and frisk (with a negative 
sign) and temperature (with a positive sign).  As explained above, strong empirical 
research provides support for both of these particular linkages with those particular 
signs,126 which gives us additional confidence that our equations are tracking real 
world effects.  Our adjusted R2 (a measure of what part of the variance we can 
explain) is also relatively high, particularly given the limited number of 
observations that we have over the five year (i.e., sixty month) period.   
 
This may be the appropriate place to say a few words about including arrests 
as explanatory variables.  An argument can be made that they are actually 
dependent variables, that is, the crime variables explain arrests rather than the other 
way around.  For example, it might plausibly be argued that as homicides increase, 
homicide arrests will increase, simply by virtue of the fact that more killers are on 
the loose for police to apprehend.   
 
 
125 All statistical significance tests reported in this Article are two-tailed, although an 
argument could be made for a one-tailed test. We are aware of the controversy surrounding 
reporting p-values and have tried to follow the recommendations of the American 
Statistical Association in our approach and report of findings. See generally Ronald L. 
Wasserstein & Nicole A. Lazar, Editorial, The ASA’s Statement on p-Values: Context, 
Process, and Purpose, 70 AM. STATISTICIAN 129 (2016). All p-values reported in this 
article should be considered in light of the results from Bayesian Model Averaging 
reported below at infra notes 260-61 and accompanying text. 
126 See supra notes 53-83 and accompanying text (stop and frisks); supra notes 25-28 and 




The direction of the causality arrow between crimes and arrests in regression 
equations remains an interesting point to be considered.127  But for present purposes, 
since our focus is on stop and frisk, the key point remains that including arrest 
variables in our equations does not defeat the statistical significance of the stop and 
frisk variable.  Nor is inclusion of the arrest variables necessary to generate the 
statistical significance of the stop and frisk variables, as we demonstrate through 
Bayesian Model Averaging below.128  
 
Because we were interested in whether trends both inside and outside 
Chicago could be playing some role in the homicide spike, we also collected data 
on homicides in cities throughout the “Midwest.”   Specifically, we collected 
monthly homicide data from St. Louis, Missouri; Columbus, Ohio; Louisville, 
Kentucky; Indianapolis, Indiana; Grand Rapids, Michigan; Gary, Indiana; 
Cincinnati, Ohio; Cleveland, Ohio; and Detroit, Michigan.  As with the Illinois 
homicide data collected above, the theory is not that homicides in, for example, St. 
Louis, Missouri, somehow cause homicides in Chicago, but rather that there might 
be some factor influencing both cities at the same time that would be reflected in 
the data series.129   
 
We are aware that more sophisticated approaches be used in applying such 
data, such creating a “synthetic control” city to compare to Chicago.130  Such 
approaches, however, inevitably require some judgment in constructing the more 
elaborate models.  For purposes of this particular paper, we decided to proceed in 
the most straightforward manner possible by simply including the other cities’ data 
as explanatory variables.  We could understand that some might disagree with this 
approach, so we simply ran these regression equations separately, so that a reader 
who believes that inclusion of such variable is inappropriate can simply refer to the 
table above without such variables.  But in any event, adding these cities as 
possible explanatory variables does not alter our findings.  As shown in Table 7, 
 
127  See Sonja B. Starr, Testing Racial Profiling: Empirical Assessment of Disparate 
Treatment by Police, UNIV. CHI. L. FORUM, vol. 2016, art. 12, at 485, 512 (discussing 
“circularity problem” between crimes rates and arrest rates), 
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol2016/iss1/12.   
128 See infra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.     
129 We preliminarily examined the data from the other cities for “breakpoints” comparable 
to Chicago’s.  On quick examination, we found no comparable break points with the 
exception of St. Louis, which exhibited two possible break points:  October 2013 (with an 
August to November confidence band), and September 2014 (with a confidence interval of 
August to October).  The shooting of Michael Brown, which led to widespread unrest in 
Ferguson, Missouri (a suburb of St. Louis) occurred in August 2014.  Because our focus 
was on Chicago homicides, we did not follow up this possible explanation for the St. Louis 
data. 
130  Cf. Rushin & Griffin, supra note 115, at 762-66 (comparing consent decree cities to non-




the stop and frisk variable remained highly statistically significant with the 
expected sign—negative—across all four crime variables.   
 
Table 7 
Regression Equations of Chicago Crimes Explained by Various Variables 
Homicides from Regional Cities Also Included 
(2012 to 2016 Monthly Data) 

























































































































































































































.729 .752 .885 .900 
 
*** significant at .001 level  ** significant at .01 level  * significant at .05 level  † significant 
at .10 level 
 
  Inclusion of these additional variables did not significantly improve the 
explanatory power of the equations, as shown relatively minor increases in the 
values for the adjusted R2.   Also, none of the newly included city time series were 
statistically significant across all four crime categories, reinforcing our earlier 
conclusion that the Chicago homicide spike was caused by something unique to 
Chicago.  
 
To be sure, we would like more fulsome regression equations.  One difficulty 
in collecting data is that we wanted to have monthly data, since the changes in stop 
and frisk practices are best revealed in monthly data sets.  There is a great deal of 
data available about Chicago, surrounding cities, and the entire United States on an 
annual basis.  But finding it on a monthly basis is challenging. 
 
 Nonetheless, we think it unlikely that an “omitted” variable problem131 exists 
that is significant enough to defeat the strong statistical significance shown in these 
equations between shooting crimes and the decline in stop and frisks.   We turn to 
possible omitted variables in the next section.   
 
V.  OTHER POSSIBLE CAUSES OF THE HOMICIDE SPIKE 
 
 So far, we have provided reasons for believing that a steep drop in the 
number of stop and frisks conducted by the Chicago Police Department triggered 
the subsequent spike in homicides.  In this section, we investigate other possible 
“alternate causalities” and explain our reasons for believing that they are much 
weaker candidates for causing the spike than declines in stop and frisks.  In section 
A, we examine several candidates that are plausible, but ultimately inadequate, 
candidates for triggering the spike.  In section B, we examine other candidates that 
are entirely implausible candidates. 
 
A.  Other Plausible, But Ultimately Inadequate, Candidates for the Homicide Spike
  
 In a previous section, we explained why the triggering mechanism appears 
to have been something that occurred uniquely within Chicago, not more broadly 
 
131 See Cassell & Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops?, supra note 30, at 801 (discussing 




in Illinois, throughout the Midwest, or across the country.132  But within Chicago’s 
boundaries, in late 2015 several changes occurred that could, in theory, have 
triggered a spike in homicide rates.  None of these changes, however, is nearly so 
strong a candidate as declines in stop and frisk for triggering the homicide spike. 
 
 1.  Release of the Laquan McDonald Shooting Video 
 
 Just as stop and frisks were starting to decline in late 2015, another event of 
possible significance took place.  On November 24, 2015, a disturbing video was 
released showing a CPD officer shooting and killing Laquan McDonald, a young 
African-American male.  Did the release of the video generate the homicide spike? 
 
A time line of the relevant events is fairly easy to construct.133  On October 20, 
2014, Laquan McDonald, a 17-year-old African-American male, was shot and 
killed by a Chicago police officer, Jason Van Dyke.  The initial story was that Van 
Dyke feared for his life because McDonald was carrying a knife, had a “crazed” 
look in his eyes, and lunged at Van Dyke.134 Multiple officers corroborated this 
account, and Van Dyke was quickly cleared of any wrongdoing.135 CPD released a 
statement explaining that “[o]fficers confronted the armed offender, who refused to 
comply with orders to drop the knife and continued to approach the officers. As a 
result of this action, the officer discharged his weapon, striking the offender.”136 
 
 As the public found out later, this account was untrue and, on April 15, 
2015, about six months later, the Chicago City Council recognized that the 
shooting was improper and voted 47-0 in favor of paying a $5 million settlement to 
McDonald’s family.137   About a month later, a journalist filed a Freedom of 
Information Act request with CPD, seeking videos from the night Van Dyke shot 
and killed McDonald.138  CPD denied the request for production in August, leading 
to a lawsuit seeking copies of the videos.139  In early November 2015, a judge 
ordered CPD to release the videos by November 24.140  
 
132 See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.  
133 For a helpful chronology of events, see Nausheen Husain, Laquan McDonald Timeline: 
The Shooting, the Video and the Fallout, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 20, 2017, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/laquanmcdonald/ct-graphics-laquan-mcdonald-
officers-fired-timeline-htmlstory.html [hereinafter Chicago Tribune Timeline].  The 
chronology that follows relies heavily on this timeline, so as to include events that the 
Tribune thought were significant.   
134 Ben Austen, Chicago After Laquan McDonald, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/24/magazine/chicago-after-laquan-
mcdonald.html?_r=0. 
135 Id.  
136 Id.  
137 Chicago Tribune Timeline, supra note 133.    
138 Id. 






On November 24, 2015, mere hours before the release of the videos, Officer 
Van Dyke was charged with first-degree murder in the shooting of McDonald.141  
This was the first time a Chicago police officer had been charged with first-degree 
murder for an on-duty fatality in nearly 35 years.142 A few hours later, the City 
released a police dashcam video showing Van Dyke shooting McDonald sixteen 
times, killing him.143  The footage appeared to contradict accounts of the shooting 
given by Van Dyke and other officers.144 While officers had initially alleged 
threatening behavior, the teenager was shown walking (obliquely) away holding a 
folding knife when Van Dyke unloaded his gun.145  
 
Protests swiftly followed the video’s release.  The night of the release, 
hundreds of protesters marched through downtown Chicago,146 chanting “sixteen 
shots” and calling for the resignation of Mayor Rahm Emanuel and the firing of 
police Superintendent Garry McCarthy.147  About a week later, on December 1, 
2015, Mayor Emanuel fired McCarthy.148  On around the same day, Mayor Emanuel 
announced the creation of a Task Force on Police Accountability.149  On December 
6, 2015, Attorney General Loretta Lynch announced that the U.S. Justice 
Department would begin an investigation of CPD’s use of force.150  On December 
24, 2015, protesters staged a “Black Christmas” march among last-minute 
 
141 Id.  
142 Wayne Drash, The Killing of Laquan McDonald: The Dashcam Video vs. Police 
Accounts, CNN, Dec. 19, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/us/laquan-mcdonald-
video-records-comparison/. 
143  Id.  
144 Jeremy Gorner et al., City Homicide Numbers Spike, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 1, 2016, at 1 
WLNR 6389204 (noting the video “was starkly at odds with the police account of the 
shooting).  In recent interviews, former Superintendent McCarthy appears to have defended 
aspects of the shooting, although the validity of that defense has itself been contested.  See, 
e.g., Eric Zorn, McCarthy Talks Like a Cop, Not a Potential Mayor, in Offering Excuses 
for the Laquan McDonald Shooting, CHI TRIB., Feb. 13, 2018, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/zorn/ct-perspec-zorn-mccarthy-laquan-
excuses-mayor-0214-20180213-story.html.  
145 See Drash, supra note 142.  The video itself can be viewed at 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/85142730-132.html.  
146 Jason Silverstein, Hundreds Protest Laquan McDonald Video in Chicago, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS, Nov. 25, 2015, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/hundreds-protest-
laquan-mcdonald-video-chicago-article-1.2446008. 
147 Chicago Tribune Timeline, supra note 133.    
148 Id. 
149 Mayor’s Press Office, Mayor Emanuel Announces Task Force on Police Accountability, 
Dec. 1, 2015, 
https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/mayor/press_room/press_releases/2015/decem
ber/Task-Force-Police.html.  




shoppers in downtown Chicago.151  The number of protesters was “far smaller” than 
the earlier protests in November and effect on retail sales was minimal.152 
 
In 2016, the CPD investigated whether other officers had been involved in 
covering for Van Dyke.  In March 2016, Mayor Emanuel appointed a new police 
Superintendent, Eddie Johnson, who helped continue the investigation.  
Ultimately, in August 2016, Johnson recommended that seven officers involved in 
the shooting’s cover-up, many of them patrol officers at the scene of the shooting, 
be fired.153   
 
While the Laquan McDonald video was shocking—and led to significant 
backlash against the CPD and the mayor—we think it is an unlikely candidate to 
explain the Chicago homicide spike.  To be sure, an argument can be made that the 
date of the video’s release (November 24, 2015) fits the subsequent increase in 
homicides and shootings that we observed.  As noted earlier, there is a breakpoint 
in our homicide and other series around November 2015.  But as the events 
recounted above make clear, awareness of Officer Van Dyke’s actions and rumors 
of a cover-up was widespread much earlier—such as in April 2015 when a 
unanimous Chicago City Council voted to pay $5 million to McDonald’s family. 
 
More important, a causal mechanism through which the video’s release 
triggered the homicide spike is not immediately obvious.154  The protests that 
surrounded release of the video concerned alleged racism by the CPD in shooting a 
young African-American man sixteen times.  It is unclear why a result of such 
events would have been additional shootings of (predominantly155) young African-
America men by (predominantly156) other young African-American men.  Nor did 
the video’s release constitute a unique revelation of possible racism by some of 
Chicago’s police officers.  Sadly, CPD has a long history of allegations of 
racism—including widely-publicized allegations preceding the 2016 spike.157 
 
151 Heather Gillers et al., Protesters Stage “Black Christmas” Among Last Minute-
Shoppers, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 2015, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-laquan-mcdonald-protest-
20151224-story.html.  
152 Id.  
153 Chicago Tribune Timeline, supra note 133. 
154  Cf. Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 693 (finding little data suggesting that police use of 
force is connected to community residents’ lack of respect for police).    
155 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.   
156 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.  Cf. Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 702 
(reporting that most crime is intra-racial and that nationally “93% of black homicide 
victims were killed by black people”). 
157 See, e.g., Michael E. Miller, Cops Accused of Brutally Torturing Black Suspects Costs 
Chicago $5.5 Million, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 15, 2015 (lawsuits settled with plaintiffs alleging 






One possible mechanism for the video to have interfered with police 
protections is suggested by a recent study conducted by Professor Matthew 
Desmond and his colleagues.158  They concluded that high-profile cases of police 
violence may produce lower crime reporting, leading to an increase in violence. 
Using an interrupted time series design, Desmond et al. analyzed how one of 
Milwaukee’s most publicized cases of police violence against an unarmed black 
man—the beating of Frank Jude—reduced police-related 9-1-1 calls in the months 
immediately following.159 Controlling for crime, prior call patterns, and several 
neighborhood characteristics, they concluded that residents of Milwaukee’s 
neighborhoods, especially residents of African-American neighborhoods, were less 
likely to report crime after Jude’s beating was broadcast.160  The effect lasted for 
over a year and resulted in an estimated total net loss of approximately 22,200 calls 
for service.161 
 
 Interestingly, Desmond et al. looked at homicides in Milwaukee in the six 
months following the highly publicized beating.  They found a 32% increase in 
homicides, which they speculated might be attributable to increased law breaking 
in the wake of decreased citizen reports to police.162  (They did not look at other 
crime categories.)   
 
Here again, while there is some facial plausibility to reduced police calls as a 
causal mechanism for the Chicago homicide spike, on closer examination it 
appears the theory fails to fit all the facts.  Desmond et al. found that the publicized 
police violence produced a reduction in all police-related 9-1-1 calls and also all 
police-related 9-1-1 calls reporting violence.163  This might suggest an ultimate 
increase in crime across all crime categories, including in particular violent crime 
categories.  But the Chicago data in 2016 show a unique spike in shooting-related 
crimes—not all violent crimes.  It seems unlikely that reduced police-citizen 
cooperation would operate exclusively to increase shooting crimes, not other 
crimes.   Thus, while Desmond et al. found an increase in homicides in their study, 
and it seems likely that had they looked at other crime categories, they would have 
 
torturing-african-american-suspects/?utm_term=.800eba5b106d; Carlos Sadovi & Megan 
Crepeau, Chicago Cop Disciplined for Playing “Sweet Home Alabama” at Protest, CHI. 
TRIB., Dec. 11, 2014 (officer disciplined for playing alleged racially offensive song during 
protest against police violence), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/chi-
cpd-disciplines-officer-after-sweet-home-alabama-song-played-at-protest-20141211-
story.html.  
158  Matthew Desmond et al., Police Violence and Citizen Crime Reporting in the Black 
Community, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 857 (2016).   
159 Id. at 859–62.   
160 Id. at 862–66.   
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found similar increases.  If so, the pattern we observe in Chicago would not be the 
same as the pattern in Milwaukee. 
 
In addition, while Desmond et al. found that the publicity surrounding the 
beating reduced calls to police, the reduction started to dissipate significantly 
within a year of the publicized event.164  Transporting that finding to Chicago, even 
if we assume that the “event” of interest was the McDonald video release—rather 
than earlier publicity surrounding the shooting and a $5 million settlement with the 
family—the effects on citizen reports to the police should have declined 
significantly by the end of 2016.  As one indication of this dissipation, as discussed 
above, the size of the December 24, 2015 protest against McDonald’s shooting was 
“far smaller” than the protest on November 24, 2015—the day of the video’s 
release.165  If the video’s release caused a homicide spike shortly after November 
2015, Desmond et al.’s study suggests that spike should have dissipated overtime 
through 2016.  And yet we see no evidence of a reduction in the homicide spike 
towards the end of 2016.166   
 
 In any event, we have been able to obtain monthly 9-1-1 data from Chicago 
during the relevant time period.167   The data show pronounced seasonality – more 
calls in the summer months, fewer calls in the winter months.  As with the 
temperature data discussed earlier, we have smoothed the data set by making a 
standard seasonal adjustment What the data show is generally a long downward 
trend – no sharp break around the time of the McDonald video release (marked in 
Figure 7, below, by a vertical line between November and December 2015).    
 
Figure 7 
Chicago Monthly 9-1-1 Calls (2012-16) 
 
 
164 See id. at 867 (figures 2 & 3).   
165 See Gillers et al., Protesters Stage “Black Christmas”, supra note 151 and 
accompanying text. 
166 Homicides did decline in 2017, compared to 2016, a point we discuss below at infra 
notes 234-47 and accompanying text.   
167  We appreciate the assistance of Chicago’s Office of Emergency Management and 
Communications (OEMC), who provided the data to us.  Interestingly, while there was no 
sharp decline in 911 calls from 2015 to 2016, there was sharp drop in 2017.  See Maya 
Miller, Call to 911 Drop by Tens of Thousands in First Quarter of 2017, CHICAGO 







The lack of any unique change trends in 9-1-1 calls at the time of the release of the 
McDonald video suggest that changes in police-citizen cooperation do not explain 
the homicide spike.  And, in any event, we have included 9-1-1 call volumes in our 
equations.  The inclusion of a 9-1-1 call variable does not alter our conclusions.  
 
A related hypothesis surrounding the McDonald video release is that it might 
have produced a climate that hampered law enforcement.  It is possible that after 
the video’s release, police officers became concerned about increased public 
scrutiny surrounding stop and frisks and other investigative actions. Former FBI 
Director James Comey famously suggested that a “chill wind” was blowing 
through law enforcement, making it harder for law enforcement to do its job—
although he made this suggestion in a speech in October 2015 explaining events 
that had taken place throughout the year.168  This timing suggests that unfavorable 
headwinds were already blowing in Chicago (and elsewhere) well before the 
homicide spike. 
 
Illustrations of Comey’s argument come from a Chicago Tribune story 
describing an instance where police officers, responding to a report of gunshots, 
were “taunted and harassed” by bystanders and worried that “the split-second 
 
168 James B. Comey, Law Enforcement and the Communities We Serve: Bending the Lines 






decisions they make in the normal course of their very dangerous jobs are being 
second-guessed by people with the power to end their careers.”169 Another officer 
noted that, “[t]he bad element knows that policemen aren’t willing to do the job the 
way they did it [before].”170 Superintendent Johnson said, “I’ve never seen the 
level of disrespect out there on the streets,” and acknowledged officers were more 
reluctant to conduct street stops for fear of “being the next viral sensation.”171 
Another officer observed that increased public scrutiny resulted in officers being 
unable to rely upon their hunches, “[a]n officer’s sixth sense is gone,” he told the 
Chicago Tribune.172  
 
Perhaps it is true that the McDonald video release contributed to a unique, 
sharp, and sustained decline in morale.173  But even on this theory, our earlier 
interpretation of our regression results would likely remain valid.  We do not see a 
decline in measures of law enforcement productiveness after the release of the 
video, such a drop in arrests or firearms seizures.174 So the operative chain of events 
would still appear to be a decline in morale, leading to a decline in stop and frisks 
(perhaps for various reasons), ultimately leading to a spike in homicides.  If so, the 
causal mechanism triggering the spike (the decline in stop and frisks) stays the 
same, and the only debate would be why stop and frisks declined.  In a later section 
in this article, we explore reasons for declining stop and frisks.175     
 
2.  The Federal Investigation of the Chicago Police Department 
 
Another event that was roughly coincident with the homicide spike was a 
U.S. Justice Department investigation of the Chicago Police Department.  In early 
December 2015, the Justice Department and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the 
Northern District of Illinois began an investigation to determine whether the 
Chicago Police Department was “engaging in a pattern of practice of unlawful 
conduct and, if so, what systemic deficiencies or practices within CPD, IPRA 
[Independent Police Review Authority], and the City might be facilitating or 
 
169 The Chicago Lessons That Chicago Has To Relearn, supra note 5. 
170 Jeremy Gorner, Morale, Policing Suffering in Hostile Climate, Cops Say “It’s Almost 
Like We’re the Bad Guys,” Veteran City Officer Says, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 27, 2016, at 1, 2016 
WLNR 36322761. 
171 Id.  
172 Id.  
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174  See infra notes 308-12 and accompanying text.   




causing this pattern of practice.”176 A triggering event for the investigation was the 
release of the McDonald shooting video.177 
 
Ultimately, a little more than a year later, on January 13, 2017, the Justice 
Department released a 161-page report, which concluded that the Chicago Police 
Department “unconstitutionally engaged in a pattern of excessive force.”178 The 
report also detailed findings such as loss of trust in the police department and 
feelings of abandonment within the Chicago Police Department, due in part to 
insufficient training and low morale.179 The report described incidents where police 
shot multiple unarmed victims, claimed the victims were armed, and the 
Department’s Independent Police Review Authority accepted these accounts,  
despite evidence to the contrary.180 The report called on CPD to make a series of 
changes to its use of force policies.181 
 
After a report such as this, one common outcome is the issuance of a “consent 
decree” between the Justice Department and the investigated police agency.182 In 
this case, however, no federal consent decree resulted, perhaps due to the election 
of President Trump and the appointment of a new Attorney General who was less 
inclined to impose consent decrees on local law enforcement agencies.183  In August 
2017, the Illinois Attorney General sued to force federal court oversight of the 
CPD.  As of this writing (in April 2018), litigation over the issue continues.184   
 
The reason for tracing out these events in some detail is to show that the 
federal pattern and practices investigation is a poor candidate as the triggering 
event for the Chicago homicide spike.  While the investigation began in January 
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2016, no report was issued until January 2017.  A mere investigation seems 
unlikely to have any clear connection to a spike in homicides and shootings. 
 
Moreover, the investigation never actually resulted in a consent decree 
between the Justice Department and the CPD.  Past empirical research has linked 
federal consent decrees imposed on police departments with increases in crime.  In 
an important empirical study, Stephen Rushin and Griffin Edwards considered the 
issue of whether legal regulation of police behavior could inadvertently reduce 
officer aggressiveness, thereby increasing crime. To test this issue, they compared 
all police departments that have been subject to federally mandated reform under 
consent decrees with those who have not. They found that the introduction of such 
external reforms “was associated with a statistically significant uptick in some 
crime rates, relative to unaffected municipalities.”185 They concluded that this 
effect was due to “de-policing”—i.e., police becoming less aggressive, and thereby 
less effective in fighting crime.186 Rushin and Edwards thought it was “likely that 
external regulation of law enforcement comes with growing pains. Frontline 
officers may find the imposition of external mandates to be procedurally unjust.”187  
 
Not only did Rushin and Edwards’ study track the general conclusions of this 
study, but it also helps pinpoint the timing of a “de-policing” effect.  They 
identified that point as the imposition of a federal consent decree—not simply the 
investigation of a police department by the Justice Department.188  Of course, in 
Chicago no federal consent decree was ever imposed—although an ACLU 
“consent decree”189 was.  We believe that a consummated consent decree imposed 
on a police force is a far more likely cause for change than a mere investigation 
into police practices.  And that is precisely what Rushin and Edwards found 
through sophisticated analysis—i.e., that a Justice Department investigation (such 
as the one that took place in Chicago in 2016) did not produce recognizable effects 
on crime rates.190 
 
 
185 Rushin & Edwards, supra note 115, at 759 n.183.  
186
Id. at 736.  
187 Id. at 773; see also Stephen Rushin & Allison Garnett, State Labor Law and Federal 
Police Reform, 51 GA. L. REV. 1209 (2017) (discussing other barriers to police reforms).   
188 See Rushin & Edwards, supra note 115, at 730 (noting little evidence that DOJ scrutiny 
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189 Technically the agreement was a “settlement agreement,” although it was similar in 
character to a consent decree, as we discuss in infra note 269. 
190 Rushin & Edwards, supra note 115, at 758 (finding, by and large, no statistically 
significant increase in crime associated with the beginning of a Justice Department 
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It is also important that the Justice Department’s investigation focused on 
CPD’s use of force policies, not its stop and frisk policies.191  Thus, the investigation 
would have had, at most, only an indirect connection to stop and frisk practices.192  
The federal investigation is a pure candidate for triggering the homicide spike.  
 
3.  Changes in Police Leadership 
 
One fallout from the release of the Laquan McDonald shooting video was 
change in the leadership of the Chicago Police Department.  On December 1, 2015, 
just one week after release of the video, Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel fired 
Police Superintendent Garry McCarthy.193  Mayor Emanuel justified the firing by 
claiming that “the undeniable fact is that the public trust in the leadership of the 
department has been shaken and eroded.”194  The same day he fired Superintendent 
McCarthy, Mayor Emanuel appointed the second-in-command at CPD, 1st Deputy 
Superintendent John Escalante, to run the Department while a permanent 
replacement was sought.195 
 
 
191 See CHICAGO DOJ REPORT, supra note 176 (no substantive discussion of stop and frisk 
policies and practices). 
192 As a point of reference, the number of police shootings of suspects is a tiny fraction of 
overall shootings in Chicago.  See, e.g., Jennifer Smith Richards et al., 92 Deaths, 2,633 
Bullets: Tracking Every Chicago Police Shooting Over 6 Years, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 26, 2016 
(noting only 44 police-involved shootings in all of 2015).   
 To be clear, this article does assess use-of-force policies and does not address the 
many controversial issues surrounding police use of force. Cf. INTERNATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, NATIONAL CONSENSUS POLICY AND DISCUSSION 
PAPER ON USE OF FORCE (Oct. 2017) (proposing “consensus” standards for use of force), 
http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/documents/pdfs/National_Consensus_Policy_On_Use_Of
_Force.pdf.   We thus do not address CPD’s change in its use of force policy designed to 
de-escalate confrontational situations, a policy change implemented in May 2017—outside 
the time period for our regression equations.  See Tom Jackman, Chicago Police Adopt De-
Escalation in Sweeping Change to Use-of-Force Policy, WASH. POST, May 17, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2017/05/17/chicago-police-adopt-
de-escalation-in-sweeping-change-to-use-of-force-policy/?utm_term=.c5ad88d3af2e.   
 See also infra note 385 (noting that we do not propose change in any critical incident 
reporting requirements).   
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Could this change in police leadership have created instability in the Chicago 
Police Department, which in turn triggered the Chicago homicide spike?  While 
these changes have been suggested as a possible causal factor,196 it is an unlikely 
explanation for several reasons.  First, a mere change in police leadership in a large 
police force like Chicago’s would not be expected to have any immediate impact 
on day-to-day policing.  And it is hard to understand how merely replacing the 
Superintendent with his Deputy would have created immediate and significant 
changes in Chicago policing or, for that matter, criminal activity. 
 
It is, however, interesting that roughly contemporaneously with replacing the 
Superintendent, Mayor Emanuel also created a police-accountability task force and 
announced policy changes intended to reduce incidents of deadly force by Chicago 
Police.  At the end of 2015, the mayor announced measures such as increased 
training on the use of force and an initiative to provide all officers who respond to 
police calls with Tasers.197 Furthermore, all Chicago police officers were to 
became equipped with and trained on the use of body cameras and to receive 
training in de-escalation tactics.198 Here again, it is hard to see how such measures 
(which were only implemented much later) would have had any real impact in 
triggering a sustained increase in homicides starting in 2016.  For example, police 
officers respond to homicide calls after a death has occurred, not before.  
Therefore, “de-escalation” training and related use-of-force measures would 
appear to be largely disconnected from the homicide and the shooting crimes this 
article investigates. 
 
Moreover, whatever instability might have been created by the firing of 
Superintendent McCarthy in December 2015 would have largely dissipated a few 
months later with the hiring of a new, permanent Superintendent.  Within three 
months of McCarthy’s firing, in March 2016, Mayor Emanuel hired Eddie 
Johnson.199 A Chicago native and 27-year veteran of the CPD, Johnson did not even 
apply for the job.200  However, his many years on the force, combined with his 
varied experience in different precincts of the CPD, made him the mayor’s top 
 
196 U.S. Attorney Fardon briefly referenced lack of a police superintendent in his 
resignation letter.  See Fardon Resignation Letter, supra note 1.  
197 Mitch Smith, Mayor of Chicago Announces Measures to Curb Use of Deadly Force by 
the Police, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/31/us/mayor-
rahm-emanuel-announces-measures-to-curb-use-of-deadly-force-by-chicago-police.html. 
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http://chicagotonight.wttw.com/sites/default/files/article/file-
attachments/Chicago%20Police%20Department%202016%20Reforms_0.pdf 






choice.201   He was quickly and unanimously confirmed by the Chicago City 
Council.202  Moreover, because of Johnson’s deep roots in the CPD, he was 
regarded, as the mayor explained, as “uniquely qualified to rebuild officer morale 
at the helm of the nation’s second largest municipal police force and to tamp down 
violence while also being a bridge to the community.”203  Superintendent Johnson 
has remained in the position since his selection and has drawn generally positive 
remarks for his leadership.204  If instability in police leadership caused homicides to 
spike beginning in December 2015, we would have expected to see a decline after 
March 2016.  And yet no such decline appears.   
 
 For all these reasons, changes in police leadership do not appear to explain 
the homicide spike.   
 
B. Other Highly Implausible Candidates for Explaining the Spike 
 
 We have just explored several causes that have some facial plausibility as 
significant explanatory factors for the homicide spike but are ultimately 
implausible.  Other theoretically possible candidates also exist, but we find those 
factors highly implausible.   
 
 1.  Fractured Gang Leadership 
 
One possible factor that has been suggested to have contributed to the 
homicide spike is “fractured gang hierarchies and rivalries.”205  If we understand the 
theory correctly, the idea would be that gangs splintered in 2016, creating 
increased gunfire as rival factions battled it out for control of the streets.  The 
theory seems implausible to us. 
 
 
201 Id. (“His resume runs from violent crimes sergeant supervising homicide cases on the 
West Side, to commander of a police district on the South Side, to the CPD’s citywide 
chief of patrol”). 
202 Mark Berman & Mark Guarino, After a Blistering Report, What’s Next For the 
Embattled Chicago Police?, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/04/16/after-a-blistering-
report-whats-next-for-the-embattled-chicago-police/?utm_term=.565f236c9eb7 (noting the 
vote in favor of Johnson was 50-0). 
203 Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Eddie Johnson, New Chicago Police Leader, Has Deep 
Roots in a City Adrift in Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2016, 
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205 CHICAGO CRIME LAB, supra note 17, at 18; see also MATTHEW FRIEDMAN ET AL., 
CRIME IN 2016: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 1 (Brennan Center for Justice 2016) (pointing to 




For starters, Chicago already had a very high baseline of entrenched gang 
crimes beginning well before 2016.206   Given the existing high level of criminal 
activity by gangs before 2016, it would be unexpected to find a sudden surge on 
top of that already high level.   
 
In addition, the fracturing of Chicago’s gangs appears to be a longer term 
phenomenon, starting well before 2016.  A CPD audit of Chicago’s gangs in 2012 
identified 59 active street gangs with 625 factions in Chicago, up from 500 
factions and 68 gangs in 2003.207  And our review of news sources and other 
contemporaneous accounts of the homicide spike reveals little support for the 
theory208—much less identifying some new and specific gang animosity and 
consequent violence that suddenly developed in January 2016.    
 
Even more problematic for the theory is the lack of any empirical support. If 
the fractured-gang-violence theory were true, one would expect to see a significant 
increase in either gang-related victims or gang-related perpetrators of homicides in 
2016 compared to 2015.  In fact, no such evidence exists.  In 2015, 53% of 
Chicago homicide victims showed current or prior gang affiliation, compared to an 
almost identical 54% in 2016.209  A similar lack of connection comes from looking 
not at victims but at suspects.  In 2015, 73% of Chicago homicide and shooting 
suspects had current or prior gang affiliation, compared to an even lower 67% in 
2016.210   
 
Related to this point is the fact that, although Chicago’s homicide rate 
increased in 2016, “the characteristics of homicide were generally similar in 2016 
and 2015,” in that “most murders involved guns, occurred in public places, and 
stemmed from what police believe was some sort of altercation. . . . [and] 
disproportionately affect[ed] the city’s most disadvantaged residents.”211  We 
might expect to see some change in the characteristics of gun violence—i.e., more 
gang-related crimes if the gang theory were the explanation.   
 
 
206 See Fardon Resignation Letter, supra note 1, at 2.  
207 Noah Isackson, Garry McCarthy Under the Gun, CHI. MAG., July 5, 2012, 
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blamed for increasing homicides by CPD in 2012).  
208 This is, of course, not to say that gang fights and rivalries were non-existent in 2016.  
See, e.g., John Eligon, Bored, Broke and Armed: Clues to Chicago’s Gang Violence, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 22, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/22/us/chicago-gang-
violence.html. We simply see nothing in the news reports that would suggest that a unique 
50% increase in year-over-year gang violence suddenly began in Chicago around January 
2016.  
209 CHICAGO CRIME LAB, supra note 17, at 14 fig. 17.   
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A final problem with the theory is the lack of any geographical concentration 
of the homicide spike.  Gangs tend form within local geographic boundaries.212  If a 
rivalry developed over a particular gang’s leadership, we might expect to see an 
increase in violence within the gang’s boundaries or “turf”.  But the 2016 homicide 
spike afflicted many parts of the city.213  This suggests that the causal factor was a 
more widespread phenomenon—such as a city-wide consent decree—rather than 
something that would cause an increase only within particular neighborhoods.   
 
 2.  The Opioid Epidemic  
 
 Another arguable candidate for the Chicago homicide spike would be the 
opioid epidemic.   Sadly, a tidal wave of opioid use and resulting overdose deaths 
has occurred in recent years.  Could that have triggered the spike? 
 
 Here again, ample reasons exist for discounting any such theory, which does 
not appear to have been advanced contemporaneously as an explanation for spike.214  
Timing is a serious problem.  While the use of opioids (as measured by the number 
of opioid deaths) increased substantially in Chicago in 2016,215 the starting point for 
that increase was not January 2016, but several years earlier.  In 2017, the Illinois 
Department of Human Services published a detailed report on “the Opioid Crisis in 
Illinois.”216  But the report identified the year in which usage began to increase as 
2013—not 2016.217  And the surge continued after 2016 as well.218 
 
212  See THE CHICAGO CRIME COMM’N, GANG BOOK: A DETAILED OVERVIEW OF STREET 
GANGS IN THE CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA, http://www.chicagocrimecommission.org/.  
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(2013). 
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AMERICAN OPIOID EPIDEMIC (Nov. 2017), 
https://www.thechicagourbanleague.org/cms/lib/IL07000264/Centricity/Domain/1/Whitew
ashed%20AA%20Opioid%20Crisis%2011-15-17_EMBARGOED_%20FINAL.pdf. 
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 Moreover, if opioid usage were the causal factor to the homicide spike, we 
would expect to see that fact reflected in homicide increases throughout Illinois – 
and, indeed, throughout the country—as the opioid problem is a nationwide 
tragedy.219 Indeed, many rural areas are among the hardest hit.220  But as discussed 
above, Chicago’s homicide spike was not generally replicated in other parts of 
Illinois or other large cities in the Midwest or elsewhere.221  
 
 Finally, there remains the question of why increasing opioid usage would be 
reflected uniquely in a spike in homicides and shootings—but not other crime 
categories.  The linkage between opioid use and violent crime continues to be 
debated.222   However that debate is ultimately resolved, we think it unlikely that 
opioids will be shown to have some special connection to gun violence—and an 
especially strong connection to Chicago gun violence.    
 
 3.  Gun Control Laws 
 
 Another unlikely candidate for the homicide spike is gun control laws.  In 
making this claim, we do not intend to enter the contentious debate about how gun 
control laws might (or might not) affect crime.223  Instead, we make a much more 
modest claim: That gun control laws applicable to Chicago did not significantly 
change around January 2016, and therefore Chicago’s homicide spike must have 
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competition in the illicit drug market).   
223 Compare, e.g., JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME (3d ed. 2010) with, e.g., 
Abhay Aneja, John J. Donohue III & Alexandria Zhang, The Impact of Right-to-Carry 
Laws and the NRC Report: Lessons for the Empirical Evaluation of Law and Policy, 13 




 In advancing this narrow claim, it is initially worth noting that we have not 
seen any substantial argument developed elsewhere that changes in gun control 
laws were responsible for Chicago’s increase in homicides.  Nor did police officers 
or others “on the ground” contemporaneously identify changing gun control laws 
as a triggering factor.  
 
 Moreover, this idea lacks empirical support.  If the idea were correct, it 
should be reflected in an increase in illegal guns discovered in Chicago in 2016.  
But, in fact, firearm recoveries by CPD remained essentially unchanged from 2015 
to 2016. There were 6,762 firearm recoveries in 2015 and 6,644 in 2016.224  Firearm 
recoveries by CPD from 2013 through 2016 were almost perfectly stable.225  
Nothing in the data suggests that anything changed suddenly around December 
2015 to make guns more readily available for illegal activities.226 
 
 In rejecting this theory, we do not mean to suggest that gun control issues 
should be absent from a debate about how to prevent gun violence in Chicago.  It 
is true that the guns used illegally in Chicago are often imported from outside the 
city.  A 2017 Chicago Police Department analysis precisely traced most illegal 
guns seized in Chicago to specific federally-licensed firearms dealers in suburban 
Cook County and in Illinois’ “collar counties,” as well as several located in Indiana 
just across the state border.227  But that analysis also suggested that nothing had 
 
224 CHICAGO CRIME LAB, supra note 17, at 11. 
225 CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, GUN TRACE REPORT: 2017, at 3, 
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note 84, at 1529 (reviewing studies on NYPD stop and frisk success and concluding the 
most likely mechanism is “deterring public gun-carrying”).  Moreover, in Chicago in 2016, 
there were substantially more homicides and shootings than in the previous year.  The fact 
that total gun seizures remained essentially stable would mean that gun seizures per firearm 
crime declined in that year.   
227 GUN TRACE REPORT: 2017, supra note 225, at 4.   
 Some firearms used in crimes in Chicago are also apparently stolen from some of 
the city’s railyards.  See Michael Tarm, Railroad Thefts and Guns: A Deadly Mix in 
Chicago, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15, 2018, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-chicago-
railroad-thefts-20170303-story.html. Here again, we do not see a pattern in gun thefts that 
would match the homicide spike, as gun thefts from railroads were occurring well before 
the spike, including 2014.  Id.  Moreover, given the apparently fairly widespread 
availability of firearms in Chicago throughout the relevant time, this one source does not 




changed regarding the source of firearms from an earlier analysis conducted in 
2014.228  Whatever problems existed with gun control affecting Chicago before 
2016, they appear to have continued into and after 2016.   
 
 4.  Educational and Social Spending 
 
 A final issue worth brief discussion is spending on social services, including 
education in Chicago.  During 2016, widely-reported fiscal problems afflicted 
Illinois in general and Chicago in particular.229  But these problems do not appear to 
be strong candidates for initiating a homicide spike. 
 
 For starters, any connection between social spending and crime rates 
appears to be, at most, a long-term phenomenon that remains poorly understood.230  
We would find it remarkable if changes in social welfare spending had such a 
strong triggering effect on violence as we see in our data. 
 
 Moreover, any theory would have to provide some explanation for why 
Chicago gun violence increased uniquely.  Social welfare spending has been linked 
to changes in property crime and other broad measures of crime,231 but we are not 
aware of empirical research pointing to a distinctive link to gun crimes alone. 
 
   In any event, for the reduction-in-social-spending theory to work here, it 
would be necessary to show some sharp reduction in social service spending 
centered around January 2016.  In fact, so far we can tell, social service spending 
increased in Chicago during the year.  All social service spending in Chicago 
increased from $534 million in 2013, to $547 million in 2014, to $561 million in 
2015, to $581 million in 2016.232  And a subset of social service spending—
spending on the Department of Family and Support Services—likewise steadily 
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Social Welfare Spending on Crime During the Great Depression, NAT’L BUR. ECON. RES. 
PAPER, Mar. 2010, (suggesting linkage between rising welfare payments during the Great 
Depression and reduced property crimes http://www.nber.org/papers/w12825).  But cf. 
John L. Worrall, Reconsidering the Relationship Between Welfare Spending and Serious 
Crime: A Panel Data Analysis with Implications for Social Support Theory, 22 JUST. Q. 
364 (2005) (finding no relationship between several measures of welfare spending and 
various types of serious crime).   
231 See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 230; C. Fritz Foley, Welfare Payments and Crime, 
Nat’l Bur. Econ. Res. Paper, June 2008, http://www.nber.org/papers/w14074.  




increased during the same time period, from $298 million in 2013 to $322 million 
in 2014, to $333 million in 2015, to $348 million in 2016.233 
 
  It may be worth saying a few words about the role of Chicago’s public 
schools and crime.  Famously called the “worst in the nation” in 1987 by then-U.S. 
Secretary of Education William Bennett,234 Chicago’s public schools have struggled 
to provide acceptable education to Chicago’s children.  As a result, a heroic charter 
schools movement and other reform efforts have attempted to put pressure on CPS 
to improve its performance.235  It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that 
Chicago’s weak educational system may bear some ultimate responsibility for 
Chicago’s high baseline crime rate.  But here again, our focus is not on underlying, 
long-term crime issues, but the 2016 homicide spike.  And as with social spending 
data, nothing shows a unique change in around January 2016.  Indeed, in 
September 2016, the Chicago Public School system touted its latest graduation rate 
at 73.5%, marking a steady increase over the last five years.236 
 
 Finally, just as nothing significant changed with Chicago social service 
spending in January 2016, nothing significant changed with spending in Illinois 
generally.  Of course, as discussed earlier, we saw no indication of an Illinois-wide 
phenomenon affecting homicide rates.  And all through 2016, Illinois was in the 
middle of a two-year long budget stand-off that was not resolved until July 2017.237  
Changes in Illinois spending do not fit the spike.   
 
 To be clear, it is an important debate about whether it would be sound public 
policy for Chicago—or Illinois—to increase social welfare spending or improve its 
educational system.  We express no views on this subject.  Our limited interest is 
in searching for variables that might have changed significantly around January 
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2016 to trigger a sharp homicide spike.  Social service spending does not appear to 
be a viable candidate. 
 
 5.  Socio-Economic Factors. 
 
 We have not included in our regression equations any variables dealing with 
socio-economic factors, such as race or poverty.  While such variables may be 
important in other contexts,238 here we are attempting to explain a phenomenon 
developing over a relatively short period of time—e.g., a homicide spike that 
appears in about twelve months of data.  Socioeconomic factors would not have 
changed so rapidly in such a brief time as to explain the spike.   
 
 
C.  A Preliminary Peek at the 2017 Data 
 
 So far this article has focused exclusively on events occurring before 2017.  
This is because, when we began our project (in April 2017), we were only able to 
collect data sets running through the end of 2016.  But since then, time has 
obviously marched on, and as of this writing (in April 2018) additional data has 
become available.  So the reader may wonder, after the homicide spike in 2016, 
what happened since then? 
 
 The quick answer to this question is that Chicago responded to the spike in 
various ways, but did not attempt to reinvigorate its stop and frisk policies.  
Notably, on September 22, 2016, Mayor Rahm Emanuel outlined a new 
“comprehensive” public safety strategy.239  He promised to hire 970 new police 
officers in 2017 and 2018.240  He also promised new investments in crime 
prevention (such as mentoring for at-risk kids), support for longer prison sentences 
for repeat gun offenders, and expanded economic opportunities for “disconnected 
youth.”241  He also promised increased accountability and transparency for the CPD, 
such as a new policy requiring the release of videos in any officer-involved 
shootings within 60 days of the event.242  The mayor did not discuss changes in stop 
and frisk policy.   
 
 Following up on the mayor’s promises, CPD took steps to respond more 
effectively to violence.  In an interview at the end of 2016, Superintendent Johnson 
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pointed to the anticipated rollout of new data-driven command centers located in 
two districts with particularly high rates of violence (Englewood and Harrison).243  
He also pointed to the installation of 44 new surveillance cameras in in those 
districts, along with new gunfire detection technology.244 
 
 Other responsive measures also took shape in 2017.  In June 2017, the 
Illinois Legislature passed a law (backed by Mayor Emanuel and CPD 
Superintendent Johnson) increasing sentences for repeat gun offenders.245  In 
addition to these state and local efforts, the federal government responded.  For 
example, on January 2, 2017, President Trump tweeted about the alarming number 
of homicides and shootings in Chicago, and suggested federal law enforcement 
intervention.246  As a result, federal firearms prosecutions increased significantly in 
2017.247  A substantial number of new ATF (Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) 
agents were also deployed to Chicago during the year, along with additional 
federal prosecutors focusing on gun crimes.248  
 
 Some of these response seem to have had some success.  For example, the 
data-driven command centers, along with cameras and gunfire detection 
technology, appear to have reduced crimes in the districts where they were 
implemented.249  And expanding the size of CPD was badly needed, even if the 
number of new officers added to the force was relatively modest—about a 4% 
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increase occurred in 2017. 250  During 2017, there were also discussions about 
whether CPD should enter into a consent decree with the Illinois Attorney 
General’s Office to address problems related to excessive use of force—although 
discussions dragged on and no agreement was reached.251   
   
 Our general sense of the 2017 responses is that, while generally useful, they 
would not have been sufficient to fully restore the baseline level of homicides in 
Chicago that existed before 2016.  And if we look at the data for 2017, we see that 
while homicides declined modestly in 2017 from the heights they reached in 2016, 
the number of homicides in 2017 was still substantially above the number in 2015, 
as show in Figure 8 below.  
 
Figure 8 
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 Certainly more research is warranted on what happened with homicides in 
Chicago in 2017.  Interestingly, the pattern of a restriction on policing resulting 
from the ACLU agreement in 2015, followed by a substantial increase in crime in 
2016, and a modest decline in the year following is a consistent with results 
reported by Rushin and Edwards.  In their research on the effect of DOJ consent 
decrees in various American cities, they found increases in crime immediately after 
the imposition of the decree, which then faded away into insignificance five to 
eight years later.252  Perhaps we are witnessing some sort of similar reversion to the 
mean in Chicago, but only time will tell. 
 
 While researchers should explore events in Chicago in 2017 and beyond, 
our plan for this particular article is to remain focused on the 2016 spike.   Given 
the complex and potentially competing array of responses to the homicide spike 
after 2016—ranging from expanded police power to the introduction of new 
technologies to increased investments in crime prevention programs to 
intensification of federal gun prosecutions—modeling regression equations will be 
difficult.  In contrast, the 2016 spike was a sudden and sustained event, for which 
it should be possible to determine a cause.  After all, the spike occurred well into 
the twenty-first century, when expanding data sources and increasingly 
sophisticated research tools are available.  And the spike was a highly visible 
phenomenon—homicides—that took place mostly on the streets of one of our 
nation’s largest cities.  Researchers should be able to figure out what happened.  
We believe our qualitative and quantitative analysis properly identifies declining 
stops and frisk as the most likely and primary cause. 
 
VI.  MODEL SPECIFICATION OF THE REGRESSION EQUATIONS 
 
Another question about the robustness of our findings is whether our “model 
specification”—i.e., the decisions we made about what variables to include in our 
regression equations—could have affected our results.253  A powerful test for 
analyzing this issue is Bayesian Model Averaging (“BMA”).  Historically, 
uncertainty about which model specification was “correct” was a subject on which 
classical econometric methods offered little guidance. But recently, interest in 
Bayesian approaches has grown to address this problem.254   In this section, we first 
discuss the model specification problem.  We then report BMA results for our 
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equations, which strongly suggest that our findings are not dependent on model 
specification.   
 
A.  The Problem of Model Specification 
 
A researcher attempting to quantitatively explore a phenomenon (such as, in 
this article, homicides) will likely encounter uncertainty about which variables to 
include in the statistical models. Typically, a researcher must develop a theoretical 
model that contains some explanatory variables, but the precise set of variables to 
include is uncertain.255 More worrisome, a researcher could try a series of alternative 
specifications until discovering one that “works”—i.e., one that produces a favored 
statistically significant result256 (or, if trying to debunk a particular theory, one that 
does not produce a statistically significant result). 
 
Conventionally reported statistical significance measures (such as the t-
statistics we report above) are of little use in assessing such concerns. These 
statistics show statistical significance within a particular model, but fail to help 
answer the question of whether the model itself is correct. Issues of model 
uncertainty related to the choice of which variables to include in a regression are 
paramount to problems of simultaneity and multicollinearity. In particular, 
problems emerge when the associated explanatory variables are correlated within a 
regression model. 
 
As a consequence of problems such as these, reported econometric results are 
sometimes fragile to even slight changes in model specification.  BMA attempts to 
address these concerns by helping to assess robustness of regression results with 
regard to alternative specifications. The interested reader can find more discussion 
of this issue in other technical literature (including articles previously co-written 
by Fowles257) for details about how the procedure works.258   But, in brief, BMA 
looks at all conceivable model specifications and then weights them by their 
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posterior probabilities.259  For example, if there are n number of variables that might 
be included in a regression equation, then BMA consider all 2n conceivable 
discrete models and determines whether the variable in question remains 
significant across those various specifications.260   It appears to be generally 
accepted that “BMA can help applied researchers to ensure that their estimates of 
the effects of key independent variables are robust to a wide range of possible 
model specifications.”261  It is also generally agreed that BMA can be a useful 
corrective for the (apparently widespread) problem of researchers selectively 
reporting only models that “work.”262  BMA has recently become commonly used in 
econometric literature,263 probably because advances in computing power have 
promoted made BMA calculations feasible.264    
 
B.  Bayesian Model Averaging of the Regression Equations 
 
Turning to the specifics of our regressions here and using our basic regression 
equations (the equations without other regional city homicide series included), the 
number of explanatory variables is eleven, meaning the theoretically possible 
number of alternative model specifications is 4,096 (2 to the 12th power or 212).  
We used the standard BMA package in R, which is readily available and well 
documented.265    We used the standard odds ratio of 1:20 for model inclusion. Our 
BMA results for the regression equations reported in Tab1e 6 above, are reported 
here in Table 8. 
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Bayesian Model Average of Stop-and-Frisk Variable Inclusion in Various 
Model Specifications 
















100.0% 100.0% -0.000575 35 
Fatal Shootings 
 
100.0% 100.0% -0.000646 33 
Non-Fatal 
Shootings 
100.0% 100.0% -0.00201 28 
All Shootings 
 
100.0% 100.0% -0.00259 41 
 
Since some readers may be unfamiliar with the standard statistical reporting 
for BMA results, we will describe the first row of the table in some detail. This 
row reports BMA results for the earlier regression equations (in Table 6) 
explaining Chicago homicides. The BMA procedure considered all 4,096 possible 
specifications of our equations—i.e., all possible combinations of the 11 
explanatory variables. The procedure then selected equations that had odds of 
greater than 5% of being the correct model. BMA sorts through all conceivable 
models and retains those that are supported by the evidence and discards models 
whose support is low. From a Bayesian perspective, it is perfectly sensible to 
calculate a given model’s posterior probability, P(D|Mi), where Mi represents the ith 
model and D represents the observed data. When two models are compared, a 
selection decision comes down to either dropping one of the models from 
consideration or keeping both of them. The mechanism to assist in making this 
decision is the ratio of the posterior probabilities. If the odds ratio is relatively 
close to 1.0, the two candidate models are kept; otherwise, one model is retained 
and the other eliminated. With our choice of 1:20, the odds window retains a large 
number of plausible models, but significantly fewer than all possible ones. As 
noted above, posterior model probabilities are also used as the weights applied to 
the estimated coefficients for the retained models when computing Bayesian 
average. 
 
In this case, the BMA procedure identified 35 out of 4,096 models as being 
most likely correct. Of these 35 identified models, the stop-and-frisk variable was 
included in 35 of the 35 identified models (100.0%). Typically, posterior model 
probabilities drop quickly, so BMA also identified the top five models and, in 




generated from these equations is -0.000575, meaning that the BMA-selected 
models had this as the average coefficient associated with stop and frisks. The 
remaining rows in Table 8 report the same data for each of the other three shooting 
crime categories this article investigates.  
 
It is also possible to conduct the same analysis with our regression equations 
that include more variables—i.e., with the equations with regional cities homicide 
data included as additional explanatory variables reported in Table 7 above.  
Because this increases the total number of explanatory variables to 21, the 
theoretically possible number of different equations is 2,097,152 (221).   Table 9 
reports the BMA results. 
 
Table 9. 
Bayesian Model Average of Stop-and-Frisk Variable Inclusion in Various 
Model Specifications 
Homicides for Regional Cities Included 
















100.0% 100.0% -0.000520 79 
Fatal Shootings 
 
100.0% 100.0% -0.000559 67 
Non-Fatal 
Shootings 
100.0% 100.0% -0.00190 122 
All Shootings 
 
100.0% 100.0% -0.00246 224 
 
In light of these findings, we think it is fair to say that our stop-and-frisk 
results are robust—i.e., they are not sensitive to model specification problems, as 
demonstrated by the BMA procedure which assessed, quite literally, thousands of 
possible alternative specifications.     
 
VII.  QUANTIFICATION OF THE COSTS OF THE DECLINE IN STOP AND FRISKS. 
 
Our regression equations not only permit us to assess whether the decline in 
stop and frisks contributed to the homicide spike, but also to roughly quantify the 
size of that contribution.  In this section, we first turn first to the human costs that 
resulted from the decline in stop and frisks—an approximate number of additional 




costs, readily acknowledging that any financial quantification is likely to 
significantly understate the human consequences involved.   
 
A.  Human Costs 
 
Our regression equations permit us to offer some tentative estimate of the 
cost—in human lives and additional shooting victims—that resulted from the 
decline in stop in frisks.  As shown in Table 10 below, we quantify approximately 
how many additional homicides, fatal shootings, non-fatal shootings, and total 
shootings occurred due to the drop in stop and frisks in 2016.  To make this 
calculation, we simply determined the average monthly number of stop and frisks 
for the year preceding the structural break in the data—i.e., November 2014 to 
October 2015.  During this period of time, CPD conducted, on average, 45,706 
stops each month.   
 
We then determined the average number of stops for calendar year 2016.  
During that year—i.e., January 2016 through December 2016—CPD conducted, 
on average, 7,910 stops each month.  The “delta” (∆) or change is 37,769 fewer 
stops each month during 2016. 
 
We then can multiply the coefficient reported in our two BMA tables above 
to estimate how many fewer homicides, fatal shootings, non-fatal shootings, and 
total shootings if stop and frisks had simply remained at the same level as they 
were before November 2015.  We report the data for both our smaller or “basic” 
model and larger model (“Midwestern” cities included) in Table 10 below.266  
 
Table 10 
Additional Crimes in 2016 as a Result 










Basic 260 293 911 1,174 
With Cities 236 253 861 1,115 
 
As shown, even using our more conservative “with cities” model, the 2016 
decline in stop and frisks in Chicago lead to approximately 236 more homicides 
that same year.  Looking at the data for shooting crimes, the 2016 decline in stop 
 
266 The alert reader may wonder how there can be more “fatal shootings” attributable to the 
stop and frisk reductions than “homicides,” since homicides which include killings 
committed in ways other than shootings is a broader category in some respects. The answer 
is that the models we use produce slightly larger number for fatal shootings, due to the 




and frisks produced approximately 253 more fatal shootings, 861 more non-fatal 
shootings, for about 1,115 more total shootings in 2016 the city.   
 
These numbers also fit with the hypothesis that we set out to explore.  As the 
reader will recall from the opening paragraph of this article, an additional 274 
people were killed in Chicago in 2016 above the previous year.  Our regression 
equations suggest that, for example, somewhere around 236 to 260 of those 
victims were killed due to reductions in stop and frisk.  In other words, our 
regression equations suggest that the answer to the question what caused the 2016 
Chicago homicide spike is that declines in stop and frisks explain virtually all of 
the change.  The fact that the additional homicide numbers so closely corresponds 
to our regression numbers provides additional support for our conclusions, 
although we offer our numbers of homicides and shootings as suggestive of the 
magnitude of the effects that we are examining rather than a perfectly precise 
number. 
 
B.  Financial Costs 
 
We are also able to attach a rough estimate of the financial cost from the 
increase in homicides and shootings that resulted from the decline in stop and 
frisks.  Both of us have an economics background, so the urge to undertake a 
financial quantification comes naturally. But others may wonder whether it is 
appropriate to attach a dollar figure to, for example, the life of a homicide victim.   
 
We are not the first to consider this question.  In their informative book Gun 
Violence: The Real Costs, Professors Philip  J. Cook and Jens Ludwig offer a 
lengthy defense of such monetization.267  They explain, persuasively in our view, 
that “putting a monetary value on gun violence is useful in laying claim to public 
attention.”268  Other social problems of any kind—health care, welfare, education, 
environmental protection, or highway safety, for examples—all demand attention 
in the public policy arena due to the financial costs involved.  The issues that this 
article explores can likewise be assessed as a financial burden on society. 
 
Fortunately, in attempting such a quantification, one need not reinvent the 
wheel.  We are able to simply draw upon Professors Cook and Ludwig’s previous 
work, which developed a very substantive framework for quantifying the costs of 
gun violence. They calculated a cost per crime-related gun injury—either a 
homicide or other shooting—of about $1 million per injury in 2000.269  
 
 
267 PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUN VIOLENCE: THE REAL COSTS vii–x (2000). 
268 Id. at vii. 
269  Id. at 110; see also Philip J. Cook et al., Gun Control After Heller: Threats and 
Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1049 (2009) 




 Starting with that cost figure and taking our total number of victims (the “all 
shootings” category) above, and using the more conservative figure of 
approximately 1,115 additional victims, the total dollar cost of the additional 
shootings resulting from the decline in stop and frisks in 2016 is an estimated 
$1,115,000,000 in 2000 dollars, or $1,561,000,000 in current dollars.270 
 
High though this estimate may seem, it does not fully reflect the social harms 
associated with the increase in gun violence we have identified.  We know that the 
vast majority of the victims were African-American and Hispanic, many of them 
from disadvantaged communities already suffering many other deprivations.  In 
other words, the costs of the increase in violence were not distributed evenly across 
Chicago (as the average figures recited above assume), but instead constituted a 
highly regressive “tax” on minority communities already in weaker positions to 
bear it. 
 
VIII.  THE DROP IN STOP AND FRISKS AS AN “ACLU EFFECT” 
 
In this article’s previous sections, we have provided reasons for believing that 
the decline in stop and frisks was the primary trigger for Chicago’s 2016 homicide 
spike and what the tremendous social costs of that spike were.  If our findings are 
correct, they have tremendous public policy importance, not just for the City of 
Chicago but for other cities wrestling with stop and frisk issues.  The conventional 
wisdom, at least among some policy makers, has been that reductions in stop and 
frisk policies are cost free.  A good illustration comes from the debate surrounding 
the Chicago homicide spike itself.  On February 1, 2016, the ACLU of Illinois 
noted that some Chicago police officers were blaming the reductions in stop and 
frisks for the increasing gun violence.  The ACLU emphatically stated that it 
“reject[ed] any suggestion of a so-called ‘ACLU effect’ to explain the recent spike 
in gun violence on Chicago’s streets.”271  The ACLU went on to argue, “[j]ust 
because a few police officers claim there’s a correlation between crime rates and 
some policy with which they disagree does not make it so. . . . There is no 
discernible link between the rate of invasive street stops and searches by police 
 
270 This current dollar figure (140% of the earlier figure) is simply an inflation adjustment 
for the 16 years since Cook and Ludwig made their $1 million calculation, using the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index (CPI).  This adjustment is likely 
conservative, as a substantial component of the cost valuations that Cook and Ludwig made 
were hospitalization costs, which likely increased more rapidly in recent years than other 
components of the CPI.   





and the level of violence on those streets. . . . There simply is not any evidence of 
this effect.”272   
 
Whatever may or may not have been the accuracy of that statement on 
February 1, 2016, our regression equations clearly disprove it now.  If nothing else, 
the regression equations provide strong evidence of a “discernable link” between 
declining stop and frisks and the tragic spike in homicides in Chicago throughout 
2016.   
 
From a public policy perspective, an important remaining question is why 
stop and frisks declined at the end of 2015.  Here, we consider evidence of a so-
called “ACLU Effect,” that is, evidence that the ACLU’s consent decree with the 
Chicago Police Department caused the decline in stop and frisks. In section A, we 
describe the ACLU consent decree with CPD.  Section B explores reasons for 
believing that the consent decree caused the decline in stop in frisks.  Section C 
explains why changes in Illinois legislation regarding stop and frisk do not appear 
likely to have triggered the reduction.    
 
A.   The ACLU Consent Decree 
 
 That stop and frisks declined sharply in Chicago at the end of 2015 is 
beyond dispute, as we discussed earlier.273  But what was the cause of this decline?   
A settlement agreement or “consent decree”274 between the ACLU and the Chicago 
Police Department—on the very subject of stop and frisks—appears to be the 
obvious answer.   
 
It is first useful to look at the background surrounding the ACLU consent 
decree.  In March 2015, the American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois (ACLU) 
 
272 Id. (emphasis added). The ACLU also pointed to the reduction in stop and frisks in New 
York in support of its argument.  We discussed the New York’s experience at supra notes 
84-117 and accompanying text.   
273  See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.   
274 Technically, the document that resulted was a voluntary “settlement agreement” 
between the ACLU and the Chicago Police Department.  See CITY OF CHICAGO, THE 
CONSULTANT’S FIRST SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATORY STOP AND 
PROTECTIVE PAT DOWN AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 2016 – JUNE 30, 2016 at 
13 (2017) 
https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/dol/supp_info/TheConsultantsFirstS
emiannualReport032317.pdf [hereinafter FIRST CONSULTANT REPORT]. But the term 
“consent decree” seem reasonably interchangeable in this context, since the agreement 
called for compliance monitoring by a retired federal court judge.  We use both terms 




released a report entitled “Stop and Frisk in Chicago.”275  The ACLU report 
reviewed the Chicago Police Department’s “stop and frisk” practices—i.e., 
situations where police officers stopped persons on reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity and, if reasonable suspicion of a firearm (or the weapon) existed, 
frisked the person to discover the weapon.276 The report alleged that that the CPD 
had “failed to train, supervise and monitor law enforcement in minority 
communities for decades, resulting in a failure to ensure that officers’ use of stop 
and frisk is lawful.”277  The report contended that “Chicago stops a shocking number 
of people,” more than New York.278  The report called for the City of Chicago to 
change stop and frisk practices, by requiring the collection of data on the number 
of stops, making that data public, increased training for officers, and requiring each 
officer to issue a receipt at the conclusion of a stop.279 
 
  Several months later, in August 2015, the ACLU of Illinois and the Chicago 
Police Department entered into a “landmark” settlement agreement in order to 
avoid a possible lawsuit over the Department’s stop and frisk practices.280  Under 
the settlement agreement, officers were required to complete a form after any 
“investigatory stop and/or protective pat down.”281 The forms were to be collected 
and forwarded to the ACLU, entered into a database, and reviewed twice a year by 
retired U.S. Magistrate Judge Arlander Keys to determine whether the stops were 
constitutional.282 The new forms were significantly longer than the previously 
required documentation.  They required the officer to include much more 
information, such as “the name and badge number of the officer, the race/ethnicity 
of the person stopped, the gender of the person stopped, all the reasons for the 
stop, the location, date and time of the stop, whether or not a pat down resulted 
from the stop (along with the reason for the pat down), whether contraband was 
 
275 ACLU OF ILL., STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO (2015), https://www.aclu-
il.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ACLU_StopandFrisk_6.pdf   
[hereinafter 2015 ACLU STOP AND FRISK REPORT]. 
276  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (upholding constitutional of stop and frisk as a 
constitutional matter if reasonable suspicion exists).  
277 See 2015 ACLU STOP AND FRISK REPORT, supra note 275, at 2. 
278 Id. at 3.   
279 Id. at 3–4.    
  In April 2015, several plaintiffs filed a lawsuit challenging Chicago’s stop and frisk 
practices, citing the ACLU Report and seeking class action certification.  See Darnell 
Smith et al. v. City of Chicago, No. 1:15-cv-3467 (N.D. Ill. Filed Apr. 20, 2015).  The 
lawsuit remains pending.   
280 The text of the agreement is available on the ACLU’s website.  See https://www.aclu-
il.org/sites/default/files/exhibits-1-the-agreement.pdf ([hereinafter ACLU Agreement].  See 
generally Jeremy Groner, ACLU, Chicago Police Agree to Changes on Controversial 
Street Stops, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7, 2016, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-chicago-
police-aclu-street-stops-met-20150807-story.html. 
281 See ACLU Agreement, supra note 280, at 2. 




discovered and what happened as a result of the stop (including an arrest, warning, 
or no action at all).”283   
 
The agreement was controversial.  Former-Superintendent of the CPD, Garry 
McCarthy, stated in December 2015 that, “I acquiesced to it because, you know, 
I’m trying to work with [the ACLU], [and] they’re trying to work with us.”284   
 
The agreement allowed a phase-in period of several months, setting 
December 31, 2015, as the expected date for CPD to enter new general guidance 
on stop and frisk practices.285  Beginning around December 2015, as the 
implementation of the settlement agreement was put in place, the number of stop 
and frisks (or, more precisely, stops, since not every stop will lead to a frisk) 
conducted by CPD fell dramatically.   
 
B. Contemporaneous Reports of an “ACLU Effect” 
 
 The ACLU settlement agreement seems likely to have been the primary 
cause of Chicago’s reduction in stop and frisks.  Several reasons support this so-
called “ACLU Effect.”  
 
 To comply with the ALCU settlement agreement, beginning around January 
1, 2016, the CPD required officers to complete a two-page “investigatory stop 
report” (an “ISR”) that provided extensive documentation of the stop.286  As this 
new requirement was implemented, stop and frisks in Chicago plummeted.  Many 
contemporaneous reports identified the new paperwork requirement (and related 
discouragement of stop and frisks) as the cause.287   
 
 For example, U.S. Attorney Zachary Fardon, in his March 2017 resignation 
letter looking back on the events of 2016, explained that “[o]n January 1, 2016, a 
contract began between CPD and the ACLU requiring that officers complete 
lengthy contact cards for every street encounter.  That ACLU deal grew out of a 
lawsuit about stop and frisk, but the contract that settled the lawsuit swung the 
 
283 See Landmark Agreement Reached on Investigatory Stops in Chicago, ACLU OF ILL., 
Aug. 7, 2015, https://www.aclu-il.org/en/press-releases/landmark-agreement-reached-
investigatory-stops-chicago. 
284 Jeremy Gorner, ACLU, Chicago Police Agree to Changes on Controversial Street Stops, 
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7, 2015, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-chicago-police-aclu-
street-stops-met-20150807-story.html. 
285 ACLU Agreement, supra note 280, at 3.   
286 See Jeremy Gorner, After Officers Complain, Chicago Police Simplifying Stop Reports 
Required by ACLU Deal, CHI. TRIB. Feb. 24, 2016, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-investigatory-stop-form-replaced-20160223-
story.html.   
287  See, e.g., id. (noting that stops had “plummeted significantly” in early 2016, and stating 




pendulum hard in the other direction by telling cops if you (officer) go talk to those 
kids on the corner, you’re going to have to take 40 minutes to fill out a form and 
you’re going to have to give them a receipt with your badge number on it.”288   
 
 Interestingly, perhaps in an effort to deflect its responsibility for the decline 
in stops starting around the beginning of 2016, Karen Sheley, Director of Police 
Practices for the ACLU of Illinois responded to Fardon’s assessment by arguing 
that “Mr. Fardon is wrong that the agreement took effect on January 1, 2016—the 
agreement had been in force for four months by that time.”289  But this argument is 
disingenuous.290  As the ACLU must have known, while the agreement itself was 
signed on August 6, 2015, it provided a reasonable phase-in period for the new 
agreed stop-and-frisk procedures to take effect.  In particular, the agreement 
provided that the CPD expected to issue revised general orders relating to stop and 
frisk “by December 31, 2015.”291  The new general orders were promulgated on this 
schedule and put in place shortly before January 1, 2016292—precisely when the 
decline in stop and frisks occurred.293  
 
 The “ACLU Effect” was something that police officers on the street quickly 
described as stops were declining.  For example, a January 31, 2016, article in the 
Chicago-Sun Times was entitled “Street Cops Say ‘ACLU Effect’ Drives Spike in 
Gun Violence.”294  The article reported interviews with police officers who 
generally agreed that “the Chicago Police Department’s pact with the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Illinois to monitor police stops in greater detail is 
prompting officers to stop policing, leaving the streets to the criminals and leading 
to the spike in gun violence.”295  Along the same lines, ex-CPD superintendent 
 
288 Fardon Resignation Letter, supra note 1.   
289 Statement of Karen Sheley, Police Practices Project Director, ACLU OF ILL., Mar. 14, 
2017, https://www.aclu-il.org/en/press-releases/aclu-statement-open-letter-former-us-
attorney-zachary-fardon.   
290 The ACLU also apparently took inconsistent positions.  In March 2017, when the 
decline in stop and frisks was being linked to the homicide spike, Ms. Sheley appeared to 
have disavowed any connection.  But in January 2016, before the homicide spike was fully 
evident, Ms. Sheley said that the decline in stop and frisks was a “good thing” resulting 
from the ACLU’s agreement.  See infra note 315 and accompanying text.   
291 See ACLU Agreement, supra note 280 at 3, ¶ II.1.. 
292 See Memorandum from Stephen R. Patton and Jane Elinor Notz, City of Chicago Dept. 
of Law, to Judge Arlander Key, Oct. 6, 2016, at 1 n.1 (referring to new Special Order S04-
13-09 as having been adopted “prior to January 1, 2016”).    
293 See Figure 5, supra (monthly data on stop and frisks, showing sharp decline in 
December 2015 and new baseline reached in January 2016).   
294  Frank Main, Street Cops Say “ACLU Effect” Drives Spike in Gun Violence, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2016, https://chicago.suntimes.com/chicago-politics/street-cops-say-aclu-
effect-drives-spike-in-gun-violence/.     




Garry McCarthy told the Chicago Tribune during 2016 that “the more complicated 
forms have contributed to the end of proactive policing.”296 
 
 One indication of the contemporaneous concern about the harmful effects of 
the extensive paperwork was that in late February, 2016—after the new procedures 
had only been in effect for a short time—the  CPD tried to simplify the 
Investigative Stop Report form (ISR) because of officer complaints.297  However, as 
the ACLU was quick to point out, the modifications to the form were “modest.”298  
Even the purportedly simplified form had more than seventy(!) separate fields that 
the an officer had to complete, including a lengthy “narrative” section requiring the 
officer to write down “all factors that support Reasonable Articulable Suspicion to 
justify the Investigatory Stop, all factors that support Reasonable Articulable 
Suspicion to justify the Protective Patdown, and the basis and all reasons that led 
to the search beyond a Protective Patdown.”299  
 
 Another indication of contemporaneous concern comes from an account 
published on the blog “Second City Cop.”  The blog has a detailed discussion of 
the simple “Contact Card” that Chicago Police use to complete after stops and the 
“Investigative Stop Report” that the ACLU agreement required.  After running 
through the byzantine requirements to properly complete the form, the blog 
concluded: “Little wonder activity has dropped off by extraordinary amounts.”300 
 
 Officers not only had concern about the length of the required forms, but 
also their recipients.  The settlement agreement required that the ISRs be sent to 
the ACLU for its review on a monthly basis.301   One officer described the concerns 
this way: “If tomorrow, we still had to fill out the new forms, but they no longer 
went to the ACLU, stops would increase.”302  And the Chicago Sun-Times reported 
early in 2016 that cops confessed that “they have avoided making many of the 
 
296 Gorner, Morale, Policing Suffering in Hostile Climate, supra note 170.  
297 Id.  
298 Statement on Changes to Chicago Investigatory Stop Report, ACLU OF ILL., Feb. 24, 
2016, https://www.aclu-il.org/en/press-releases/statement-changes-chicago-investigatory-
stop-report. 
299  See Appendix A, infra, at p. 2.   
 Interestingly, a similar form was ordered as a result of litigation in New York, 
where a form 250 (“UF-250”) was mandated. See Rachel A. Harmon & Andrew Manns, 
Proactive Policing and the Legacy of Terry, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 49, 66 (2017) 
(describing form). While a full exploration of the New York form is beyond the scope of 
this article, it appears that the form differed significantly from Chicago’s in not requiring a 
full narrative of the circumstances surrounding the stop, but rather just a simple check of a 
box.  See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.Supp.2d 540, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing 
checkoff).   
300 Second City Cop, Contact Card vs. ISR, Jan. 13, 2016, 
http://secondcitycop.blogspot.com/2016/01/contact-card-vs-isr.html. 
301  See ACLU Agreement, supra note 280 , at 5.   




stops they would have routinely done last year. They fear getting in trouble for 
stops later deemed to be illegal and say the new cards take too much time to 
complete.”303 
 
 Interestingly, the report of the retired judge monitoring the implementation 
of the ACLU settlement agreement also noted the decline in stops in the first half 
of 2016, and further noted that both news media and various law enforcement 
officials “suggest that the lower stop rates are attributable to the amount of time it 
takes police officers to document all the information required for each individual 
stop of a civilian required by the new ISR.”304  The report noted “time estimates 
ranging from 10–15 minutes, based on police officer interviews . . . to 40–45 
minutes, based on news media reports from other CPD officials and outside 
sources.”305  After recounting this suggested cause-and-effect relationship, the report 
did not disagree that the paperwork requirements were the cause but instead argued 
that the paperwork was important to permit assessment of the legality of CPD’s 
practices.306  This failure to identify any other causal factor for the reduction in stops 
further supports the conclusion that the form was the main culprit. 
 
 The reports from Chicago about concerns with burdensome paperwork 
dovetail with those from other jurisdictions.  Professors Rushin and Edwards 
collected some of the literature on the subject in their recent article and reported 
problems with externally-imposed police reforms, which often established 
“inherently cumbersome” administrative requirements.  For example, police in 
Pittsburgh were worried when “[e]very incident has a paper trail,” with the result 
that “officers were almost afraid to say anything for fear of punishment.”307  In Los 
Angeles, a stunning 70% of officers agreed with the statement that “paper work 
deters officers from making arrests,” and even more—79%—believed that, as a 
result, external regulation impeded the LAPD’s ability to fight crime.308 
 
303 Main, supra note 294. 
304 FIRST CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 274, at 10.  The report also suggested that 
better training could reduce the 45-minute time period that some officers reported it took 
them to complete the forms.  Id. at 206. 
305 Id.   
306 Id. at 10–12 
307  Rushin and Edwards, supra note 115, at 768 (citing ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., CAN 
FEDERAL INTERVENTION BRING LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING? THE 
PITTSBURGH CONSENT DECREE (2005)), https://www.vera.org/publica 
tions/can-federal-intervention-bring-lasting-improvement-in-local-policing-thepittsburgh-
consent-decree).   
308  Rushin and Edwards, supra note 115, at 768 (citing CHRISTOPHER STONE ET AL., 
POLICING LOS ANGELES UNDER A CONSENT DECREE: THE DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE 
LAPD 19 (2009)), http://www.lapdonline.org/ 
assets/pdf/Harvard-LAPD%20Study.pdf.   
     Rushin and Edwards also cite our comprehensive study on Miranda’s effects as 





 For these reasons, we think that the paperwork requirement that stemmed 
from the ACLU consent decree was the primary driver of the reductions in stop 
and frisk, although it is possible other factors could have played a supporting role.309  
In particular, it appears that following the consent decree, the CPD may have de-
emphasized its focus on so-called “hot spot” policing.310  While we have been 
unable to obtain details about this change, one possible explanation is that the 
ACLU argued in its stop and frisk report that African-Americans were being 
stopped at a rate that was disproportionate to their percentage of the population.311 
But, of course, one of the consequences of hot spot policing is to place a 
disproportionate number of police officers in high crime areas—a fact not 
discussed in the ACLU report.  Perhaps CPD choose to scale back hot spot patrols 
in an effort to respond to the ACLU’s criticisms.  If so, then crime rates would 
 
call it “one of the most rigorous studies on the effect of police regulation on officer 
behavior.”  Rushin & Edwards, supra note 115, at 738 (citing Cassell & Fowles, supra note 
4, at 1118).  We appreciate the favorable citation; but for our purposes here, we believe that 
the stop-and-frisk issues are sufficiently different that we will not press the analogy. 
309 While this subject is not the focus of our study, it seems unlikely that concern about 
actually unconstitutional stops being discovered through the form were a significant cause 
of the decline, because the forms, completed by the officers, would not a be a good 
mechanism for discovering questionable stops.  It is also interesting to note that detailed 
analysis of CPD’s stops after the consent decree found that 90 to 94% were, seemingly 
beyond dispute, “good” stops, see infra note 370 and accompanying text, although this 
obviously raises the question of what CPD’s good stop rate was before the consent decree.  
Our very limited point is not to suggest that all of CPD’s stops were good in 2015, but 
rather that from an aggregate statistical point of view the number of bad stops would be 
expected to be relatively small.  Cf. Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: 
Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 
U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 165 (2015) (“If a court had analyzed any of the stops carried out as 
part of the NYPD program, or as part of a similar program in another city, the court likely 
would have found that police appear to abide by Terry’s strictures most of the time”).  But 
cf. Jonathan Mummolo, Modern Police Tactics, Police-Citizen Interactions and the 
Prospects for Reform, 80 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 1, __ (2018) (finding reduction of stops in 
NYPD due to recordkeeping requirements led to improved constitutional compliance).  See 
also infra notes 347-52 and accompanying text (discussing “objective reasonableness” of 
CPD’s stop and frisk policies).  We also do not see declines in other forms of policing, 
such as arrests and gun seizures, as discussed in supra notes 220-22 and accompanying 
text.  But cf. Bellin, supra note 84, at 1548 (concluding the NYPD’s policies reduced gun 
crimes only by creating deterrence through fear of unconstitutional stop and frisks). 
Finally, to the extent that the concern of the ACLU was that a disproportionate number of 
stops involved African-American and Hispanic residents of Chicago, it does not appear that 
the agreement reduced the stops for minority residents more than whites.  See infra note 
377 and accompanying text.    
310 See Reuven Blau, Former Chicago Top Cop Blames City’s Spike in Violence on 
Politicians’ Interference with Police Business, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 27, 2016, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/ex-chicago-top-blames-city-spike-violence-
politicians-article-1.2925908 (former CPD Superintendent Garry McCarthy says that, after 
“political pushback against police stops and other proactive measures to curb the ongoing 
violence,” CPD “no longer holds CompStat meetings to focus on crime hot spots”).   




have been expected to increase due to that change in tactics.  According to the 
National Academy of Science’s November 2017 report, hot spot policing is 
generally effective in reducing crime in the short term, although the long-term 
impacts remain somewhat unclear.312   
 
It is also interesting to consider comments made by Mayor Rahm Emanuel 
about two months after the ACLU agreement was signed.  On October 13, 2015, 
Mayor Rahm Emanuel asserted that Chicago police officers were becoming “fetal” 
out of concern that they would get in trouble for actions during arrests.313  If so, 
perhaps the ACLU would shoulder some of the blame.  But we do not see any real 
evidence of this in our data.  Other than the decline in stop and frisks, we do not 
see any unique reductions in general measures of law enforcement activity related 
to violent crime around the time of the homicide spike.  For example, as already 
discussed, firearms seizures by CPD did not exhibit any substantial decline314—and 
such seizures might reasonably be seen as measure of law enforcement efforts 
directed towards firearms.315  Nor were there any unique declines in the number of 
arrests in 2016,316 and arrests might also serve as a measure of effort.  On these 
lines, our regression equations, which included multiple arrest measures, did not 
suggest that declining arrests explained the homicide spike.   
 
The one measure of law enforcement activity that exhibited clear and stark 
declines at the time of the homicide spike was stop and frisks.317  Since a 
preliminary draft of our paper was made publicly available, we have received 
communications from several CPD police officers, all making clear to us that they 
were contacting us in their own private capacity, suggesting their general 
agreement with our conclusions.  These communications suggested an answer to 
one question that puzzled us in researching this subject: If cops were not doing 
 
312 NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note49, at S-4.  
313 John Byrne, Emanuel Blames Chicago Crime Uptick on Officers Second-Guessing 
Themselves, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13, 2015, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/politics/ct-emanuel-fetal-police-met-20151012-
story.html.   
314 See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.   
315  To be sure, because gun crimes increased in 2016, a constant level of firearms seizures 
would mean a lower “success rate” in seizing guns per crime.  But our interest here is not 
in police success, but rather police effort.  Given steady seizures, it would appear that effort 
remained constant.    
316 We ran our arrest series through the strucbreak program and observed no structural 
breaks.     
317  It does appear that Chicago’s crime clearance rates declined in 2016, CHICAGO CRIME 
LAB, supra note 17, at 23, but clearance rates would not appear to be a good measure of 
police effort.  Many crimes are cleared for reasons not connected with law enforcement 
effort.  See generally JOHN E. ECK, SOLVING CRIMES: THE INVESTIGATION OF BURGLARY 
AND ROBBERY (1983); Cassell & Fowles, supra note 30, at 728 (no statistically significant 
connection between historical homicide clearance rates and law enforcement variables).  
Chicago’s declining clearance rates in 2016 were mostly likely due to static levels of law 




stop and frisks, what were they doing instead?  The answer appears to be—traffic 
stops.  While we have not obtained exact data, according to one tabulation while 
stop and frisks declined substantially from 2015 to 2016, the number of CPD 
traffic stops doubled, from about 86,000 in 2015 to about 190,000 in 2016.318  While 
traffic stops may be useful for fighting traffic offenses and other types of crimes, 
their usefulness in suppressing gun violence, and particularly gang-related gun 
violence, is limited.319  Moreover, in March 2016, the Chicago Police Department 
instituted what is commonly referred to as a “no chase” policy, prohibiting police 
chases for traffic offenses320 – further reducing the likelihood that such stops would 
deter possession of firearms.  In our view, this redeployment of policing power 
away from street stops and toward traffic stops produced the expected result—
more gun-related violence.   
 
 Finally, and perhaps most important in determining whether the ACLU 
agreement reduced stops, it should be recalled that one of the main animating 
factors for the agreement was the concern that too many stops were being 
conducted.  The ACLU Report argued that a “shocking number of people” were 
being stopped.321  The ACLU presumably set out to reduce that number in its 
agreement.  And in publicizing its agreement with CPD, the ACLU website 
announced (in bold typeface for emphasis) that “We are confident that the 
agreement will result in fewer stops on Chicago streets.”322   
 
 As things unfolded, the ACLU’s “confident” prediction was correct.  
Indeed, at least in February 2016, when it was clear that the number of stops had 
fallen dramatically—but the consequences had not yet fully materialized—the 
ACLU appeared to be proud of this particular result.  When the Chicago Sun-
Times pointed out the decline in stops to Karen Sheley, Director of Police Practices 
for the ACLU of Illinois, she took credit, saying it was actually “a good thing” 
produced by the agreement.323   
 
C. The ACLU Consent Decree Compared to Illinois Legislation  
 
 One question that could arise in attributing the decline in stops to the ACLU 
agreement is whether the attribution should instead be made to Illinois legislation 
dealing with stop and frisks.  Just a few months after the ACLU settlement 
 
318 See https://www.aclu-il.org/en/news/piercing-myth-so-called-aclu-effect.   
319  See Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 710-11.   
320 See CPD Gen. Order G03-0-01, Emergency Vehicle Operations – Pursuits, available at 
http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-1291920c-54712-9192-
aecb02ef17e0c47d.pdf?hl=true. 
321 See supra note 273 and accompanying text.   
322 ACLU Statement on Agreement with Chicago Police Department on Stop and Frisk 
Reform, ACLU OF ILL, Aug. 13, 2015 (emphasis in original), https://www.aclu-
il.org/en/news/aclu-statement-agreement-chicago-police-department-stop-and-frisk-reform. 




agreement was signed, in October 2015, Illinois governor Bruce Rauner signed 
SB-1304, also called the Police and Community Relations Improvement Act, into 
law.324  The Act became effective January 1, 2016325 and required Illinois police 
officers to provide citizens with a receipt after a stop and frisk.326 The receipt 
required “the officer’s name, badge number and reason for the search or frisk” and 
what (if any) contraband was found.327 The law also required officers to complete a 
“pedestrian stop card” if a person was detained in public.328 The pedestrian stop 
card required “the race and gender of the person and the reason the person was 
stopped.”329 
 
 It is possible that some part of the reduction in stop in frisks in Chicago is 
attributable to SB-1304 rather than the ACLU settlement agreement. But several 
reasons suggest that SB-1304 played, at most, a very small role in the process.   
 
 First, the receipt requirement is rather modest when compared to the ALCU 
consent decree requirements.330 The receipt simply echoes information the police 
already would be recording, requiring far less time to complete than the 70-field 
ACLU form.331  The reader can examine the differences between the two forms by 
looking at them both—found in Appendices B and C to this article.   
 
 Moreover, it is interesting to compare what happened in other parts of 
Illinois outside of Chicago after SB-1304 went into effect.  As noted earlier,332 we 
collected monthly homicide data for all of Illinois from 2012 through 2016.  We 
then backed out the Chicago homicides, leaving a data series for the remainder of 
Illinois.  We then ran this data through the strucchange program discussed earlier.  
Unlike the Chicago homicide series which showed a clear structural break, the 
series for the remainder of Illinois showed no such break.  The fact that, unlike 
Chicago, homicides outside of Chicago did not sharply increase in 2016 provides 
indirect support for the proposition that stop and frisks did not decline sharply 
outside Chicago.   
 
Of course, rather than relying on indirect measures of what happened to stop 
and frisks in Illinois in 2016, direct data would be preferable.  While we have not 
 
324 See New Illinois Law Requires Police to Give a “Stop Receipt” for Pedestrians, WREX 
(Jan. 5, 2016, 9:37 AM), http://www.wrex.com/story/30888673/2016/01/Tuesday/new-
illinois-law-requires-police-to-give-a-stop-receipt-for-pedestrians. 
325 See 50 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 727/1-1 through 1-5.   





330 See FIRST CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 274 at 69–71.  
331 MacDonald, The “Ferguson Effect” is Destroying Chicago, supra note 9.   




been able to obtain any, we have found a few anecdotal reports from cities outside 
of Chicago about implementation of SB-1304.  The general sense of these reports 
was that police did not have much concern about issuing the relatively-easy-to-
complete “stop receipts.”333   
 
 For these reasons, we believe that the decline in stops attributable to the 
Illinois legislation is relatively minor compared to the decline attributable to the 
ACLU settlement agreement.  But regardless of the details of attribution, the larger 
point remains that a precipitous fall in stop and frisks occurred in 2016—at 
precisely the same time as homicides spiked.  How to respond to that spike is the 
subject of the article’s next section.   
 
IX.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 In this penultimate section, we turn to policy implications that might be 
drawn from our findings.  Initially, we agree with other researchers that we cannot 
determine “definitively” what caused the 2016 spike in Chicago gun violence.334 
Social science research rarely provides conclusive answers.  But lack of a 
definitive answer should not paralyze policy makers seeking to respond to rising 
gun violence.  Public policy decisions must be made on the basis of the available 
information, and we believe our research shed important light by identifying the 
most likely cause of the spike. 
 
 Our main goal in this article is descriptive—to diagnosis what caused the 
spike, so that others on the ground in the affected communities in Chicago and 
other cities facing comparable problems could design appropriate cures.  But given 
the pressing public policy problem described by this article, we would be remiss if 
we failed to provide at least some tentative recommendations for what could be 
done to reduce the terrible toll in human lives and suffering in Chicago and other 
cities facing similar issues.  Understanding that our recommendations, like our 
research, are only part of what will be an on-going discussion, we briefly and 
tentatively outline several specific steps that our research suggests policymakers 
should consider in Chicago and elsewhere.   
 
A. Reassessing the Benefits of Stop and Frisk  
 
 
333 See, e.g., Jeff Kolkey, Police in Rockford Area, Illinois to Implement New Stop-and-
Frisk Rules in 2016, ROCKFORD REGISTER STAR, Sept. 19, 2015 (quoting Rockford 
Assistant Deputy Police Chief as concluding that the new law was unlikely to change how 
stops were conducted), http://www.rrstar.com/article/20150919/NEWS/.  




 In assessing police practices, cost-benefit analysis holds great promise.335  
Perhaps the most obvious conclusion that follows from our research is that 
Chicago should reassess the benefits of stop and frisks—and other cities should 
exercise great caution before emulating Chicago’s example of steep reductions.  
Our research is the first study to attempt to quantitatively assess the crime control 
benefits of CPD’s stop and frisk policies.  If our findings are correct and if CPD’s 
frequency of stops had simply continued through 2016, they would have prevented 
the deaths of about 230 victims, the shootings of about 1,100 victims, and the 
infliction of social harm of about $1.5 billion.  If our approximate figures are 
anywhere close to correct, these are very significant benefits (accruing in the 
course of just a single year) that must be fully and fairly considered in evaluating 
the desirability of CPD’s stop and frisk policies.   
 
 It is also important to emphasize that stop and frisk policies can often be 
implemented within existing police budgets.  For example, from a purely fiscal 
point of view, for CPD to continue its 2015 stop and frisk policies through 2016 
would not have required hiring any new officers or otherwise expanding the 
budget.  Given the financial exigencies that Chicago and other cities face,336 the 
financial feasibility of using such policies is important.   
 
 Our findings also have an important implication for assessing the 
effectiveness of stop and frisk policies. Some previous studies point to the relative 
infrequency of actual seizures of firearms to suggest the policies are ineffective.337 
But these challenges assume that the crime-reduction mechanism for stop and frisk 
policies is incapacitation—i.e., removing guns from the hands of criminals on the 
streets via the stop and frisk.  Our article suggests, consistent with some other 
research,338 that the policies operate more through deterrence—i.e., keeping 
criminals from carrying guns on the street due to fear of being stopped and 
frisked.339  If this conclusion is correct, then the efficacy of stop and frisk policies 
should not be assessed solely (or even primarily) through the number of firearms 
 
335 See generally POLICING PROJECT, ACHIEVING SOUND POLICING: THE PROMISE AND 
CHALLENGES OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC SAFETY (2017), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58a33e881b631bc60d4f8b31/t/5a81fc3f24a6944a11d
916fe/1518468200792/Policing+Project_Achieving+Sound+Policing+2.9.2018.pdf; Barry 
Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 NYU L. Rev. 1827, 1832 
(2015) (calling for cost-benefit assessment of policing practices and procedures).  
336 See, e.g., The Civic Federation, Civic Federation Supports Proposed FY2018 Chicago 
Budget (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.civicfed.org/ChicagoFY2018Release (noting that 
Chicago “will face many more tough decisions in the coming years to fully stabilize its 
financial situation”).   
337 See, e.g., 2015 ACLU STOP AND FRISK REPORT, supra note 275, at 15 (citing datum that 
in New York City fewer than 2% of frisked persons were carrying weapons).     
338  See supra note 222 and accompanying text.   
339  The alternative to deterrence is “incapacitation”—i.e., in this context, direct seizure of a 




police seize or the number of arrests they make,340 but rather through the policies’ 
contribution to reducing crime rates.  Put another way, while removing guns from 
the streets through stop and frisks is useful, it appears that even more important is 
preventing guns from being carried on the streets in the first instance.     
 
 Our analysis also sheds light on another criticism made of Chicago’s stop 
and frisk policies—that CPD stopped Chicagoans at a far higher rate than other 
cities.   For example, the ACLU collected data showing that in May to August 
2014, the Chicago Police Department stopped 93.6 people per 1000, while during 
May to August 2011 (at the height of NYPD’s stop and frisk practices), the New 
York Police Department stopped 22.9 people per 1000341—making Chicago’s stop 
rate about four times higher.  But this difference is easily explained by comparing 
the size and nature of Chicago’s crime rates compared to New York City’s.  
Chicago’s homicide rate is about seven times higher than New York’s, and its 
homicide-by-firearm rate is more than ten times higher than New York’s.342   Since 
stop and frisk polices aim to respond to crimes—and particularly serious gun 
crimes—the proper unit of measurement would be stops per serious gun crime 
rather than stops per person.  On this important measure, it appears that Chicago’s 
stop rate before the ACLU agreement was likely lower than New York’s.343    
 
 To be clear, we are not reflexively calling for stop and frisk policies as some 
sort of “cure all” for crime.  In Chicago in particular, we are not necessarily calling 
for a restoration of pre-agreement levels of stop and frisks or the invalidation of the 
ACLU Settlement Agreement.  Stop and frisk policies necessarily entail tradeoffs.  
For example, stop and frisks involve a restriction of liberty of the person 
stopped—and an even greater intrusion if the person is frisked.344  And stop and 
frisk policies can affect neighborhood perceptions of law enforcement fairness.345   
These are potential costs that have to be evaluated as part of a full cost-benefit 
analysis.  Professors Cook and Ludwig have accurately summarized the relevant 
tradeoffs in explaining:346 
 
340  For other criticisms of so-called “hit rate” assessments of police efficacy, including an 
argument that it tends to underestimate burdens placed on racial minorities, see Sonja B. 
Starr, Explaining Race Gaps in Policing: Normative and Empirical Challenges, U. Mich. 
Law & Econ. Paper 15-003 (Jan. 2015), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2550032.  
341  See, e.g., 2015 ACLU STOP AND FRISK REPORT, supra note 275, at 10.     
342  See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.   
343  See supra note 89-93 and accompanying text.   
344  See, e.g., JENNIFER FRATELLO ET AL., COMING OF AGE WITH STOP AND FRISK: 
EXPERIENCES, PERCEPTIONS, AND PUBLIC SAFETY IMPLICATIONS 34 (2013). 
345 Henry F. Fradella & Michael D. White, Stop-and-Frisk, in INST. FOR JUSTICE, 
REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 67-68 (2017); Craig B. Futterman et al., Youth/Police 
Encounters on Chicago’s South Side: Acknowledging the Realities, 2016 U. CHI. LEG. F. 1, 
62-64 (2016); Renee Hutchins, Stop Terry: Reasonable Suspicion, Race, and a Proposal to 
Limit Terry Stops, 16 LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 883, 899 (2014). 
346 The agreement allows for either party to terminate the agreement “at any time.”  ACLU 





[T]he best available evidence suggests that police patrols against 
illegal gun carrying may produce benefits far in excess of 
measurable costs.  The question is whether these substantial net 
gains are outweighed by the intangible costs of such policies, 
including the resentment that such programs may engender among 
those who are stopped and searched.  While the imposition is 
primarily on residents of targeted high-crime neighborhoods, the 
benefit also accrues primarily to those neighborhoods.  The 
expansion of such efforts deserves serious consideration, with 
particular attention given to the concerns and preferences of the 
residents of impacted neighborhoods.347   
 
Our limited conclusion here generally tracks that of Professors Cook and Ludwig.  
We do not attempt to reach definitive answer about the desirability of stop and 
frisk policies in Chicago or elsewhere.348  Instead, we advance the limited point that, 
so far as we have seen in public discussion, the benefits of stop and frisk policies 
appear to have been dramatically undervalued in striking a proper balance between 
competing concerns.  This might suggest that an increase in stop and frisks is 
appropriate. But our article simply attempts to accurately describe the (literally 
lifesaving) benefits of stop and frisk so that, with the benefits properly described, 
policy makers in Chicago and other cities are in a position to make a final 
determination about how best to proceed.   
 
B. Reassuring Minority Communities about the Value of Stop and Frisk 
 
 We also echo Professors Cook and Ludwig in suggesting that the concerns 
and preferences of the impacted neighborhoods must be heavily weighted in any 
calculation of costs and benefits to stop and frisk.  All too often, policy makers 
determining such issues as stop and frisk do not have to bear the burdens of 
expanded police enforcement—or of increased gun violence.  Given that stop and 
frisk policies may present “deadly dilemmas,”349 the proper resolution of those 
dilemmas requires consideration of the weights to be attached to the competing 
sides of the scales—weights that perhaps can best be attached by those directly 
affected by the consequences.350 
 
 
347 COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 267, at 132–33 
348 Cf. Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s “Stop-
and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813, 
822 (2007) (calling for quantitative examination “of the issues in dispute” in stop in frisk).   
349 Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 65 (2008). 
350 See  Harmon & Manns, supra note 299, at 66 (“A police chief must integrate all of the 
competing voices to develop a neighborhood-specific and historically-contextualized 
understanding of community concerns both about safety and order and about interactions 




 At the same time, however, our findings may be useful to communities in 
Chicago and other parts of the country that are considering these issues, 
particularly minority communities.  Our research strongly suggests, contrary to 
claims made by some observers, that CPD’s stop and frisk practices have an 
important effect in providing increased public safety for minority residents in 
Chicago.  For example, if we simply take our finding that extending the stop and 
frisk practices through 2016 would have saved approximately 236 lives351—and if 
we assume that those saved lives would have been distributed in the same ratios as 
were found in 2016 for all Chicago homicides352—then the lives of about 184 
African-American homicide victims and 38 Hispanic victims would have been 
saved in that one year.   Our findings thus suggest that, just as gun violence exacts 
a disproportionate toll on minority communities, stop and frisk as a response to 
that violence provides special benefits for those communities—benefits that are 
often overlooked353 and may strengthen the arguments of voices within minority 
communities calling for strong proactive policing.354   
 
 In any reassessment of the scope of stop and frisk policies in Chicago (and 
elsewhere), an overriding consideration will necessarily be constitutional 
compliance.  After all, CPD entered into the settlement agreement with the ACLU 
only after the ACLU leveled allegations of unconstitutional racially discriminatory 
application of the stops.   
 
 Previous scholars have suggested that “well-designed proactive policing 
programs that utilize stops and frisks probably could pass constitutional muster.”355  
Here, our research on the collective effects of CPD’s stop and frisks obviously 
does not permit us to assess specifically the constitutionality of any particular stop 
(or even any collection of stops).  But at the same time, the general test for the 
 
351 See supra note 261 and accompanying text.  
352 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (78% of the 2016 Chicago homicide victims 
were African-Americans and 16% were Hispanics).  A listing of the names of all of the 
2016 Chicago homicide victims in found in Appendix A. 
353 Cf. Steven L. Carter, When Victims Happen to be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 447 (1988) 
(“All too often, American legal and political culture seem to suggest . . . that there are two 
varieties of people who are involved in criminal activity, black people and victims”).     
354 See, e.g., Ross Sandler, Other Voices on Stop-and-Frisk, 18 CITY L. 74 (2012) (noting 
African-American mother supporting NYPD’s stop-and-frisk policies and observing “an 
undercurrent of grass-roots support for stop-and frisk”); see also Timothy Mclaughlin, 
Chicago police push for community assistance after deaths of three children, Reuters (Feb. 
17, 2017, 2:20 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chicago-police/chicago-police-
push-for-community-assistance-after-deaths-of-three-children-idUSKBN15W2BP (quoting 
the mother of Takiya Holmes, an 11-year-old who was killed in Chicago, as saying “[the 
police] are not our enemy.”); Jeremy Gorner, Chicago’s homicide total drops by over 100, 
but violence still ‘intolerably high’, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 29, 2017), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-chicago-violence-2017-
story.html (aunt of a 15-year-old homicide victim, Latasha Green, “I’ve seen more police 
officers out here. They do good over here on this side, honestly.”).   




constitutionality of any stop is whether it is based on “reasonable suspicion,”356 a 
standard that requires only “some minimal level of objective justification”357 that 
“criminal activity may be afoot.”358  In making a determination of whether to stop a 
person, officers are allowed to draw on “their own experience and specialized 
training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information 
available to them that might well elude an untrained person.”359  The evidence 
collected here suggests that, at the systemic level, the collective body of CPD’s 
stop and frisks were, in some sense, “objectively justified” because they had such a 
clear connection to deterring gun violence in Chicago.  Put another way, the fact 
that the 2016 reductions in stop and frisks appear to have caused a sharp increase 
in homicides (and shootings) suggests that, in general, police practices were 
properly targeted on reducing crime—rather than on racial harassment.360    
 
 Professor Erika George has provided an insightful analysis of these kinds of 
issues in discussing earlier litigation between the ACLU and the City of Chicago—
specifically litigation pertaining to law enforcement operations conducted by the 
Chicago Housing Authority.361  In criticizing a federal court decision restricting (at 
the ACLU’s behest) “sweeps” of public housing, George explained that: 
 
[b]y focusing first and fundamentally on what the residents of public 
housing have a right to be free from, namely governmental intrusion, the 
court neglected precisely what public housing residents are entitled to, 
freedom to flourish.  The lack of one of life’s most basic necessities—
security—prevents residents of public housing from experiencing 
substantive freedom.362  
 
Similar concerns are present in evaluating stop and frisk policies, which require (as 
George suggests) a more expansive consideration of the competing concerns.363   
 
356 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973).   
357 INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984).   
358 Navarette v. California, 134 S.Ct. 168, 1690 (2014).  Current doctrine does not consider 
the severity of the offense as a factor in stops, although this failure has been criticized.  See 
Note, An Offense-Severity Model for Stop-and-Frisks, 123 YALE L.J. 1448 (2014). 
359 United States v. Arivizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002).   
360  Of course, our observation about the general effect of stop and frisks could not be used 
to authorize any particular stop.  To be constitutionally valid, a stop requires 
“particularized suspicion.”  See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 36 (2000).  
But cf. Meares, supra note 309, at 177 (“A programmatic understanding of stop-and-frisk 
more accurately reflects reality, because stop-and-frisk generally is implemented as a 
program.”). 
361 See Erika George, Recent Development, The Fourth Amendment’s Forcing of Flawed 
Choices: Giving Content to Freedom for Residents of Public Housing, 30 HARV. CIV. RTS-
CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 577 (1995).   
362 Id. at 593.    
363 Policy evaluations of stop and frisk policies present separate issues from “mass 
incarceration,” in which lengthy sentences have had a racially disparate impact.  See, e.g., 





 In connection with this myopic focus exclusively on freedom from 
governmental intrusion while ignoring “freedom to flourish,” it is interesting to 
observe what appears to be the same problem in an extensive report by Judge 
Keys, the retired federal magistrate judge appointed as the consultant to supervise 
the ACLU settlement agreement and to address racial disparity issues.  Under the 
agreement, Judge Keys was to issue semi-annual reports on CPD’s compliance 
with the agreement.  On March 23, 2017, Judge Keys issued his first report, but it 
was limited to the first six months of 2016 (i.e., January 1 through June 30, 2016).364   
 
 The report noted that “[s]triking the balance between law enforcement 
interests in preventing crime and civil rights advocates’ interest in protecting 
individual liberties is at the heart of the Agreement.”365  But thereafter, the 216-page 
report spent essentially no time discussing the issue of “preventing crime.”  For 
example, quite surprisingly, the report does not appear to directly discuss the sharp 
increase in homicides that occurred in Chicago during the first six months of 2016 
(the period of time covered by the report) which was attracting attention all 
throughout Chicago and, indeed, throughout the country.   
 
 Nor did the report look at crime victimization data for the City of Chicago, 
which would also seem to be relevant to “striking the balance.”366  For example, a 
recent analysis of Chicago’s National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) data 
showed that the CPD received reports of only about 28% of all sexual assaults, 
56% of robberies, 55% of domestic violence offenses, 62% of aggravated assaults, 
40% of simple assaults, 55% of burglaries, 79% of vehicle thefts, and 26% of 
thefts.367  It would be interesting to see whether consideration of actual victimization 
rates—rather than reported crime rates—has some explanatory power in the 
considering differences related to stop and frisk.   
 
 Moreover, of particular interest given the focus of this article, the 
consultant’s report thought there was a lack of “any statistical evidence showing a 
causal connection or statistically significant correlation between the frequency with 
 
COLORBLINDNESS (2010).   Issues surrounding how to apprehend potential criminals are 
different than those surrounding how long to imprison them if convicted.  Cf. Eric Luna & 
Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2010) (criticizing 
mandatory minimum sentences).  Indeed, it may be possible that increases in certainty of 
punishment could lead to a reduction in sentence severity.  See generally WILLIAM J. 
STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011).   
364 FIRST CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 274.  
365  Id. at 12.   
366 Cf. DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL & STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE (3d ed. 2010) (discussing how crime victims are generally overlooked in 
criminal justice decisions).   





which police officers stop and frisk criminal suspects and any decrease in crime 
rates.”368  Of course, this article now provides such statistical evidence specifically 
for Chicago, which we believe should form part of future discussions about stop 
and frisk policies in America’s “Second City” and other cities as well.  Moreover, 
the consultant’s report (released in March 2017) may have overlooked other 
studies on stop and frisk policies, as summarized by the National Academy of 
Science review of the literature (released in November 2017).  A number of those 
studies did suggest a causal connection between stop and frisks and crimes, as 
discussed earlier.369 
 
 The consultant’s report also addressed at length the issue of the extent to 
which CPD’s stops were, in the consultant’s view, “good” or “bad”—i.e., the 
extent to which CPD paperwork documented that the stop complied with 
constitutional requirements or not.  The report found a “good” stop rate between 90 
and 94 percent, depending on how certain events were coded.370  The consultant 
concluded that this was an “excellent start” to implementing the agreement,371 
although a 4 to 10%  bad stop rate would involve a large number of stops.  One 
difficulty in interpreting the data is that, it turns out, most of the “bad” stops, rested 
simply on a determination that there were “not enough facts” recorded in the report 
to justify a stop—which could simply be a failure to record in the report all the 
information justifying the stop.372  Because the report offered no details about how 
the bad stop determinations were made (other than the judgment of the consultant), 
it is impossible to reach further conclusions about the nature of the 
determinations.373  But, concerningly, the report found that the chance of being 
subjected to a “bad stop” was higher for African-American and Hispanic civilians, 
although it was not possible to say whether these differences were caused by race 
or unobserved variables not tested in the statistical model.374  Our equations  suggest 
that one of the interactions between variables that should be carefully considered in 
assessing such stop and frisk issues is the likely linkage to rising crime rates as 
stop and frisks decline.   
 
 Since the release of the consultant’s first six-month report in March 2017, 
the process of semi-annual reports appears to have slowed down even further.  It 
took another year—until March 2018—to release the second six-month report, this 
 
368  FIRST CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 274, at 8.   
369 See supra notes 53-80 and accompanying text.   
370 FIRST CONSULTANT REPORT, supra note 274,  at 29.   
371  Id. at 117.   
372 REVISED FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT TO FIRST CONSULTANT REPORT, Mar. 17, 2017, at 
18-19, https://www.aclu-il.org/sites/default/files/appendix-a-analysis-of-coded-isr-
narratives.pdf.  
373  See also infra notes 371-72 and accompanying text (noting lack of transparency inherent 
in these determinations).   




one discussing the second half of 2016.375  As with the first report, this report also 
did consider whether declining stop and frisks placed minority communities at 
special risk of increased victimization in 2016 and beyond—one relevant factor in 
the balance between the need for preventing crime and the need for protecting 
individual liberties.  The report did, however, conclude that CPD had “come long 
way in its attempts to alleviate the concerns raised by the ACLU in March of 2015 
. . . .”376  Interestingly, to the extent that the ACLU was concerned that police were 
stopping a disproportionate number of African-American and Hispanics, the 
agreement did not appear to have had any significant effect in changing the 
proportions.  Comparing the last six months of the 2015 to the last six months of 
the 2016, stop rates for all racial groups declined by about the same rate—stops 
rates for Black non-Hispanics declined 81%, for Hispanics 79%, and for White 
non-Hispanics 82%.377 
 
 Finally, on the subject of balancing individual liberties with effective crime 
control, it is important to note that remedies exist for unconstitutional stops and 
frisk by law enforcement agencies.  Not only can illegally-obtained evidence be 
suppressed under the exclusionary rule, but for innocent persons unlawfully 
stopped, a civil rights action under § 42 U.S.C. 1983 is available.  On the other 
hand, for victims of ineffective crime control—such as someone shot or killed 
because the government failed to make a stop—the possibility of a remedy is 
remote.378     
 
C.  Removing or at Least Simplifying the Investigative Stop Report 
 
 
375 See CITY OF CHICAGO, THE CONSULTANT’S SECOND SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON THE 
INVESTIGATORY STOP AND PROTECTIVE PAT DOWN AGREEMENT (2018),  
https://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/dol/supp_info/InvestigatorStops2nd
Report7116_123116/TheConsultantsReportJuly12016December312016.pdf [hereinafter 
SECOND CONSULTANT REPORT].   
376  Id. at 220.  The second report noted that while for the first six months of 2016, the best 
estimate was that between 91.99% and 93.75% were good stops, for the second six months 
of 2016 the best estimate was 93.2% to 95.2%.  Id. at 168.  As with the first report, the 
determination of what was a “good stop” and a “bad step” was based on the documentation 
provided, see id. at 166, not any actual determination that the stop was, in fact, 
unconstitutional.     
377  Id. at 145.   
378 The ability of crime victims to challenge government’s failure to effectively enforce the 
law is severely restricted.  See BELOOF ET AL., supra note 366, at 177–205.  Under current 
doctrine, recourse is likely only available in circumstances where government (in)action is 
based on the race of the criminal or the perpetrator.  See Elliot-Park v. Manglona, 592 F.3d 
1003 (9th Cir. 2010).   It is in interesting question whether, in light of the racially disparate 
impact of the resulting homicides from reductions in stop in frisk, a viable constitutional 
challenge could be made to those reductions.  Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000d covers unjustified 
discriminatory effects of actions by recipients of federal funds, although any such actions 
must be brought by the federal government rather than individual plaintiffs.  Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).  This complicated legal issue is beyond the scope of this 




 Related to the previous policy recommendations, we believe that policy 
makers need to be extremely concerned about placing unnecessary impediments to 
police stop and frisks.  In Chicago, for example, policymakers should give serious 
consideration to removing or at least simplifying the cumbersome stop and frisk 
form (the Investigative Stop Report or “ISR”).  As discussed earlier, it appears that 
completing the report in connection with each stop takes at least ten to fifteen 
minutes, maybe even as long as 45 minutes for some officers.379  Presumably this is 
largely due to the “narrative” section of the form, which could take an extended 
time to fill out.  We see little evidence in our data that the length of time is simply 
due to lack of training or familiarity with the form.  After the form was first 
introduced at the end of 2015, it appears that, roughly speaking, the number of stop 
and frisks did not increase through 2016, but rather simply fell to a new, much 
lower, level.380  If the length of time were simply a training problem, we would have 
expected to see the number of stop and frisks rise throughout 2016 as officers 
gained greater familiarity with completing the form.   
 
 It is important to understand that nothing in the Constitution requires that 
the CPD keep such complicated records that involve so much time for its officers 
to complete, as least based on the current state of litigation.381  Instead, the 
requirement to complete the form stems solely from the ACLU agreement—an 
agreement from which CPD is free to withdraw at any time.  Moreover, pursuant to 
the terms of the agreement, this information is kept confidential by the CPD and is 
only made available to the ACLU and the consultant monitoring the agreement.382  
Accordingly, it does not appear to be available to independent academic 
researchers, not to mention the general public.  While the reports are reviewed by 
Judge Keys, any conclusions he reaches will essentially rest on a black box of data 
that cannot be examined.  It is thus hard to understand how the information called 
for in the ISRs could play a significant role in transparent oversight of the CPD, in 
contrast to other cities where publicly-available stop and frisk data has helped 
improve public knowledge.383 
 
 In any event, whatever may be the merits or demerits of initially collecting 
such information, the only relevant issue now is whether it is desirable to continue 
collecting such information.  As of this writing (April 2018), CPD has collected 
 
379 See supra note 300 and accompanying text.   
380 See Figure 5, supra (monthly stop and frisks).  We have requested 2017 stop and frisk 
data from the CPD and are awaiting its receipt.  This may shed further light on the subject.   
381 Of course, later in litigation, if a district court were to find a systemic constitutional 
violation, it could consider possibly issuing an injunction with supra-constitutional 
requirements, if those requirements were designed to cure pre-existing constitutional 
violations.  See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley (II), 433 U.S. 267 (1996).   
382 See ACLU Agreement, supra note 280, at ¶ 3.1 
383  Cf. Harmon & Manns, supra note 299, at 66 (noting that in New York, public 
availability of NYPD stop and frisk forms “allowed a much richer public debate about 




about 27 months of data, and only 12 months have even been analyzed (so far as 
can be determined in public reports).  Thus, plenty of data now exists for the 
ACLU and the monitoring consultant to evaluate CPD’s stop and frisk practices.  
Given the heavy price that collecting the data may exact in human lives and 
shooting injuries, further cumbersome collection of data may not pay its own way 
in terms of lessons learned.  Specifically, our research suggests that abolishing the 
general requirement for CPD officers to complete the ISR—as part of an effort to 
restore stop and frisk to pre-agreement levels384—might potentially save more than 
200 lives each year, the vast majority of them crime victims who are racial 
minorities.  If even a fraction our regression calculation of the tradeoff is accurate, 
the reports would have to contain extraordinarily valuable new information to 
justify that cost in human suffering, something that seems unlikely.   
 
 In recommending that the ISR be abolished, we hasten to add that we are not 
recommending changes to the stop “receipt” that officers in Chicago (and 
elsewhere) deliver to persons who have been stopped.385  The reader can compare 
the two forms in Appendices B and C.  The receipt form is much shorter and much 
simpler to complete.  More important, the receipt form serves a valuable public 
purpose beyond simply recording data about stops.  The receipt is designed to 
reassure persons who have been stopped that there was a valid basis for the stop.  
This reassurance is an important public policy goal, designed to not only reduce 
anxiety among those who have been stopped but also help to maintain public 
 
384  If additional, highly-detailed data is needed about stop and frisks, a point we explore 
below at infra notes 385-91 and accompanying text, it could presumably be accomplished 
by collecting such data from a small sample of police officers, rather than the entirety of 
the force. 
385  From what we can tell, CPD had required record-keeping requirements on stops 
throughout 2015, as pursuant to Special Order S04-13-09 (issued January 7, 2015), officers 
were required to complete a “Contact Information Card” for any stop that did not result in 
an arrest.  Contact Information System, Special Order S04-13-09, 
http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12a864e6-91c12-a864-
e985efd125ff521f.pdf.  This policy also contained guidance on the circumstances in which 
stop and frisks were appropriate.  From what we can tell, the substantive guidance on 
circumstances in which officers could make stop and frisks did not change during the 
relevant period of time, although CPD did provide additional training on stop and frisk 
policies.  See Declaration of Anne Kirkpatrick, DE 113-2, Smith v. City of Chicago, No. 
1:15-cv-03467 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 30, 2016).  Our article, of course, does not recommend 
eliminating policy guidance to officers on the circumstances in which stop and frisks are 
appropriate (not to mention other law enforcement tactics), such as the guidance contained 
in Special Order S04-13-09. 
 Nor are we recommending any changes in other record-keeping requirements, as 
our article focuses on stop-and-frisk.  In particular, to avoid any confusion, we are not 
addressing the recently-enhanced CPD requirements for reports in connection with police 
department use of force, which stemmed from recommendations from the U.S. Justice 
Department.  See CPD, General Order G0-02-02, Incidents Requiring the Completion of a 






confidence in the police.386  And with regard to this particular form, it appears that 
the law enforcement effectiveness is not diminished.  As discussed earlier, police 
agencies in other parts of Illinois outside of Chicago appear to have been able to 
implement this requirement without the increase in crime rates that Chicago 
experienced.387  Based on the analysis presented in this article, Chicago (and other 
cities) should keep the receipts—and discontinue burdensome additional record-
keeping requirements, such as the ISRs. 
 
D.  Relying on Body Cameras 
 
 One reason that we feel comfortable in recommending that the Chicago 
Police Department (and other law enforcement agencies) should consider 
abolishing impediments to stop and frisk such as the cumbersome ISR form is that 
recording data via such electronic “paperwork” now seems terribly outdated.  
Indeed, if we look specifically at Chicago, as of December 2017, CPD became the 
largest police force in the nation fully equipped with body cameras.  Following a 
two-year rollout, in December 2017 Mayor Rahm Emanuel and CPD 
Superintendent Eddie Johnson touted the fact that all 7,000 CPD patrol officers 
had been equipped with cameras, calling it “the largest deployment of the 
technology in the United States.”388 
 
 There is a considerable empirical debate about whether body cameras reduce 
excessive force by law enforcement officers.389  While one early study found 
significant reductions in complaints against officers,390 more recent studies have 
been somewhat mixed.  For example, in November 2017, the Metropolitan Police 
Department of the District of Columbia (MPD) reported the results of a 
randomized controlled trial to examine the effects of MPD’s body camera 
program.391 The study found that body cameras had “no effect on police use of 
force, citizen complaints, policing activity, or judicial outcomes.”392  And, of course, 
body cameras are not a panacea for police misconduct.  A clear illustration of this 
sad fact comes from the McDonald video (made by a dashboard camera rather than 
 
386 See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT 24 (2015) 
(calling for collection of demographic data on, among other things, stop and frisks); Craig 
B. Futterman et al., Youth/Police Encounters on Chicago’s South Side: Acknowledging the 
Realities, 2016 U. CHI. LEG. F. 1, 36 (calling for sharing of information about police stops). 
387 See supra notes 316-25 and accompanying text.   
388 Mayor: All Chicago Patrol Officers Now Have Body Cameras, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 
2017, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-bc-il--chicago-police-cameras-20171211-
story.html.  
389 See Rosenthal, supra note 154, at 699 & n.117 (collecting conflicting research).   
390 TONY FARRAR, THE INESCAPABLE PANOPTICONIC GAZE: THE EFFECT OF BODY-WORN 
CAMERAS ON POLICE USE-OF-FORCE (2013).    
391 David Yokum et al., Evaluating the Effects of Police Body-Worn Cameras: A 
Randomized Controlled Trial, Oct. 10, 2017, https://osf.io/rk2pa/.  




a body camera) which did not deter the officer involved from repeatedly shooting 
McDonald.393   
 
 For our purposes, however, we need not enter into the broader debate about 
whether body cameras change police behavior.  Our limited point is that, at a 
minimum, body cameras objectively record actions taken by a police officer far 
more effectively than subsequent paperwork.394  Indeed, a 2015 national ACLU 
“White Paper” on police body-mounted cameras took the position that body 
cameras could be an important check  
 
against the abuse of power by police officers.  Historically there was no 
documentary evidence of most encounters between police officers and the 
public, and due to the volatile nature of these encounters, this often 
resulted in radically divergent accounts of incidents.  Cameras have the 
potential to be a win-win, helping protect the public against police 
misconduct, and at the same time helping protect police against false 
accusations of abuse.395  
 
 It seems redundant to have CPD officers make a video recording of any stop 
and frisk that they conduct and then subsequently take an additional fifteen 
minutes to complete the ISR.  One electronic record should be enough to provide 
whatever information needs to be reviewed about the stop—as well as to create 
whatever deterrence effect to inappropriate police behavior might be possible.  
And given the fact that law enforcement agencies all over the country appear to be 
rapidly expanding their use of body cameras,396 other agencies may be able to take 
similar simplifying steps. 
 
 One note of caution needs to be sounded about body cameras.  One early 
controlled study comparing officers with cameras to those without found that 
officers with cameras “conducted significantly fewer stop-and-frisks and arrests 
than officers who were not wearing the technology.” 397  While more recent research 
 
393 See supra notes 130-50 and accompanying text. 
394  See MICHAEL D. WHITE, POLICE OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE 
EVIDENCE (2014).   
395 Jay Stanley, ACLU Senior Policy Analyst, Police Body-Mounted Cameras: With Right 
Policies in Place, a Win for All (March 2015), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/police_body-mounted_cameras-v2.pdf.  
396 Police Body Worn Cameras: A Policy Scorecard, Leadership Conf. (Aug. 2016), 
https://www.bwcscorecard.org/ [https://perma.cc/L89W-JHMV]. 
397 See, e.g., Justin T. Ready & Jacob T.N. Young, The Impact of On-Officer Video 
Cameras on Police-Citizen Contacts: Findings from a Controlled Experiment in Mesa, 
Arizona, J. EXP. CRIMINOLOGY (June 14, 2015), http://centerformediajustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/The-Impact-of-On-officer-Video-Cameras-on-Police-Citzen-




does not appear to replicate this finding,398 this potential deterrent effect to stop and 
frisks should be monitored carefully in Chicago and other cities.   
 
E.  Researching Stop and Frisk Questions 
 
 A final recommendation we make is for further research on the important 
topic of stop and frisk.  In particular, it would be desirable for controlled 
randomized field studies in various neighborhoods of Chicago and other cities to 
examine whether expanded stop and frisk programs have the kind of crime 
reduction effects that we find in our regression equations.  If this article’s 
conclusions are correct, field studies would replicate such effects and demonstrate 
important crime control benefits to this tactic, but conducting such empirical 
research is the only way to find out. 
 
 This article relied on time series regression analysis to identify the cause of 
the homicide spike out of necessity. Because the entire City of Chicago appeared 
to experience the homicide spike at the same time (although to different degrees in 
different parts of the city), it appears that something city-wide triggered the spike.  
Our time series analysis suggests that the decline in stop and frisk was the likely 
cause.  But a preferred methodology for making causal assessments is 
experimental design, in which two areas (at a minimum) are compared, one that is 
subject to the new policy with another “control” jurisdiction that is not.399    
 
 It would be possible to conduct such experiments with stop and frisk in 
Chicago and other large cities.  As is generally recognized, the strongest form of 
evidence on social policies comes from randomized controlled trials (RCTs) or 
similar quasi-experimental designs,400 the so-called “gold standard” for measuring 
outcomes in policing practices.401  Along these lines, it should be possible to employ 
enhanced stop and frisk patrols (subject, of course, to appropriate training and 
safeguards) in certain neighborhoods in a city, but not others.402  It would then be 
possible to compare results and determine whether stop and frisks helped to reduce 
gun-related crimes.   
 
 This experimental approach was recently used to determine possible ways to 
respond to gun crimes in St. Louis and Philadelphia.  Different areas within the 
 
398 See Yokum, supra note 391, at 14 (using measures of discretionary police activity, not 
including stop and frisk, that showed no reduction with introduction of bodycams).   
399
Rushin & Edwards, supra note 115, at 740; see also; Daniel E. Ho & Donald B. Rubin, 
Credible Causal Inference for Empirical Legal Studies, 7 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 17, 20 
(2011) (collecting illustrations of this approach). 
400 NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 49, at 1-16. 
401 POLICING PROJECT, supra note 335, at 8.  
402 The selection process for such “test” neighborhoods should be based solely on scientific 
needs and sensitive to avoiding racially-disparate impacts.  The St. Louis and Philadelphia 




cities were exposed to different policing strategies, with an unaffected area left as a 
“control.”  In St. Louis, significant reductions in firearms violence resulted from 
patrols directed at crime hotspots that involved enhanced enforcement activity, 
although whether reductions were attributable to stop and frisks was disputed.403  In 
Philadelphia, it appeared in one study that pedestrian stops conducted by foot 
patrol officers lead to crime reductions, although a follow-up study was unable to 
replicate the gains.404  These studies were not specifically designed to test the 
efficacy of stop and frisk as a crime-fighting measure, and our findings of 
significant changes in crime rates associated with changes in stop and frisk 
practices suggest that further studies focusing specifically on this law enforcement 
tactic are warranted. And because the success of stop and frisk may vary from city 
to city,405 it would be particularly useful to conduct such research in various cities, 




 This article set out to explain what caused the 2016 Chicago homicide spike.  
Based on the analysis presented here, the sharp reduction in the number of stop and 
frisks conducted by the Chicago Police Department, coinciding precisely with the 
spike, was most likely the cause. Using multiple regression analysis, we tentatively 
calculate that, in 2016, reductions in stop and frisks by CPD were responsible for 
approximately 236 additional homicides and 1115 additional shootings—thus 
explaining essentially the entire homicide spike.  These findings are highly 
statistically significant; they are also robust, as they survive rigorous scrutiny 
under Bayesian Model Averaging.  And they do not appear to be due to any 
“omitted variable” excluded from our equations.     
 
 This article also explores what caused the clear decline in stop and frisk in 
Chicago in 2016.  It appears quite likely that a consent decree between CPD and 
the ACLU addressing stop and frisks, implemented in late 2015, triggered CPD’s 
decline in stop and frisks. In short, we conclude that the so-called “ACLU Effect” 
was real and that, in 2016, gun violence in Chicago apparently increased 
dramatically—and tragically—as a result.   
 
 While our findings are obviously important to residents of Chicago—
particularly African-Americans and Hispanics who disproportionately were the 
victims of the increased gun violence—our findings have far broader import.  
Based on recent experience in New York City (where stop and frisks may have 
declined without an apparent increase in violence), a conventional wisdom has 
begun to develop that stop and frisks are unnecessary for effective law 
enforcement.  This article explains why any lessons to be drawn from New York 
 
403 R. Rosenfeld, M. Deckard & E. Blackburn, The Effects of Directed Patrol and Self-
Initiated Enforcement on Firearm Violence: A Randomized Controlled Study of Hot Spot 
Policing, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 429 (2014). 
404 E. Groff et al., Does What Police Do at Hot Spots Matter? The Philadelphia Policing 
Tactics Experiment, 53 CRIMINOLOGY 23 (2015); Ratcliffe et al., The Philadelphia Foot 
Patrol Experiment, supra note 69.   




City’s experience may represent something exceptional and do not translate to the 
nation’s “Second City.”  And for many of America’s other cities that have gun 
violence problems comparable to Chicago’s, a sharp reduction in stop and frisks 
might be expected to have similar lethal consequences. 
 
 Throughout our article, we have tried to emphasize the tentative nature of 
our findings—as well as our plea for further research into this important subject.  
And we have also emphasized that stop and frisk policies in Chicago (and 
presumably elsewhere) have social costs of their own.  The costs include intrusions 
on the privacy interests of those persons who are stopped, and in some cases, 
frisked, as well as the potential for harming community trust in law enforcement 
agencies.  We have called for all these subjects to be explored at length, so that 
policymakers have the best available information on which to proceed.  But along 
with these costs to stop and frisks, it is important to consider the benefits.  At least 
in the City of Chicago, these benefits appear to have been generally overlooked.   
 
 In closing, we would be remiss if we failed to mention what appears to be a 
reluctance by some observers even to consider the possibility that stop and frisks 
reduce crime.  As we researched the Chicago homicide spike, we were repeatedly 
struck by the fact that this obvious possible explanation was so often quickly swept 
under the rug.  But the costs of crime—and particularly gun crimes—are too 
significant to avoid considering every possible measure for reducing the toll.  The 
evidence gathered here suggests that stop and frisk policies may be truly lifesaving 
measures that have to be considered as part of any effective law enforcement 





APPENDIX A: THE 2016 CHICAGO HOMICIDE VICTIMS 
 
 The following is list of the 2016 Chicago homicide victims, as tabulated on 
the Chicago Sun-Times website “Homicide Watch Chicago: Mark Every 
Death/Remember Every Victim/Follow Every Case.” 
http://chicago.homicidewatch.org/photo-gallery/2016/index.html. 
 
 If the conclusions drawn in this article are correct, approximately 230 of 
these persons would not have been killed if stop and frisks had been maintained in 
Chicago in 2016 at the same levels of 2015: 
 
Sylvia Brice, Kenneth Weaver, Gregory Livingston III, Andre Lacaze, Carlos 
James, Louis Pena, Yuri Hardy, Matthew Herring, Christopher Brown, Jamil 
Shuaibi, Steven Freeman, James Gill, Roy Gill III, Jamil Farley, Jerry Thomas, 
David McClure, Fabian Ortega, Niko Walker, Nathaniel Edwards, Demetrius 
Newell, Juan Gonzalez, Derrick Jones, Stephen Tucker, Richard Chambers, 
Manual Guzman, Rolando Gamino, Quesola Mimms Anthony Durham, Joel 
Planas, Scott Thompson, Shacora Jackson, Nateyah Hines, Elijah Jackson, 
Shakeyah Jackson, Crispin Coliz Jr., Michael Newell, Daniel Torres, Arturo 
Zizumbo, Corey Martin, Lavaris Johnson, Antonin Mixon, Quenten Wright, 
Lawrence Matchem, Anthony Shorter, Anthony Barr, Otis Hatchett, Derrick 
Swanigan, Shaqwon Stidhun, Nathaniel Lewis-Edwards, Timothy Harmon, 
Sylvester Rainge, Elijah Jones, Lafayette Montgomery, Darren Smith, Ed Brown, 
Antron Young, Deangelo Martin, Bartiomiej Barczyk, Christopher Luckett, Carl 
Jones, Curtis Lowells, Ronald Allen, Reginald Smith, Marqual Bailey, Trayvon 
Dickerson, Mandell Lee Johnson III, Addonis Johnson, Gregorio Aguilar, Charles 
Johnson, Leny Cervantes, Jamie Cervantes, Delvon Watson, Rickey King, Erik 
Peoples, Gregory Thomas-Bell, Dequan Barnett, Diego Alvarado, Thomas Smith, 
Jeffrey Banks, Moises Gonzalez, Deshawn Adams, Zenan Hernandez, Ketrell Hill, 
Paul Cruz, Abimbola Sheleru, Michael Gipson, Matthew Rodgers, Odell Jones Jr., 
Carlos Williams, Kevin Shorter, Simion Jackson, Guadalupe Saucedo-Garcia, 
Javon Wilson, Joseph Anderson, Jarod Morris, Eddie King, Elijah Murphy, Roy 
Love, David Martinez, Michael Anderson, Aaron Perez, Renee Davis, Harry 
Cannon Jr., Joe Lacasto, Taurus Williams, Victor Fernando, Garcia Darian, Tyler 
Grayson, Langdon Tridell, Parker Annette, Harris Louis, Torres Lorenzo, Dixon 
Javoun Burnes, Giovanni Garcia, Raiylana Vasquez, Manuel Vega, Jeremiah 
Parker, Orephus Washington, Clarence Coakley, Kevin Faulkner, Keith Hayes Jr., 
Travis Harris, Luis Villa, Adam Moye, Elijah Terry, Rushun Gaddis, Cynthia 
Richardson, Deon Virges, Seneka Harrison, Steven Hicks, Soloman Walker, 
Francisco Guzman, Aliser Maldonado, Emoni House, Elijah House, Richard 
Porter, Terrell Griffin, Gregory Wong, Arthur Malone, Larry Matthews, Douglas 
Bowman, Raymond Griffin, Tidarrius Smith, Donald Dockery, Gerald Gordon, 
Jacolby Cannon, Tayveon Thomas, Kevin Wilson, Mark Higgins Jr., Walter 
McCurry, Edwin Bryant, Edward Bryant, RaeQuonn Ricks-Williams, Clara 
Gonzalez, Lindsey Anderson, Gilbert Leroy Wainwright III, Luis Corona, Robert 
McClinton, Aaron Bennett, Deandre Banks, Robert Bishop, Demarco Webster Jr., 
Martell Turner, Tyrice Anderson, Brian Fields, Chiquita Ford, Hernando Lamont 
Caster, Steven Cowan, DeAndre Walton, Lawrence Washington, Phillip Lewis, 
Loretta Purcell, Tramell Williams, Lamar Watson, Unknown Female, Jaylen 
Howard, Samuel Williams, Taiwan Fox, Kahn Butler, Jason Balboa, Lucius 




Galvan, Sentwali Adissa Davis, James Gerage, Alejandro Morales, Christopher 
Walters, Marilyn Duffie, Luis Romero, Jamar Robinson, Ronald McBee, Timothy 
Agnew, Demetrius Griffin Jr., Gregory Tucker Jr., Latwon Rogers, Gene Williams, 
Vincent Zarco, Davon Smith, Trasean Stokes, Jeffrey Brinson, Jamel Thomas, 
Jermale Richardson Jr., Faizon Smith, Aaron Jackson, Devante Norwood, Tony 
Hussaini, Aaron Smith, Carlos Ocampo, Lyndell Hodges, Maurice Hilliard, Javier 
Martinez, Raheem Dismukes, Kewon Vilella, Victor Sanjuanero, Martell Rhodes, 
Tommie Darling, Dorise Anderson, Danny Darling, Julia Martin, Jacory Jones, 
Miguel Adan Ramirez, Antonio Lee, Tyrone White, Said Hayik, Adrianna Mayes, 
Samuel Rockett Jr., Lazerrick Ratliff, Corvus Humphries, Jean Vital, Naome 
Zuber Anthony Banks, Byron Walker, Devon Almon, Jonathan Ortiz, Treamel 
Gray, Alvonta Pinex, Arian Smith, Jevon O'Brien, Reginald Fleming Jr., Jose 
Ernesto Martinez, Peter Fabbri, Antonio Porterfield, Nathan Watson, Jewneus 
Wilson, Jose Vizcarra, Izael McKenzie, Joaquin Gonzalez, Carlos Jackson, 
Jeremiah Curtis, Marvin Keyes, Lee Stemley, Anthony Thorpe, Eric Banks, 
Manuel Aguilar, Donald Brunson, Miguel Williams, Bruce Smith, Evette West, 
Ural Durant, Eddie Huff, Maurice McKnight, Parasha Beard, Marquese Fleming, 
Kiev Dobbins, Stanley Easley, Tontrice Weathersby Jr.,, Deamar Bingham, 
Venancia Veracruz Benitez, Ahmad Morgan, Shaquille Alexander, Alexander 
Townsend, Michael Buckner, Tony Saffore, KeeKee Fleming, Sergio Zaragoza, 
Salvador Muniz, John McKinley, Nahmar Holmes, Dominic Hallom, Louis 
Rodriguez, Jerry Lee Cummings, Israel Aragon Jr., Marqui Williams, Gregory 
Sims Jr., Dequan Trimble, Charles Smith, Devon Reavley, Paul Hamilton, 
LeShawn Carr, Kenneth Whitney, David Baldwin Enrique Morales, Allen Smith, 
Jamel Rollins, Korry Rogers, Robert Porter Jr., Alberto Medrano  Juan Pita-Rosas, 
Stephen Toplin, Malik Philpot, Hani Youset, DeLon Sims, Brian Winters, Armani 
Fiero, Kristopher Weiss, Elijah Sims, Jamarh Carter, Raheem Gray, Roberto 
Rodriguez Jr., Othijah Mooney, Terrence Murphy, William Smith, Omar Kent, 
Demarco Richards, Mahdi Herring, Dylan Dent, Corey Strothers Jr., Robert Kraft, 
Ramon Tolbert, Nykea Aldridge, Travis Allen, Rashon Nichols, Johnell Johnson, 
Victor Mata, Tykina Ali, Christopher Hibbler, Shaniya Staples, Kirk Johnson, 
Madison Watson, Melanie Watson, Mario Cousins, Booker Parrow, Kendrick 
Thornton, Daniel Delgado, Malik Causey, Darius Brownlee, Jesus Santiago 
Valois, John Alexander, Mario Mojica-Rios, Miles Kent, Martell McCary, Tyshun 
Jones, Chavrone Finley, Kenneth Carrington, Mikel Maragh, Baby Boy Welch, 
Kirino Fabian, Aaron Brown, Chavaris Guider, Vincent Winkfield, Anthony 
Nelson, Ladrell Brown, Alfronso Kyles, Antoine Johnson, Derrick Canady, 
Arshell Dennis III, Yanong Woods, Abner Garcia, Louis Carrasquillo, Jonathan 
Stewart, Johnny Butler, David McCray, Winstone DeLaney, Stephen Triplett, 
Jaime Williams, Dontae Roberts, Cortez Tate, Demarco Kennedy, Julius Coleman, 
Andre Jackson, Anthony Hatchett, Erik Williams, John Hosey Jr., Cory Hughes, 
Denzell Mickiel, Ireal Mitchell, Michael Lucas, William Villa, Lee Martin, Corey 
Buckner, Luis Marin, Everick Coleman, Victor Alvarado, Mario Venegas Jr., 
Maurice Selvy, Miguel Bahena, Delance Price, Toryius Keefer, Penny Gearhart, 
David Plank Sr., Michael Montgomery, Ronnie Hutchen, Donta Lee, Miguel Diaz, 
Jeffrey Arnold Jr., Trinyce Sanders-Wilson, Latrell Gipson, Roy Bergman, 
Marteace Rhone, Denear Scott, Jonathan Lane, Paul Farlinger, Mbiganyi Lashani, 
Demarius Roseman, Demetrius Paskel, Jessica Williams, Kayana Ormond, Denzell 
Childs, Keith Jackson, Africa Bass, Keyon Boyd, Vincent Davis Sr., Jonathan 
Mills, Taylon Hughes, Gregory Chacon, Katana Greenlee, Jesus Martinez Jr., 




Kyara Newell, Jamie Varvaris, Anthony Nicholas, Kashawan Johnson, Darrell 
Peden, Artivis Gladney, Carlos Harding, Raygene Jackson, Chureno Gatewood, 
Lloyd  Daniel, Trevon Smith, Rachee Williams, Clarence King, Sydni Murray, 
Bryan Cooley, Clarence Jones, Christopher Roberson, Marwan Sedeq, Anthony 
Thomas, Kenshon Ward, Rodney Phillips Orr, Daniel Watkins, James Moore, 
Silvestre Mejia Jr., Shemeki Heard, Demetrius Warren Glennell Fairley, Leander 
Winford II, Kendall Smith, Maurice Ross, Kewan Gillespie, Carlos DeLourdes, 
JQuinn McCune, Derion Smith, Laron McCoy, Mecahel Holder, Michael Griffin, 
Travon Clemmons, Willlie Pittman, Hector Badilo Jr., Kenneth Whitaker, Robert 
Vaughn, Chanda Foreman, Larry Lawrence, Marshawn Hilson, Darrell Guy Jr., 
Matusalem Dominguez-Gutierrez, Alfondia Kelly, Kentrail McCray, Dujuan 
Williams, Lonnie King, Frederick Johnson, Selton Ellis, Wondale Collier, Trayvon 
Wilson, Reginald Turner, Brandon Nolls, Jeremy Clark, Trevell Parker, Eric 
Burgin, Jessica Hampton, Stanley Boston, Amari Catchings, Ramal Hicks, Eugene 
Singleton, George Morgan Jr., Otis Richmond, Salvador Suarez, Carlton Hallom, 
Michael Brown, Alejandro Fuentes, Margaret Shanahan, Eric Smith, Eric Knox, 
Latrell McMahon, Charles Wiley, Melvin Cook, Renee Showers, Victor Robinson, 
Demetrius Archer, Angelo Davis, Denzel Thornton, Jeremy Rogers, Antonio 
Perkins, Steven Edwards, Darryl Ferguson, Antoine Randle, Davion Barron, 
Adrian Watson, Jordan Liggins, Angelique McClellan, Dwayne Triplett, Antwon 
Brooks, Javil Nunn, Christopher Fields, Travell Montgomery, Terry Bates Jr., 
Jeremy Ray, Paul Webster, Lewis Johnson, Lanorris Webster, Anreco Nichols, 
Anthony Williams, Sami Salaymeh, Carmen Venegas, Dontay Murray Jr., Kori  
Sellers, Bryson Holman, William Palmer, Darnell Hardeman, Anthony Howard, 
Daniel Alcantana, Henry McCann Jr., Christian Bandemer, Jamaal Bellamy, 
Kaysar Chako, Marshawn Clinkscale, Victor Felix, Kevin Atkins, Fabian 
Lavinder, Johan Jean, James Taylor, Dora Corbin, James Harris, Pamela Johnson, 
Garvin Whitmore, Damien Cionzynski, Veronica Lopez, Mark Lindsey, Shawn 
Ewing, Kevin Larry, Marshawn Cooper, Gerald Sias, Trevonne Austin, Gregory 
Carr, David Easley, Michael Wickliffe, Semial Sigle, Yvonne Nelson, Prince 
Wilson, Damarcus Williams, Marcus Patrick, Romaine May, James Hooks, Eric 
Nieves, Ashraf Sennouni, Maurice Johnston, Eric O'Reilly, Stacey Flukes, Willie 
Jones, Frank Hill Jr., Marco Mendez, Camille Cooley, Dekayla Dansberry, Albert 
Hurd, Kevin Milton, Mark Vargas, Michael Harmon, Lee McCollum III, Kiara 
Kinard, Jerome Wright, Makeesha Starks, Ira Cotton, Deangelo Diggines, Marquel 
Sharp, Jeremy Hosey, Michael Cunningham, Ladarrius Jackson, Kimble Knox, 
Deshawn Thompson, Nathan Hicks, Kourtney  Young, Keon Lewis, Najee 
Williams, Andres Rivera, Michael Montgomery, Carl Handley, Terrell Burkhart, 
Eddy Brooks, D'Andre Johnson, Devon Watson, Timothy Hill, Jesus Juarez, 
Jeremy Parker, Antonio White, Robert Rosenau, Randle Young, Leonardo 
Betancourt, Willie Pratt, Karina Soria-Bautista, Guadalupe Dean, Deitrick Stogner, 
Lamar Watson, Glenn Wheeler, Pierre Johnson, Davharea Wilson, Davon Barrett, 
Devin Hamb, Justin Bowman, Darrell Wilson, Tiara Parks, Gino Carrasco, 
Kenneth Allen, Kimberly Schnackenberg, Jason Napoles, Michael Williams Jr., 
Damond Dawson, Frederick Blount, Andrew Haynes, Pierre Payne, Raymond 
Prior IV, Davon Spivey, Arturo Pina, Rhonda Stevenson, Dennis Bradford III, 
Lauren Membreno, Ramon Ramirez, Johnathan Sanchez, Diangelo, Black, 
Deandre Trotter, Marcus Smith, Marvin Lee, Gerwancey Rambus, Aurelio 
Guzman, Babette Miller, Anthony Heatherly, Angel Ortiz Jr., Petro Rymar, 
William George, Demetrius Tolliver, Dejenaba Altman, Mario Guzman, Luis 




Mosley, Andrew Love, Antonio Johnson, Mario Ramirez Jr., Armani Dickinson, 
Jarvis Coleman, Alcarez Reyes, Marcus Smith, Christian Ortiz, Marteace Tiffith, 
Jeanette Laureano, Lorenzo Lancaster, Tyree Grant, Lucas Spicer, Kenneth Brown, 
Victor Navarrette, Antoine Crowder, Charis Eaton Jr., Taylor Flowers, Marvelle 
Arnold, Andre Taylor, Ricardo Montes, William Smith, Terall Adams, Orlando 
Porter, Paul Woods, Askie Wajd, Ronald Thomas, Cesar Perez, Daysha Wright, 
Gerardo Rodriguez, Maurice Cavin, Wavey Brown, Courtney Copeland, Darrin 
Joss, Tommie Pledge, Natyia Bowen, William Bustos, Frederick Brown, Eric 
Henry Jr., Shari Graham, Djuan Williams,, Shawndale Neal Diamond Garner, 
Jesus Reyes-Ortiz, Nicholas Robinson, Kamil Shamji, Carlos Hemphill Jr., 
Raheem Robinson, Maricela Villegas, Brian Johnson, Terrell Sykes, Richard 
Thrasher, Tiana Brown, Jonathan Luna, Iaron Brooks, Rashawn Gooden Jr., 
Steven Tate, Jeremy Hunter, Lawrence Campbell III, Terrell Peters, Vincent Avila, 
Latania Anderson, Lorenzo Garcia, Reginald Bonner, Lazane Clark, Hassan 
Childs, James Lewis, Aaren O'Connor, Marques Gaines, Dwight Hughes Jr., 
Matthew Williams, Tony Jones, John Mackey, Rosaura Martinez, Leonardo Cruz, 
Noe Martinez Jr., Alexis Cruz, Noe Martinez Sr., Maria Martinez, Maria Ramos, 
Martel Anderson, Hector Del Rio, Metabias Biles, Paul Sappington, Edward 
Flowers, Roberto Sanchez, Alan Garcia, Charles Smith, Reginald Brown, Floyd 
Hodges, DeMarrow Stephens, Damon Allen Jr., Martice White, Algie Ferguson, 
Jermiron Morris, Allen Levin, Lester Weatherspoon, Robert Howard Jr., Cory 
Brown, Ricardo Villanueva, Claude Cannon, Senclair Hill, Torrance Dortch, David 
Martinez ,Trevon Stiger, Davon Horace, Orlando McArther, Alphonzo Guinyard, 
Derrius Larres, Courtney Taylor, Juan Gonzalez, Deante Dale, Martell Howard, 
Lionel Williams, Giovani Salgado, Rene Ramirez, Henry  Cruz, Quintae Little, 
Corey Ferguson, George Anderson, Michael Fernandez, Phillip Dupree, Elliott 
Brown, Antonio Pollards, Ronell Andrews, William Larson, Keshawn Marzette, 
Erick Lacey, Matthew Ehrenberg, Darius Brown, Raymon Blount, Pablo Ulloa, 
David Gonzalez, Erskin Palm, Franklin Aguilar, Ronald Clarke, Jonathan Jimenez, 
Sakinah Reed, Donta Porter, Georgio Byrd Jr., Jose Rodriguez, Jeffrey Mattix Jr., 



















APPENDIX C: THE CHICAGO INVESTIGATIVE STOP RECEIPT 
 
